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Mass protests have been an important part of the political environment in Eastern Europe for 
more than a century. Since the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, people have turned to 
urban spaces to make their opinions heard and to demand change, with varying degrees of 
success. This was most notably the case during the 1960s; and from the beginning of the end 
of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, through a wave of what are commonly referred to as 
colour revolutions in the 2000s, to the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution of 2013–2014. 
Contention in urban spaces continues to affect politics in the region. How are such mass protests 
affected by the urban public space in which they occur? 
Based on a contextualisation of protest space and a review of the academic literature on protests 
and urban space, this article-based thesis identifies a gap in the literature and then goes on to 
describe the development of a theoretical model to analyse city spaces, based on the use of 
theories from political science, urban planning, and sociology. The approach consists of a 
mapping of the causal mechanisms between spatial elements, the political environment, and 
their combined effect on protests. This mapping is applied to three case studies—a prestudy of 
Kyiv, a transitional study of Minsk and the main test-study of Moscow—written for three 
different academic journals at three different periods in the study’s development. 
In addition to the spatial perspective model, this thesis provides new insights as to how the 
interactions in space occur, and demonstrates how geography can create limitations and 
opportunities in a large variety of ways. It also contributes a language and a typology for use in 
the studies of opposition movements and collective actions. 
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A note on language 
This thesis describes events, people, and places mainly from three Eastern Slavic countries: 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Each of these countries uses the Cyrillic script and has its own 
national language, as well as linguistic variations encompassing proper nouns: yet, for historical 
reasons, Russian has become the lingua franca of the region. The long history of Russian 
hegemony and long periods of russification have also led to the widespread international 
adoption of Russian forms for Ukrainian and Belarusian proper nouns. For these reasons, the 
Ukrainian capital is usually known as Kiev (from Rus. Киев), rather than Kyiv (from Ukr. Київ). 
Likewise, the Belarusian president is known as Lukashenko (Rus.: Лукашенко), not 
Lukashėnka (Bel.: Лукашенка); while the conflict region in Eastern Ukraine is known as 
Donbass (Russian: Донбасс), not Donbas (Ukrainian: Донбас). Conversely, some proper 
nouns are known by their national variants, as is the case with the current Ukrainian president 
Volodymyr Zelenskyi (Ukr.: Володимир Зеленський), not Vladimir Zelenskii (Rus.: Владимир 
Зеленский), and Hrodna for the town in Western Belarus (Bel.: Гродна), rather than Grodno 
(Rus.: Гродно). 
Scholars are often advised to use the transliterations most predominant in English, as these are 
most recognisable to the majority of readers. Yet such a language policy often leads to 
inconsistencies, and readers asking why some proper nouns are based on the Russian forms 
while others are not. As far as I can see, there are only two solutions to this problem. Either the 
scholar consistently and exclusively transliterates from the relevant Russian forms; or, 
conversely, they transliterate all proper nouns from the local languages. The former solution is 
often used because it is more consistent with the predominant name forms in English. (Another 
reason might be that most scholars within the field have a level of proficiency in Russian, but 
limited knowledge of the other two languages). The choice of Russian could additionally be 
justified by the large prevalence of Russophone speakers in all three countries. Although there 
is a precedent for the former solution in East Slavic area studies, the latter is not unheard-of, 
and scholars such as the Canadian historian David R. Marples (2004) and the British political 
scientist Taras Kuzio (2005) use the national variants of proper nouns. 
I have chosen the latter option. Thus, the transliterations of proper nouns found in this thesis 
reflect their national origins. The reader will also encounter proper nouns that are less frequently 
used, such as Kyiv and Lukashėnka (rather than Kiev and Lukashenko). However, I have 
retained the familiar variants of some terms and proper nouns in order to avoid confusion (e.g. 
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Kievan Rus’, not Kievskaia Rus’ from Rus. Киевская Русь; or Kyïvs’ka Rus’ from Ukr. 
Київська Русь). 
I have used the ALA-LC Romanisation tables from The Library of Congress for all Ukrainian, 
Belarusian, and Russian words, with some exceptions. Whilst letters such as ï, ĭ, ė, ë, ŭ are 
unobtrusive and easy to integrate, I have avoided confusing typographic ligatures, such as i͡ e 
for the Russian е and the Ukrainian є, t͡ s for the letter ц, i͡ u for ю, and i͡ a for я. Thus, the previous 
Ukrainian president is spelled Ianukovych, not I͡Anukovych. Similarly, I have kept some 
internationally recognised variants that are too omnipresent to change: for example, the former 
Russian president is Boris Yeltsin rather than Ieltsin (or, with ligatures, I͡Elt͡ sin). 
Three journals – three styles 
Since this is an article-based thesis consisting of these introductory chapters and three articles 
written for three different academic journals, there are some significant linguistic and stylistic 
differences between them. Most notably, the first article (Hansen, 2016) is written in 
Norwegian, while the latter two (Hansen, 2017; 2019) are written in English. All three journals 
follow different style manuals for translation and transliteration. 
Moreover, articles 1 and 2 were published in journals with a high proportion of Slavist readers, 
and thus use the Romanised forms of original-language place names. Conversely, article 3 is 
submitted to a journal with a significant portion of non-Slavist readers, and place names are 
therefore translated into English (e.g. Swamp Square, not Bolotnaia ploshchad’). For 
consistency’s sake, I will use the translated forms of place names in these introductory chapters 
(i.e. October Square, not Kastryhnitskaia). A notable exception is Maidan (Ukr.: square), which 
is used both instead of the longer original (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) and the translation 
(Independence Square), the reason being that Maidan has become a widely recognised word in 
the West, even among non-Slavists. 
For the reader’s convenience, the first article is translated from Norwegian into English, 
following the same style manual as article 3. When referred to in these introductory chapters, 
the first number in parentheses is from the Norwegian article, while the second is from the 
English translation (e.g. Hansen, 2016, p. 120/3). 
All translations are my own unless stated otherwise.
Starting point 
 1 
1 Starting point 
Went to Kyiv […] metro still closed […] Got around the police blockades easily. […] I 
returned to the Maidan. Still felt like a safe place. 
Kyiv, 20th February 2014 
This excerpt is from one of the numerous field notes I made during the final days of the 
Ukrainian revolution (2013–2014). I was studying the events in Kyiv for a research project in 
East Slavic area studies (Hansen, 2015), and went to the iconic site of the protests, Maidan 
(Independence Square), to observe the scene after the latest clashes between police and 
protesters. The contention in Kyiv had started three months earlier in response to the 
government’s sudden U-turn away from EU integration, and it had rapidly changed into a broad 
movement against the incumbent president Ianukovych. The conflict escalated into violence 
and, by this point, many people had been killed. 
I arrived at Maidan for the second time that day at approximately four or five o’clock in the 
afternoon. At the time, rumour had it that 780 protesters had been killed over the previous 24 
hours.1 The city was in a state of shock, and there was much uncertainty as to what would 
happen next. Yet, for some reason, I felt quite safe where I was standing. 
I knew Maidan well: the entrances and exits, the many tunnels underneath, the seemingly 
random monuments mixed with intrusive advertising boards, kiosks, and architecture from all 
periods of Ukraine’s Soviet and post-Soviet past. Many times over the previous three months, 
I had wondered why this particular space had become the symbol of protest in Ukraine. Now, 
during these final days of the revolution, it was evident that the authorities had been unable to 
clear the square and stop protesters (or curious people like me) from entering it, despite 
numerous road blocks and a heavy riot police presence. Strangely, I also noticed that, even 
though everything was uncertain and no one knew whether the authorities would launch another 
attack, it didn’t feel particularly frightening to be where I was standing. If anything, I figured, 
I could always find a way out. 
It became apparent to me then that Maidan was a very suitable place for protest, although I 
could not define precisely why. 
 
1 The Ukrainian Ministry of Health later announced that the actual number of those killed was 82 (“Informatsia 
pro postrazhdalykh,” 2014). 
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Figure 1: Maidan, Kyiv, 20th February 2014. Photo: Arve Hansen 
Maidan is merely one of several examples of a town square that has turned into a location of 
great political significance. Actions and events spring immediately to mind at the mere mention 
of the Bastille, Red Square, Taksim or Tahrir. We associate these places with the making of 
history: places where revolutions have been started, dictators ousted, or rebellions crushed. 
Central urban spaces can thus create powerful imagery, and we intuitively understand that space 
has importance. Yet how are massive collective actions, such as the latest Ukrainian revolution, 
affected by urban public space? Or, to put it another way, how does urban space facilitate and/or 
inhibit public protests? These questions led me to the current study. 
— 
This article-based thesis describes the development of a spatial perspective on mass protests, a 
model which has been applied to three case studies: Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow. It consists of 
seven introductory chapters and three articles, two of which have been published (Hansen, 
2016, 2017) and one more submitted for publication (Hansen, 2019). These and a translation of 
the first article (from Norwegian into English) are attached to this document (see appendices 1, 
2, 3, and 4). 
Starting point 
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Chapter 2 opens with a contextualisation of space and its central position in human society 
since the prehistoric era. It outlines a history of contention in urban public spaces, and explains 
why public spaces in the East Slavic region form the topic of this thesis. 
Having established that urban public space has both a historic and a contemporary relevance, 
chapter 3 provides a systematic review, in two sections, of the existing research on protests and 
space. The first section (3.1) includes general theories within sociology and political science, 
and research on the specific conditions necessary for a collective action or revolution to occur. 
The second (3.2) looks at the various research on public (philosophy), physical (architecture, 
urban planning, geography), and contested space (urbanism). In the third section (3.3), an 
existing gap in the available research is identified. Even if connections between space and 
protest are identified in the research literature, and from a variety of perspectives, none of the 
publications surveyed provide a systematic and generalised approach to the analysis of this 
causal relationship. 
Chapter 4 continues the discussion of chapter 3 by providing two key definitions of mass 
protests (4.1) and urban public space (4.2), before stating the primary and secondary research 
questions of this thesis in full (4.3). 
The theorising and development of the spatial perspective, from the conception of an idea to a 
complete theoretical model, are described in chapter 5. This includes the theory and approaches 
to theorising applied during the various stages of the model’s development (5.1), and some of 
the ethical considerations taken into account during the process (5.2), as well as my main 
reservation about developing a theory with a focus on geography. From this starting point, the 
development of the model is traced from its beginnings (5.4) through different stages of 
theorising and testing (5.5) to a description of the causal chains between urban space and mass 
protests employed in the final model (5.6). The project’s three research articles were written in 
parallel with the model’s development, and thus also reflect the various stages of the process. 
The first article is described as a prestudy (5.5.1), the second as a transitional study (5.5.3), and 
the third as the main study, demonstrating how the spatial perspective can be applied in its 
current form (5.7). 
The causal mechanisms described in chapter five are explicated in chapter 6, including the 
model’s independent (6.1), intermediary (6.2), and dependent variables (6.3). 
Chapter 7 provides a final demonstration of the spatial perspective as applied to Republic 
Square (Place de la République), Paris, during a demonstration there on 6 January 2019 by the 
Mass Protests from a Spatial Perspective 
 4 
Yellow Vests (Fr.: Mouvement des gilets jaunes). The case study is used to demonstrate how 
the research questions outlined in chapter 4 have been answered, and forms the basis for arguing 
that the model can be used as a tool and a language to discuss spaces of contention and to 
provide new insights into the study of social movements and mass protests. Following a brief 
review of the contents, findings, and utility of this thesis, I then suggest a few ways in which 
the spatial perspective can be developed further. 
Space in context 
 5 
2 Space in context 
Human beings are cognitive creatures. We experience the world around us through our external 
sensory input, such as touch, smell, and sight, which our brains interpret based on our 
experiences, memory, and thoughts. One fundamental aspect of the experienced world is space 
and, consciously or subconsciously, we never stop interpreting the physical environment 
around us. This does not imply that we are necessarily aware of how this analysis is done, or 
even that it is being done in the first place. We often are unable to appreciate the full extent and 
impact of it or to explain how it works to a third party. Nevertheless, we are instinctively aware 
of our surroundings, sense their uses, opportunities, dangers, and risks, and adapt our behaviour 
accordingly.2  
This keen sense of place has probably played a vital part in the survival of our species. When 
our early hominid ancestors, millions of years ago, entered new ground, instincts would be 
activated to provide information about the possibilities and dangers that particular space might 
provide. Exploring a new location, an individual would be sensitive to whether the space made 
them feel relaxed and safe, or alert and uneasy. 
Over time, as the human capacity for social interaction evolved, space would come to be 
perceived not just as a place that might provide food and a chance to eat (or, conversely, a threat 
of being attacked and eaten), but also as a location for the increasingly complex social 
interactions between individuals within a group. Thus, the instinctive human perception of 
space would come to include information about other people and about the social interactions 
and relations occurring in that space. A newly arrived individual would, for example, soon 
sense whether this was a place to eat, relax, converse, and mate, or to be on its guard against 
other individuals in the group. It would know—with little conscious effort—where its allies 
and friends were, find the possible exits, sense whether it belonged in the group, and locate 
itself strategically according to its position in the social hierarchy: whether funny, loud, and 
boastful at the centre of the group, or reserved, quiet, and humble near one of the exits. 
Individuals who were oblivious to such social space would probably end up as outcasts, or 
worse, killed. 
 
2 This way of thinking about human nature has its roots back in the cognitive turn of the mid 1950s. At this time, 
sciences such as psychology, linguistics, and anthropology began distancing themselves from the traditional way 
of looking at the mind and body as separate entities; and the new cognitive sciences moved towards a more 
integrated interpretation of the human mind, which sees most aspects of the human body (and possibly the 
environment in which it moves) as interrelated (Miller, 2003; Núñez & Cooperrider, 2013; Thagard, 2018). 
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According to the Australian anthropologist Terrence Twomey (2014), our discovery and 
domestication of fire hundreds of thousands, perhaps even over a million years ago (Gowlett, 
2016) probably facilitated the evolution of human cooperation. Twomey explains how making 
a fire and keeping it going was a costly endeavour, yet the result was a good from which all the 
individuals in a group could greatly benefit. Hence, the domestication of fire would stimulate 
cooperation (Twomey, 2014). We could therefore imagine that, for groups of hunter-gatherers 
in prehistoric times, the campfire would become one of the first dedicated spaces for social 
interaction. Here, people would flock together not only to eat and sleep in the relative safety 
from predators, insects, and cold weather, but also to process past events, discuss gains and 
risks, and make a plan of action for the day to come. 
After the Neolithic Revolution of approximately 10 000 BCE, humans gradually started to live 
in fixed settlements and the new agricultural technology laid the foundation for explosive 
population growth (Bellwood & Oxenham, 2008). In the new and increasingly urban setting, 
the locations of social interaction and planning would probably move from the campfire into 
urban spaces, such as marketplaces, town squares, or other focal points of growing villages and 
cities. We can find archaeological evidence from the Bronze and Iron ages, for instance, which 
indicate that social and deliberative spaces were valued to such an extent that they were 
formalised as various forms of political institutions. Popular assemblies in urban space could 
be found in the Ancient Greek Agora (Anc. Greek.: ἀγορά), the Roman Forum Romanum, and 
the Slavic Veche (Rus.: вече); or, conversely, in the outskirts of settlements, such as the 
Scandinavian Thing (Icel.: þing). 
However, urban spaces have some significant limitations as formal places of deliberation and 
public administration. Notably, the central plaza of a large city may not have enough physical 
space available for all people to attend, and large groups of people are often at risk of being 
affected by demagoguery. For these and other reasons, in most societies, public organisation 
moved into the remit of formal political institutions. Yet the cities’ urban spaces have remained 
as necessary parts of the landscape, needed in order for people to move from one place to 
another. Additionally, they function as places for trade, recreation, and social interaction. Urban 
spaces are often the location of joyful activities such as festivals and public entertainments, but 
also, sometimes, of floggings and executions. Some rulers might use the city’s focal point to 
display their might, too—for instance, in the form of army drills and parades. Moreover, 
although the majority of formal decisions now occur in buildings, the potential use value of 
Space in context 
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urban space for people to discuss, deliberate, and decide on a course of action has not gone 
away. 
Throughout human history, people have tended to congregate in central places in times of 
trouble. Such gatherings sometimes occur on the initiative of rulers to collectively find a 
solution to a shared problem (such as how to respond to an imminent invasion or the death of a 
prince). Yet, every so often, the ruling elites are themselves perceived as the problem, and the 
urban squares and marketplaces might be seized by the people and turned into arenas of 
opposition. 
 
Figure 2: Althing, Iceland (Icel.: Alþingi). The country’s form of popular assembly was first located on Thingvellir 
(the Assembly Fields, Icel.: Þingvellir)/Lögberg in the tenth century CE. Photo: Andrei Rogatchevski. 
2.1 Complexities of urban contention  
Urban contention has a large number of aspects, and several of these are discussed in the next 
chapter. But there are three ways to look at and categorise urban collective actions that should 
be mentioned here to provide the reader with a sense of the complexity of the phenomenon: 1) 
the various forms of urban contention, 2) the motivations people have for action: and, 3) the 
local, regional, and global tendencies or waves of contention of which the collective action is 
part. 
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2.1.1 Form 
One form of urban contention is the violent mob, wholly or partially controlled by powerful 
individuals such as politicians, religious leaders, and oligarchs. The mob has often been used 
as a tool to incite violence in cities against political opponents and so change the political 
landscape. In the Ancient Roman Republic, for example, groups of discontented plebeians often 
became an important force in the frequent (and often violent) transitions of power (Brunt, 
1966). Another example might be the veche (popular assembly) of the Medieval East Slavic 
Novgorod Republic (1136–1478), where the crowd were often more powerful than their prince. 
Historical chronicles recount how the Novgorodians, under heavy influence from wealthy 
boyars, sometimes removed ineffective leaders by force (Paul, 2008; Evtuhov, Goldfrank, 
Hughes & Stites, 2004, pp. 88–89). 
Urban contention can also be seen in the uncontrolled violent crowd which, under pressure, 
stands up to the ruling elites and overthrows them in violent riots, uprisings, and revolutions. 
The French Revolution (1789–1799) is a particularly prominent example because it shows how 
space can both foster discontent and provide a suitable environment for insurgencies.3 
Conversely, urban discontent can manifest as nonviolent protests, such as the 1913 Women’s 
Suffrage Parade on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C. (Lumsden, 2000), or the 1919 
May Fourth Movement at Tiananmen Square in Beijing (Wasserstrom, 2005). 
2.1.2 Motivation 
Another way to look at urban contention is by considering the motivation for the action. The 
US is a fitting example to illustrate that urban contention can have a wide range of different 
motives, ranging from a wish to improve living conditions, e.g. the Great Railroad Strike of 
1877 (DeMichele, 2008), to the many movements against wars and military interventions (see 
for example the protests against the war in Vietnam [“Vietnam Veterans,” 2019], and in Iraq 
[Chan, 2003]). Cities in the US have also seen multiple protests for the equal rights of oppressed 
groups in society, such as the 1969 Stonewall Riots and the birth of the Gay Rights Movement 
(Kuhn, 2011), the feminist movements of the 1970s (Spain, 2016), and the more recent Black 
Lives Matter protests (Karduni, 2017); collective actions aimed at causing harm, such as 
 
3 The revolution erupted in 1789 with the storming of the Bastille, a symbol of monarchical oppression, and was 
fuelled by the poverty and sickness created in the overcrowded and unsanitary districts of Paris. Moreover, the 
insurgency was possible in no small part due to barricades raised in the city’s narrow and easily defendable streets 
and alleys (Doyle, 1989, pp. 178-191; Traugott, 1993; Wilde, 2018). 
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racially motivated violence in Southern US cities (Olzak, 1990); religiously inspired protests, 
such as the Washington for Jesus rally in 1980 (Flippen, 2011, pp. 1–23), and social movements 
against economic inequality, such as the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protest movement (Gillham, 
Edwards & Noakes, 2013). 
2.1.3 Waves 
A third approach to urban discontent is to see it as waves that come and go, sweeping through 
periods in history, changing power structures and the layout of societies. A large number of 
such waves of contention have occurred throughout history in cities across the globe. In Eastern 
Europe, for example, we can identify at least four waves, shown here together with their 
political aftermath: 
1917 
Eastern Europe did not become part of the three European waves of revolution of the 1820s, 
1830s and 1840s that followed in the aftermath of the French Revolution. But the radical new 
ideas of European thinkers, combined with the grievances of war and deep inequality in society, 
turned into a series of urban uprisings in the Russian Empire and eventually into the October 
Revolution of 1917. The Soviet Union was created in the aftermath of this revolution.4 
1950s and 1960s 
The second wave of urban discontent in Eastern Europe started during the period of thaw 
introduced by Nikita Khrushchev in the aftermath of Stalin’s death in 1953. A series of mass 
protests against poor standards of living and political repressions broke out in the streets and 
squares of major cities in the Eastern Bloc. Notably, uprisings and demonstrations occurred in 
1953 on Leipziger Straße in Berlin (Ostermann & Byrne, 2001, pp. 163–165), in 1956 on Adam 
Mickiewicz Square in Poznań (Grzelczak, n.d., pp. 98–101) and on Kossuth Lajos Square in 
 
4 At its peak, in the 1960s and 70s, the Soviet Union covered a sixth of the planet’s landmass, controlled the 
world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and dominated the Warsaw Pact military alliance. This alliance was created as a 
counterweight to NATO in May 1955 and consisted of the 15 Soviet Republics in the USSR as well as Albania 
(until 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This group of republics 
and countries is referred to as the Eastern Bloc. 
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Budapest, also in 1956.5 The public spaces of cities in several of the Warsaw Pact countries 
also featured in the worldwide protest movements of 1968, four years after the thaw ended. 6 
1985 to 1991 
From the second half of the 1980s, triggered by the 1986 glasnost (transparency/openness) and 
perestroika (restructuring) reform policies, urban protests started to appear in the Eastern Bloc. 
In the Baltics, for example, protesters actively used music in what would later be known as the 
Singing Revolution of 1987–1991 (Smidchens, 2014). Opponents of the Soviet regime 
organised numerous concerts in city centres and formed a human chain between the three 
capitals, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, to demonstrate their unity in their discontent with the USSR 
(2014, p. 249). These actions inspired similar protests, notably in Ukraine (Hansen, 
Rogatchevski, Steinholt & Wickström, 2019, pp. 36–37). Between 1989 and 1991, the Warsaw 
Pact gradually fell apart as series of both nonviolent and violent anti-communist revolutions 
occurred in capital cities across the Eastern Bloc. Notable events include masses of East 
Germans tearing down the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the failed military coup of 
August 1991, which was partly stopped by the masses of people who went out into the public 
spaces of Moscow and other Russian cities (Marples, 2004, p. 84). The Soviet Union was 
dissolved later that same year. 
2000s 
Following a somewhat chaotic decade in the 1990s,7 a new wave of social movements and mass 
protests hit the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia in the 2000s (see fig. 3). Inspired by 
 
5 The Hungarian student protests turned into a revolution and triggered a Soviet military intervention the same 
year, resulting in “more than 3,000 dead and 13,000 injured as well as over 4,000 destroyed buildings. Actual 
losses were probably higher” (Hoensch, 1984, p. 219). 
6 1968 is a year famous for the amount of urban protests worldwide. In the West, public spaces were occupied by 
demonstrators in London, Madrid, Mexico, Paris, Rome, West Berlin and numerous other cities; and the social 
movements of that year showed that even seemingly stable democracies can burst into protests, riots, and even 
revolutions (see Kurlansky, 2005.). While people in the West were largely protesting in the name of equality and 
socialism, the protests in the East demanded political freedoms and increased autonomy from the Soviet Union. 
When the Kremlin ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to stop the Prague government’s new reform 
programme, thousands of Prague-dwellers took to the streets to protest. A number of demonstrations in support of 
the Czechoslovaks appeared in cities across the Soviet Union, too, including at Red Square in Moscow 
(Wojnowski, 2018, p. 85; Bichof, Karner & Ruggenthaler, 2010; Kondrashova, 2018). 
7 In Eastern Europe, the 1990s are often known by the Russian term Likhie devianostye, which can be translated 
into English as the Wild Nineties. The period got this label due to the chaos that followed the Soviet Union’s 
collapse. The 15 newly born post-Soviet states had to reorient their economic models towards a new reality and 
create new political systems while struggling with severe scarcity of consumer goods and social security, explosive 
crime rates, rampant corruption, and uncontrolled privatisation. At the same time, wars and uprisings for 
independence broke out frequently in the Caucasus (notably in Abkhazia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and South-Ossetia) and in the Transnistria Region of Moldova, triggering several, often 
unpopular, military interventions by Russia and other countries. Just when the economic situation started to 
recover, the 1997 financial crisis in Asia hit the former Soviet Union hard, particularly Russia and its trade partners 
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the Eastern European protests of the late 1980s, the demonstrators used nonviolent means to 
occupy central public squares in capital cities. The protests were often triggered by election 
fraud, and they demanded (and often achieved) the resignation of the elites that had managed 
to hold on to power after the breakup of the Eastern Bloc. The social movements of the 2000s 
are usually known as colour revolutions, with reference to the bright colours and symbols 
employed by the protesters. Although not in the former Soviet Union, the Yugoslavian 
Bulldozer Revolution, which overthrew President Slobodan Milošević in 2000, is often 
regarded as the first of the colour revolutions (e.g. by Tucker, 2005). 
Year Country Focal point Name(s) Result 















Forceful removal of protesters, 
legal retributions against 







New presidential elections. 




Resignation of President 
Akayev, new presidential 
elections. 






Some concessions. “[O]fficial 
results for 7 or 8 of 125 
parliamentary seats [were] 
annulled.” (Chivers, 2005) 





Forceful removal of the protest 
camp, legal retributions against 
protesters and protest organisers.  





Forceful removal of the protest 
camp, protesters killed, legal 
retributions against protesters 
and protest organisers. 





New parliamentary elections, 
resignation of President Voronin. 
Figure 3: Notable protests and colour revolutions in post-Soviet states in the 2000s. 
— 
 
Ukraine and Belarus. It should be noted that the Russian authorities support the use of the term Likhie devianostye, 
as it focuses on the negative aspects of the unstable decade between the Soviet Union (stability) and Putin (new 
stability), although for many Eastern Europeans, the decade was seen as one of freedom and possibilities rather 
than anarchy (see for example Rusin, 2016; Boldyrev, 2018; Osipov-Gipsh, 2019) 
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The above three categories (form, motivation, waves) are not intended to be exhaustive, but to 
illustrate that “urban contention” is a multifaceted term with historic and contemporary 
relevance to most regions in the world. The following section serves two purposes: 1) to provide 
a justification for choosing Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow as case studies for the three articles in 
this study; and 2) to show that space and protests are important factors which have affected, 
and continue to affect, the political situation in the East Slavic area. 
2.2 Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia 
Since this study is limited by a number of factors, such as time, funding, and space available, 
the project has been narrowed down geographically. These introductory chapters and the three 
article case studies are limited to the capital cities of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia for three 
main reasons. Firstly, the three countries have many similarities. Secondly, despite these 
similarities, there are some interesting differences between the respective national opposition 
movements. Finally, two outside factors have pushed me to select these cases. 8 I shall return to 
these shortly. 
Furthermore, each case study has also been geographically limited to one or two urban public 
spaces, as the word limitations provided by the journal article format rarely allow for more. The 
choices and delimitations for each case study are discussed more thoroughly in each of the three 
articles. 
Similarities 
Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow are the capital cities of the countries often referred to as the Slavic 
Triangle (see e.g. Godin, 2014), a term originating from the countries’ shared history. The 
territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia each cover parts of Kievan Rus’ (approx. 882–1240), 
the Tsardom of Russia (1547–1722), and the Russian Empire (1722–1917), and they were all 
signatories to the Treaty of the Creation of the USSR in 1922, which was dissolved in 1991 by 
the collective decision of the three heads of state. In post-Soviet times, the three countries have 
struggled with many of the same obstacles: a brutal transition from planned to market economy, 
widespread corruption, autocratic leadership, popular discontent, etc. Moreover, there are 
strong ethnic, linguistic, cultural, political, architectural, economic, and criminal similarities 
and bonds between the three countries. 
 
8 The justification for the choice of the article-based thesis format is explained in section 5.1. 
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Differences 
However, the differences between the three countries are significant, too. Ukraine was one of 
the countries upended by a revolution in the 2000s, as the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005 
resulted in regime change. Conversely, Belarus and Russia avoided becoming part of the wave 
of colour revolutions.9 This tendency repeated itself in the 2010s, as protests in Minsk and 
Moscow at the start of the decade all ended badly for the protesters,10 whilst the latest Ukrainian 
revolution of 2013–2014, centred on Maidan in downtown Kyiv, led to regime change for the 
second time in nine years.11 Today, protests continue to exert an influence on local and regional 
politics.12 
Moreover, whereas the opposition in Kyiv has Maidan as an urban space designated for protest, 
the opposition in Minsk has very limited access to the city’s urban spaces; and in Moscow, 
although the authorities do allow protests, they carefully select which spaces to sanction for 
such actions, most probably to restrict the impact of the protests. 
Outside factors 
This study forms part of a research group studying Russian space (broadly understood to 
include Belarus and Ukraine).13 I have also lived in each country for an extended period of time 
 
9 In Russia in 2000, the presidency changed from the unpopular, ageing and sickly Boris Yeltsin to the 
comparatively young, reasonably sober and physically very fit Vladimir Putin, who for several reasons enjoyed 
high levels of popularity well into the mid-to-late 2000s (Hansen, 2019, pp. 9–10). In Belarus, too, the economy 
had been growing since the early 2000s, and mass protests were mostly ideological (driven by Belarusian 
nationalists) or constitutional (against the policies of President Aliaksandr Lukashėnka). Yet none of these protests 
resulted in a colour revolution (Hansen, 2017, pp. 37–38). 
10 The 2006 protests in Minsk and the 2011–2012 protest movement in Moscow were suppressed so harshly that 
the opposition of both countries was effectively disabled for several years to come (Hansen, 2017, p. 43; Hansen, 
2019, pp. 1–2). In both cases, the protesters were met with violence, hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, and 
the leaders of the opposition received long prison sentences. 
11 The revolution has greatly affected both regional and global power politics. Russia has accused the EU and US 
of orchestrating what they perceive to be a coup d’état, and the Ukrainian revolution became Russia’s pretext for 
occupying the Crimean Peninsula and supporting the separatist movements in the Donbas region in Eastern 
Ukraine. Thus, the revolution indirectly became one of the triggering events for the deteriorating relations between 
Russia and the West today. 
12 Since 2014, protests in Ukraine have for the most part been aimed at the policies of President Petro Poroshenko 
(2013–2019) and President Volodymyr Zelenskyi (since 2019). In Belarus, little has changed, and protests are 
usually suppressed in much the same manner as before. In Russia, following the annexation of Crimea, a surge in 
patriotic sentiment led to members of the opposition being labelled traitors, and discontent has remained at low 
levels. Since 2016, there has been an upswing in public protests in the country. A variety of economic and social 
problems have motivated hundreds of thousands of Russians to participate in numerous collective actions in cities 
across the country (Hansen, 2019, p. 10). 
13 The research group RSCPR (Russian Space: Concepts, Practices, Representations) “is engaged in 
a multidisciplinary study of Russian attitudes to their own and other people’s/nations’ spaces […] 
which can provide insights into the interdependence of Russian space and Russian identity, both at an individual 
and a state policy level” (“Russian Space,” n.d.). Ukraine and Belarus are often (and especially in Russia) 
perceived as integral parts of a “Russian” world. 
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(in Belarus, 2006–2010; in Ukraine, the first half of 2011 and 2013–2017; in Russia, 2011–
2013). I thus have first-hand knowledge of, and a network of friends and acquaintances in, each 
of the three cities. 
2.3 Relevance 
Since prehistoric times, people have related by necessity to the intricacies of physical and social 
space, to the associations and emotions such spaces evoke, as well as to the possibilities and 
obstacles they provide. Even though our environment has changed, our basic human instincts 
are still active and, as in the prehistoric era, people congregate to discuss, deliberate, interact, 
and—in times of trouble—struggle together to find a solution to the problem. 
The small selection of collective actions mentioned in this chapter demonstrates that urban mass 
protest can be a means of changing society, used by people across the world. With the spread 
of social media, waves of protest can expand with increased speed, and the Internet has 
facilitated the extension of protest movements, such as the colour revolutions, the Arab Spring, 
the Occupy movement, and the Yellow Vests. However, although the Internet is available in 
and used by the majority of the world’s population, people still use physical space in order to 
protest. This is because the presence of a group of people assembled at a focal point of the city 
serves a number of purposes that are rarely served by collective online action. A physical protest 
shows that there is discontent in the city, and that people are willing to sacrifice time and effort 
to come out in support of their cause. 
I do not wish to undermine the power of the Internet as a tool for mobilising people to protest. 
Social media outlets clearly have several qualities suitable for facilitating and/or organising 
mass protest (see for example Herasimenka, 2016). Yet, for a collective action to be effective, 
it more often than not needs some form of physical manifestation. Urban protests occur where 
people are concentrated, and so are often hard to ignore. On one hand, citizens are forced to 
react to the protests as they obstruct movement and demand attention, and some might be 
inspired to join in. On the other, the authorities are also forced to react, and their reaction 
(whether by way of official statements, violence, or both) might further spread the news of 
discontent. Mass protest also represents a form of threat to the authorities. It might mean that 
people expect the authorities to change their ways, or else they will not vote for those in power 
again; and it might discourage others from doing so, too. It can also be a threat of violence, as 
a large group of discontented people has the potential of turning into a mob and removing the 
authorities by force. 
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Consequently, urban public space has both a historic and a contemporary relevance, and the 
ways in which people perceive and use space, especially at times of contention, still have an 
impact on local, regional, and global politics and society today. 
How are mass protests affected by geographical urban space in modern cities? To answer this 
question, it is first of all necessary to consult the research literature to see whether such a spatial 
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3 Mapping the field 
The previous chapter outlined some key aspects of space and contention. Historical and 
contemporary examples were cited to illustrate the important psychological and practical 
effects of urban space on mass actions. 
The aim of the current chapter is to provide a more detailed overview of academic publications 
concerned with space and/or protests. Starting from this proposition, two key questions may be 
asked: 1) What academic literature recognises and/or relates to the links between space and 
protests?; and 2) What approaches and concepts can be integrated into a theoretical model 
which examines the causal relationship between space and protest? To facilitate reading, the 
body of research literature is split into three main sections: literature on protests (3.1), literature 
on various types of space (3.2), and then a section that sums up the findings of this chapter and 
outlines a gap in the research literature (3.3). 
3.1 Protests 
Protest is a broad subject that has been approached by scholars from a range of academic 
disciplines. If theories on social movements are included, the amount of literature on protests 
becomes even greater. A good starting point to make sense of these broad categories is 
sociology, which is naturally concerned with the act of protest. 
In Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements by the German sociologist Karl-Dieter 
Opp (2009), six major theoretical perspectives on protests and social movements are defined 
and criticised. These are collective action theory (CAT), resource mobilisation perspective 
(RMP), political opportunity structure theory (POS), identity theory, framing perspective, and 
dynamics of contention approach (DOC). Opp describes these theories particularly with a view 
to the degree in which they present macro (i.e. structural) and micro (i.e. psychological) 
perspectives on social movements and protests, and how these are interlinked. His main point 
of critique is that the existing theoretical frameworks do not properly combine macro and micro 
factors in their attempts to explain protests (2009, p. 349). Opp’s proposed solution is a 
synthesis of the major theoretical approaches, which he calls the structure-cognitive model 
(SCM).14 
 
14 Opp’s structure-cognitive model has itself been criticised for being too theoretical, to the point that it is hard to 
put into use in practice (DeCesare, 2013, p. 521). 
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Opp analyses these models in detail, but not one of them is shown by his analysis to give 
specific consideration to the spatial element of protest. I would argue that all seven models, for 
various reasons, would benefit from applying a spatial perspective of this type.15 The model 
that comes closest in nature to a such a perspective is POS theory. 
The aim of POS theory, as it was first developed by the US political scientist Peter Eisinger 
(1973), is to understand the behaviour of protests and to calculate the chance of success of 
protests and social movements. To do this, the theoretical model relies on the thorough 
examination of the political environment (i.e. the context within which politics take place). If 
significant changes occur to the POS (i.e. to the factors and conditions of the political 
environment), reasons and opportunities for political action are created. POS theory thus strives 
to identify various factors in the political environment and to prove each factor’s causal effect 
on the chances of a given action occurring and/or succeeding. What constitutes “success” needs 
to be defined empirically by the researcher (Opp, 2009, p. 162). 
One part of Opp’s (2009) extensive critique of this theory is that it is virtually impossible to 
identify all factors in the political environment (or find the ‘correct’ ones), and thus hard to 
calculate the “chances of success”. Opp also argues that the theory is poorly defined and not 
clearly distinct from RMP and RCT, and he questions why POS theory emphasises changes in 
the political environment rather than just opportunities (pp. 167–171; 177–178). However, in 
his view, the utility of the model is that it demonstrates how the political environment may 
affect protest behaviour. POS could also be used to identify factors in the political environment 
that inhibit and/or facilitate protests, even if the causal effect of each factor is difficult to assess. 
(pp. 200–201.) 
The political environment is relevant to a theoretical model on space and protest for two 
reasons: 1) As I argue throughout this thesis, geographical space can significantly contribute to 
the emergence, realisation, and impact of protests, and it should thus be considered as one of 
the factors in the political environment. 2) In order to understand the causal relationship 
between space and protests, it is necessary to identify not only the effects of space, but also the 
other factors and conditions that have an effect on protests (the importance of mapping such 
rival theories is explained more thoroughly in chapter 5, 5.6). The following three subsections 
 
15 CAT, for example, emphasises the expected number of participants in a collective action as important for 
people’s willingness to protest (Opp, 2009, p. 62). Thus it is natural that a square where protests have been 
successful in the past will produce more incentives to protest than another, less successful square. Space is also 
relevant to identity theory, which highlights negotiations and in-group interactions (Opp, 2009, pp. 207–208)—
aspects which can be affected by the protesters’ physical location. 
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survey research literature that contributes to our understanding of protest, with a particular view 
to spatial and non-spatial factors in the political environment that make contentious politics 
successful or unsuccessful. 
3.1.1 Repertoires 
The term repertoire of contention (ROC) was initially coined by the US sociologist Charles 
Tilly. The concept is used as an analytical tool by sociologists and political scientists to identify 
tendencies in contentious politics and to explain why people choose to act the way they do. 
Strategies utilised during contentious collective actions are often repeated, and social groups 
develop traditions for methods of protest over time, affected by social, political, and cultural 
factors. Such repertoires include oft-repeated forms of contentious action (e.g. sit-ins, riots, and 
protests), and the participants’ preferred tools of choice, which develop and change over time 
(Tarrow, 1993). 16 The activists’ choice of urban space often becomes a part of such repertoires, 
and an analysis of a given space should therefore also consider whether or not it is included in 
any ROCs (see history of protest as a spatial element, 6.1.1). 
The Italian scholars Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani have written extensively on the 
ROCs of social movements. In one of their books, Social Movements: An Introduction (della 
Porta & Diani, 2006), the two authors use various theoretical approaches, such as ROC, RMP, 
and POS, to approach social movements17 on three levels of analysis—micro levels (e.g. 
feelings, identity, beliefs, values, etc.), meso levels (the organisation, and the social networks 
the movements are comprised of), and macro levels (i.e. structural factors, such as economy, 
political system, etc.)—and the relationship between these three levels (see figure 5 for a 
graphical representation). Particularly relevant to this thesis is the authors’ overview of the 
literature on the policing of protests (see policeability/defensibility as a spatial quality, 6.2.1), 
to which della Porta has made significant contributions (della Porta & Reiter, 1998; della Porta, 
2013; della Porta, Peterson & Reiter, 2006). 
Della Porta & Diani (2006, p. 197) elaborate on the act of policing protests and identify three 
prevailing policing strategies: coercive strategies (i.e. the use of physical force); persuasive 
strategies (attempts to control events through contact with activists and organisers); and 
 
16 For example the pragmatic use of music in social movements (see Hansen et al., 2019, pp. 36–38, on music in 
Ukrainian repertoires of contention). 
17 Diani defines social movements as “a distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors 
engaged in collective action: are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by 
dense informal networks; [and] share a distinct collective identity.” (della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 20–22). This 
definition may include protests. 
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informative strategies (which consist of “widespread information-gathering as a preventive 
feature in protest control”). While choice of strategy on the part of the police has a great impact 
on the outcome of protests, it is not clear which of the two first strategies is most efficient in 
controlling events. The authors do note a tendency of coercive (repressive) strategies increasing 
the risk of escalation, and thus also the proportion of radical protesters.18 
In addition to the police, della Porta & Diani (2006) identify other actors in opposition to or 
allied with the social movements, and whose structural makeup, strength, weaknesses, and other 
characteristics also function as POSs. These might be institutional, such as government 
agencies, political parties, trade unions, foundations, religious institutions, etc. Other important 
actors are provocateurs, used to incite violence and legitimate coercive strategies, and social 
countermovements that arise “as a reaction to the successes obtained by social movements”, 
develop in parallel to the social movements, and often use similar strategies to those of the 
movements they oppose (2006, p. 2011). 19 
Containment and kettling 
Some of the literature on the policing of protest is particularly concerned with the strategic 
aspects that space provides, both for protesters and police (e.g. Whelan & Molnar, 2018, pp. 
123–153; Noakes & Gillham, 2006; McCarthy & McPhail, 2006). Gillham, Edwards & Noakes 
(2013), for example, have analysed the mass contentious actions during the 2011 Occupy Wall 
Street protests (OWS) in New York City, and argue that OWS created a transition to a new 
form of police ROC, marked by a decrease in persuasive and increase in coercive strategies. 
During the contestations over public space in New York (notably over Zuccotti Park in Lower 
Manhattan), the authors argue, the police started using ‘strategic incapacitation’. This is a multi-
method approach to the policing of protest, which includes informative strategies to survey and 
infiltrate the movement beforehand and the creation of zones in which different groups are 
contained and kept apart from each other (e.g. different protest and no-protest zones; zones for 
the media; and a separate zone for the financial elite). 
 
18 Other factors, such as the nature of the police’s use of force (soft or brutal); whether the police’s actions are 
perceived by activists as legal or illegal; the police’s attitude to the protesters (often either “good” or “bad”); and 
their level of tolerance towards activists’ conduct, are also discussed. 
19 An example of this is the counterrevolutionary, pro-governmental protests, known as Antimaidan, which 
appeared in Ukraine as a reaction to the Euromaidan protests against president Viktor Ianukovych (2013–2014). 
The two movements were opposed to one another, and both movements adopted elements of the other’s ROCs. 
See for example Antimaidan’s use of music (Hansen et al., 2019, pp. 47–50, 52–53) and urban space (Hansen, 
2015, pp. 62–64). 
Mapping the field 
 21 
A more confrontational form of containing people that should be mentioned specifically is 
kettling. The British sociologist Hilary Pilkington defines kettling as 
[…] a police strategy of surrounding demonstrators at a protest in order to contain them 
in a particular place. The police argue it is necessary as a preventative measure to avoid 
violence or disorder during demonstrations, […] protest groups have argued that it is 
deployed to deliberately frustrate demonstrators or as a means of ascertaining personal 
details and photographs of protestors. (Pilkington, 2012) 
Kettling should thus be defined as a coercive strategy that could be used to suppress 
demonstrations with physical force, escalate the conflict (by bringing the “kettle” to a boil), 
and/or arrest a maximum number of demonstrators. 
The police’s ability to carry out such containment and/or ‘kettling’ is to a large extent affected 
by the urban space. See, for example, the difficulties Ukrainian police had in containing Maidan 
in 2014 (Hansen, 2015, p. 36), or how easy it was for the Russian police to kettle the March of 
Millions gathered on Swamp Square in 2012 (Hansen, 2019, p. 2). 
3.1.2 Nonviolent contention 
Thus far, the topic of this chapter has been two general approaches to understanding a broad 
spectrum of activities defined as social movements and protests, as well as their 
counteractivities. The next two subsections examine research literature aiming to identify more 
specific conditions and factors that determine whether or not protests occur and what makes 
them successful. The topic of this subsection is literature on nonviolent contentious actions, 
whilst the topic of the next is works about what are usually called colour revolutions (3.1.3), 
including the Western, Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian perspectives on the phenomenon. 
Despite their nonviolent methods, the colour revolutions are kept as a separate category from 
nonviolent contention. This is because colour revolutions are perceived by some scholars and 
governments as covert warfare, and as a deliberate pretext to violence (see 3.1.3, below). 
In research literature on nonviolent resistance and social movements, one of the earliest 
attempts to provide a systematic overview and analysis of nonviolent was the US political 
scientist Gene Sharp’s frequently cited 1973 book The Politics of Nonviolent Action. The three-
volume book provides the reader with a theory of political power (vol. 1); descriptions of 198 
methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion (such as ‘fraternising’ and ‘student strike’) (vol. 
2); and a practical guide for developing, employing, and defending nonviolent campaigns (vol. 
3). (Sharp, 1973). Sharp’s three volumes have formed the basis of many theories of contentious 
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action. For instance, Ackerman & Kruegler (1994) condensed Sharp’s 198 methods into 12 
principles of strategic nonviolent action. More recently, the key player behind the Resistance! 
(Scb.: ‘Otpor!’) student movement in Serbia (1998–2000), Srdja Popovic, together with Andrej 
Milivojevic and Slobodan Djinovic—two other prominent members of the opposition to 
Slobodan Milošević—published the book Nonviolent Struggle: 50 Crucial Points (2006), based 
on Sharp’s 1973 work. 
Popovic, Milivojevic & Djinovic (2006) is a practical step-by-step guide for protesters, divided 
into three parts: “Before You Start”, “Starting Out”, and “Running the Nonviolent Campaign.” 
Presented as an easy-to-read and richly illustrated textbook, it provides potential protest 
organisers with practical exercises, suggestions, and case study examples to analyse (mainly 
from the Serbian Bulldozer Revolution of 2000). In 2015, Popovic wrote Blueprint for 
Revolution, another book on the same topic (Popovic & Miller, 2015). Both books emphasise 
strength in numbers and diversity among protesters as decisive for the outcome of protests. 
One of the most systematic analyses of nonviolent actions to date is provided by the US political 
scientists Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan (2011). The authors build on statistical 
analysis of 323 major violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006 and 
four qualitative case studies, in addition to the works of other scholars, such as Sharp (1973) 
and Ackerman & Kruegler (1994), who are discussed above. The authors argue that nonviolent 
campaigns are nearly twice as likely to be successful than violent campaigns, and they 
emphasise the ability of campaign organisers to mobilise large and diverse segments of the 
population as a key condition for success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). In a TEDx talk, 
Chenoweth states that the critical mass of any resistance campaign, violent or nonviolent, is as 
little as 3.5 % of the total population (whichever the country), stressing that nonviolent actions 
are much more likely to mobilise a sufficient proportion of the population (Chenoweth, 2013). 
A key element in virtually all existing studies on nonviolent collective actions is emphasis on 
the number of participants. What is surprising is that, although the majority of the research also 
underline the importance of planning and of developing strategies, tactics, and methods, there 
are almost no references to physical space, which is often of major importance to these practical 
aspects of collective action. 
3.1.3 Colour revolutions 
We now turn to publications concerned with the colour revolutions. As described in the 
previous chapter, a wave of colour revolutions ousted autocratic leaders and changed the 
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political landscape of Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 2000s (2.1.3).20 The often 
unforeseen protest movements and their influence on protests in other parts of the world gave 
rise to a host of explanations of why colour revolutions intermittently occur, and under which 
conditions they achieve regime change. This literature is particularly relevant to this thesis, 
since a majority of the colour revolutions were carried out as static occupations of central urban 
spaces, and it should therefore be possible to assess whether space is considered a factor by 
leading scholars within the field. Moreover, because the factors identified in the literature are 
based on collective actions in the post-Soviet region, they should be particularly suitable as a 
tool for describing the political environment of the case studies in this thesis. 
Among the more influential publications on the subject is the US political scientist Michael 
McFaul’s article “Transitions from Postcommunism” (2005). Basing his argument on 
similarities between colour revolutions in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004), 
McFaul presents seven basic factors he deems necessary for a colour revolution to occur: 
1) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; 2) an unpopular incumbent; 3) 
a united and organized opposition; 4) an ability quickly to drive home the point that 
voting results were falsified, 5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the 
falsified vote, 6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands or more 
demonstrators to protest electoral fraud, and 7) divisions among the regime’s coercive 
forces. (McFaul, 2005, p. 7) 
McFaul thus emphasises internal macro and meso factors more than micro factors such as the 
motivation and psychology of the protesters. Space is also left out of the equation, although one 
could imagine that the protesters’ choice of space affects the sixth factor. Furthermore, McFaul 
discusses and eventually downplays other macro factors, such as economic trauma, ethnic 
tension, and Western support for democratisation and/or the protesters. 
Several political scientists have followed McFaul’s approach in order to explain the absence or 
presence of colour revolutions (e.g. Marples, 2006, on Belarus), which shows that there is room 
for such an approach. Others have strived to nuance or change McFaul’s factors, among them 
the British political scientist Taras Kuzio (2008), who has increased the overall number of 
factors to nine and included micro and macro factors: 
 
20 In political sciences, waves of democracy is a term coined by Samuel Huntington in 1991. The term covers those 
periods in history during which a large number of countries become more democratic. Huntington writes of three 
such waves: the nineteenth century, post-World War II, and from the mid-1970s (Huntington, 1991). Colour 
revolutions are often perceived as a fourth wave of democratisation (e.g. by McFaul, 2002). 
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[1] [A] competitive- (i.e. semi-) authoritarian state facilitating space for the democratic 
opposition; [2] “return to Europe” civic nationalism that assists in mobilizing civil 
society; [3] a preceding political crisis that weakened the regime’s legitimacy; [4] a pro-
democratic capital city; [5] unpopular ruling elites; [6] a charismatic candidate; [7] a 
united opposition; [8] mobilized youths; and [9] regionalism and foreign intervention 
(Russia or the EU). (Kuzio, 2008, p. 98) 
Contrary to McFaul (2005) and Kuzio (2008), the US political scientist Scott Radnitz identifies 
the level of economic disparity as the vital condition. Drawing on successful (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan) and unsuccessful colour revolutions (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan), he argues 
that colour revolutions only occur in countries where cooperation exists between activists and 
capitalists (i.e. financial supporters of the protests) (Radnitz, 2010). 
The problem of McFaul (2005), Kuzio (2008), Radnitz (2010), and others who create lists of 
such “minimum requirements” for colour revolutions to occur is that collective actions of a 
large magnitude—which colour revolutions surely are—are immensely complex events. They 
comprise a large number of aspects, and any attempt to generalise such events to a set number 
of factors will inevitably exclude important aspects. See for example Tucker (2007), where the 
author criticises the existing literature on colour revolutions (among them McFaul) for being 
overly elite-based and downplaying the role of the masses who participated in the colour 
revolutions. Tucker uses CAT to explain how major electoral fraud provides people with a focal 
point and a window of opportunity for mass collective action, arguing that, from the moment 
the falsified results are announced to the moment they are implemented, people have an extra 
incentive to protest.21  
Tucker’s (2007) emphasis on the masses of people is corroborated by the book The Colour 
Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures, edited by the Irish 
political scientists Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese (2010). In this book, 12 post-Soviet 
countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) are compared in order to identify 
 
21 The article reviews the existing literature on colour revolutions and identifies two main approaches to their 
origin. The first approach emphasises “the lure of the West”, either as a political goal of the protesters or (as it is 
often portrayed in Russia) as Western attempts to weaken Russian influence in the region by provoking upheavals 
in its Near Abroad (Rus.: blizhnee zarubezh’e, a term used in Russia for post-Soviet countries). The second 
approach examines the nature of the opposition movements (i.e. their ability to organise, mobilise people, access 
resources, etc.) (Tucker, 2007, p. 539). The observation that elections are used as focal points for democratic 
opposition in authoritarian regimes is further developed and nuanced in a statistical analysis of regime transitions 
in the post-communist region by Bunce & Wolchik (2010). 
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reasons for the occurrence of colour revolutions. In each of the 12 case studies, five factors are 
examined: 1) regime type; 2) the degree of unity in the opposition; 3) external influences; 4) 
the strength of civil society; and 5) the people (i.e. how they organise and act, and how they 
relate to the other actors in society). The latter two factors are highlighted as particularly 
important (2010, p. 9). 
Beacháin & Polese (2010) contradict the view of Canadian political scientist Lucan Way 
(2008), who mainly highlights macro factors such as the protesters’ geopolitical connections 
with the West and the structural makeup of the state, rather than internal micro factors such as 
the motivation and innovations of the protest movements. Way argues that scholars tend to put 
too much weight on the number of protesters in collective actions, illustrating this point by 
referring to the relatively small numbers of protesters in the Georgian (2003) and Kyrgyz (2005) 
revolutions. He asserts that the protesters’ external connections often are of greater importance. 
Just as McFaul and Kuzio, Way uses macro-level explanations for the fall of autocratic regimes: 
Authoritarian stability is most affected by: 1) the strength of a country’s ties to the West; 
and 2) the strength of the incumbent regime’s autocratic party or state. (Way, 2008, p. 
60) 
Thus far, looking at the body of academic literature on colour revolutions in the West, no 
concrete references to space are evident. Regarding the factors deemed necessary for a colour 
revolution to occur, we can conclude that there are several and contradicting views on the 
phenomenon. Three major categories of factors can be identified: 1) micro factors, such as the 
protesters’ motivation and strategic innovation; 2) meso factors, such as the organisational 
structure of the ruling elite and the opposition; and 3) macro factors, such as the economy and 
political system. 
Additionally, we can add a fourth category, which consists of publications that see colour 
revolutions as a result of external (i.e. foreign) influences. Beacháin & Polese (2010) have 
identified two types of this kind of international support: 1) Western, in the form of guidance 
and training for NGOs and observers; and 2) the mutual “economic, political, military and 
diplomatic support to besieged autocrats […]” shown by other autocratic leaders in the region. 
The Kremlin in particular is highlighted as a key supporter of autocratic leaders. Even if 
external support receives considerable attention in academic literature and in media discourse, 
the editors go on to underline that domestic factors, such as a well-developed civil society and 
motivated people, are important factors for colour revolutions to occur (Beacháin & Polese, 
2010).  
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Popular revolutions or (geo-)political technologies? 22 
The leading politicians of Russia and Belarus, Vladimir Putin and Aliaksandr Lukashėnka, both 
perceive colour revolutions as affected by the latter category (external influence). In the 
aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine (2013–2014), which led to the ousting of 
Russia-leaning president Viktor Ianukovych, Putin called colour revolutions a form of 
extremism and “a geopolitical instrument for changing spheres of influence (“Putin 
poobeshchal,” 2014). Lukashėnka has also blamed Western powers for attempting to topple the 
Belarusian state (Nersesov, 2017), although in an earlier interview with Russian media outlets 
in 2016 he did state that, if the standard of living is high in Belarus and Russia, no destructive 
colour revolutions will occur (“Lukashėnka: Pry narmal’nykh,” 2016). Thus, Lukashėnka also 
recognises the third (macro-) category. 
Russian academic publications on the subject often voice views similar to those of the political 
leadership. The Russian political scientist Andrei Manoĭlo, for instance, sees only external 
factors. He defines colour revolutions as 
[…] [political] technologies for the implementation of coups d’état and external control 
of the political situation in a country in conditions of artificially created political 
instability, during which the pressure on the government is exerted in the form of 
political intimidation, [by] using a youth protest movement as an instrument of such an 
intimidation. (Manoĭlo, 2015) 
Manoĭlo (2015) presents colour revolutions as a tool created by Anglo-Saxons in the US 
(among them Gene Sharp, 1973), who have used it as a hybrid weapon in unfriendly countries: 
in Eastern Europe during the 2000s; in the Middle East from 2011; and in Ukraine in 2014 (the 
latter is presented as a “dress rehearsal” for destroying Russia with the same ‘soft power’ 
weaponry). Manoĭlo also identifies five distinct phases that colour revolutions go through: 1) 
A network of organised protest movements in the target country is created; 2) Upon a signal, 
often after an orchestrated event, the network of people simultaneously goes out on the streets 
in major cities in the country; 3) Activists in the network of cells turn into catalysts of ‘singing 
protests’23 in order to engage large sections of the population; 4) The protesters gather in large 
 
22 The British political scientist Andrew Wilson (2011) provides the following definition of political technology: 
“[…] a term largely unfamiliar in the West—[it] is the euphemism commonly used in the former Soviet states for 
what is by now a highly developed industry of political manipulation”. 
23 Manoĭlo is probably referring to the Singing Revolution in the Baltics, particularly in Estonia (1987–1991), 
against Soviet hegemony; or to the festive qualities of the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine (2004–
2005 and 2013–2014); on the latter see Hansen et al. (2019, pp. 33–83). 
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public spaces in order to create a crowd mentality, through which new values and imperatives 
are given. Here, the people are reprogrammed, in much of the same way as “Protestant 
totalitarian sects” brainwash their followers; 5) On behalf of the crowd, ultimatums are sent to 
those in power under the threat of mass riots and, occasionally, physical extermination. The 
power holders are either swept away or a rebellion or civil war begins, followed by a military 
intervention. (Manoĭlo, 2015) 
Certainly, some approaches to colour revolutions in Russia are less radical than Manoĭlo’s (see 
for example Barsamov, 2006), and some see geopolitical factors as less important (notably the 
political scientist Valeriĭ Soloveĭ, 201624), yet variations of Manoĭlo’s perspective appear to be 
numerically the most prominent, and can be found in several publications by other Russian 
political scientists and sociologists (e.g. Iel’chaninov, 2007; Naumov, 2016). In Russian media 
outlets, the understanding of colour revolutions as a geopolitical tool and a threat to the 
sovereignty of the Russian Federation is often all too obvious (see for example “Nurgaliev 
zaiavil,” 2019; “‘Im nuzhen vash mozg’,” 2019; “Na Ukraine vorovali,” 2019). 
This Cold War frame of mind stems from Russia being perceived (and perceiving itself) as the 
natural successor to the Soviet Union—the main adversary of the West during the Cold War. 
The rivalry between these two power blocks was not only fought out in proxy wars; the two 
also supported protest movements and insurgents in order to damage each other’s spheres of 
influence across the world, and especially in the former European colonies of Asia, South 
America, and Africa (Kanet, 2006, p. 337; Powelson, 2003). The dissent in the Eastern Bloc 
that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union could be seen as part of this warfare. 
Hence, given that a new wave of colour revolutions occurred at the same time and place as the 
EU and NATO were expanding—into areas seen by Russia as their sphere of influence—
Russia’s hostility to mass protests becomes more understandable. 
One outcome of the wave of colour revolutions is that autocratic countries have started to 
perceive nonviolent protest as a serious threat. Since the stakes are so high, the autocrats are 
readier to suppress political dissent with harassment, increased surveillance, and violence 
(Beacháin & Polese, 2010, p. 238). Moreover, in Russia and Belarus, pro-governmental youth 
organisations have formed to counterweight foreign influence on the youth (Matchanka, 2014; 
 
24 Soloveĭ is one of the most prominent academics in the Russian opposition. Although not explicitly dealing with 
colour revolutions, in his book Revolution (Революtion) (2016) he describes seven conditions for a revolution to 
occur, focusing mainly on micro factors such as the protesters’ moral strength, their readiness to face obstacles, 
and their inner psychology (Soloveĭ, 2016, pp. 298–306). 
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Hemment, 2012; Atwal & Bacon, 2012). This effort to combat mass demonstrations has been 
reinforced since the recent Ukrainian revolution, and colour revolutions are accordingly defined 
by the military as a threat to national sovereignty, and increasingly defined as ‘acts of war’.25 
The problem with a single focus on foreign influence is that it disregards the other micro-to-
macro factors and presumes that external influences alone are enough to create a popular 
uprising or nonviolent revolution. Ukrainian views on colour revolutions are, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, often more nuanced than the views held by their Russian counterparts. For 
example, in the Ukrainian political scientist Oleksandr Romaniuk’s (2005) assessment of the 
phenomenon in Yugoslavia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), 
internal factors—such as the decay of the political elite, a worsening of democratic standards, 
the poor standard of living, and a growing desire for political change among the general 
population—are seen as the foundation for discontent, which, triggered by election fraud, 
turned into colour revolutions. Romaniuk adds, however, that all the opposition forces have 
received moral and sometimes material support from Western democracies (2005, p. 24). 
3.1.4 Non-spatial factors 
At the start of this chapter, two questions were outlined: 1) Which academic literature 
recognises and/or relates to the links between space and protests? 2) Which approaches and 
concepts can be integrated into a theoretical model examining the causal relationship between 
space and protest? 
Regarding the former question, there is a tendency in several academic disciplines around 
protest to overlook spatial factors. For example, in the literature on nonviolent contention, 
tactical innovation is often emphasised as important; but few if any references are made to the 
possibilities space provides for such innovation. A spatial perspective is also missing from the 
literature on colour revolutions, despite the fact that most of these mass actions have utilised a 
similar form of static spatial occupation. 
One exception to this tendency, of course, is Manoĭlo (2015), who asserts that urban spaces are 
used to brainwash the people gathered in them. Another (perhaps more realistic) exception is 
the research on the repertoires of policing, which includes and accounts for space. Even so, 
compared to the countless examples in history of urban spaces that have played a role in 
contentious actions, there clearly must be a gap in the literature on protest. In the following 
 
25 See for example the harsh language used by Belarusian and Russian officials during the Third Moscow 
Conference on International Security in May 2014 (Cordesman, 2014; “O voennykh aspektak, 2014”). 
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section, the search for literature to fill this gap will continue as the focus moves from academic 
literature on protest to academic literature on space. 
Regarding the latter question, several concepts and theories can be integrated into a theoretical 
model on space and protest. POS theory is particularly relevant, as it emphasises the importance 
of the political environment, which can be used to account for and examine variables with an 
effect on protests. However, as noted above, it is difficult to map all factors. This problem 
becomes particularly apparent when a comparison is made to the wide range of arguments 
identified in the literature on colour revolutions. 
In order to gain a better understanding of factors that may or may not be of significance in the 
political environment, these are visualised in the two figures provided below. The first (fig. 4) 
is a proposed list of micro, meso, and macro factors in the political environment. The second is 
a diagram in which the three levels are placed next to each other, alongside external influences 
(such as support for leaders or NGOs) and events (e.g. election fraud), which are added as 
possible outside effects (fig. 5). 
Micro Meso Macro 
Goals Culture Political system 
Identity, feelings, beliefs, values Organisations, networks Economy 
Innovation, originality Communities Formal organisations 
Strategies, tactics, methods Groups Etc. 
Etc. Police structures  
 Political parties  
 Etc.  
Figure 4: Micro, meso, and macro factors 
 
Figure 5: The political environment 
3.2 Space 
Having identified some of the main perspectives in the literature on protest, it is necessary to 
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of course, consists of many publications; yet only a small proportion of them is directly related 
to the two questions stated at the beginning of this chapter. Additionally, I have concentrated 
on a selection of the literature that can be used to formulate an understanding of what constitutes 
the nature of space. 
This section starts with metaphysical and philosophical space (3.2.1). Here, discussions and 
understandings of space found in Arendtian and Habermasian texts are defined in reverse 
chronological order of development (from the least physical [Habermas] to the most physical 
[Arendt]), followed by various Marxian perspectives, including the terms “public space” and 
“the right to the city”. The next subsection (3.2.2) concerns more physical and concrete 
approaches found in architecture, urban planning, and human geography. This account is 
followed by an overview of the prospect-refuge theory, as found in landscape architecture. The 
final subsection (3.2.3) specifically deals with studies of protest locations. It should be noted 
that these three categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, but serve as guidelines 
within a larger body of literature. 
3.2.1 Public space 
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962/1989), the German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas introduces the term “public sphere”. According to Habermas, a weakening of 
totalitarian institutions, such as feudalism and the state church, in Western Europe in the 
eighteenth century enabled more representative forms of government to appear. At this time, a 
growing middle class had the time and energy to participate in discussions about how the public 
should be managed, and the public sphere became the transition point between public and 
private life. Habermas describes the public sphere as an ideal and abstract neutral place for 
which societies must strive. In this ideal place, people conduct their deliberations, and all 
opinions are equally valuable; there is also an absence of hierarchy. Habermas refers to coffee 
houses and salons as early examples of this sphere, and sees mass media as an important tool 
in the creation of public discourses. The threat, argues Habermas, comes from the powerful 
organisations that aim to control the discourse which occurs in the public sphere. 
The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt also stresses the importance of the public 
sphere in democratic societies, but in her works—and especially in The Human Condition 
(1958/1998)—the physicality of such spaces is strongly emphasised. The political scientists 
Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Ursula Vogel (2005) elaborate on this physicality: 
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[One] feature stressed by Arendt has to do with the spatial quality of public life, with 
the fact that political activities are located in a public space where citizens are able to 
meet one another, exchange their opinions and debate their differences, and search for 
some collective solution to their problems. Politics, for Arendt, is a matter of people 
sharing a common world and a common space of appearance so that public concerns 
can emerge and be articulated from different perspectives. In her view, it is not enough 
to have a collection of private individuals voting separately and anonymously according 
to their private opinions. Rather, these individuals must be able to see and talk to one 
another in public, so that their differences as well as their commonalities can emerge 
and become the subject of democratic debate. (d'Entrèves & Vogel, 2005, p. 9) 
In other words, opinions are formed, and meaningful exchanges of opinions and debates occur, 
in physical space; thus, the presence of a location where people can meet, talk, act, and 
deliberate is vital for the existence and proper functioning of public life and politics. (For more 
on Arendt’s focus on geography, see Howell, 1993, pp. 313–316.) 
In the book Democracy and Public Space (2012), the Dutch political scientist John R. Parkinson 
takes this argument further. Like Habermas and Arendt, he perceives a well-functioning public 
space as a premise for working democracy. He identifies four ways in which physical space can 
be considered public: It 1) “is openly accessible”; and/or 2) “uses common resources”; and/or 
3) “has common effects; and/or 4) “is used for the performance of public roles.” (2012, p. 61). 
Parkinson’s definition of public space is thus broad enough to include political institutions, and 
he argues that the layout and structure of such public spaces affect the ways we interact 
(Parkinson looks specifically at the layout of parliaments and other political institutions, but 
also town squares). This type of perspective is concurrent with the prevailing view within the 
field of political geography (see for example Jones, Jones & Woods, 2004; Van Deusen, 2004; 
and Agnew & Muscarà, 2012), but I have found no political geographers who have developed 
a way to examine the causal relationship between urban space and contentious politics. 
“Public space” and “the right to the city” 
Political philosophy is used to explain not only why space is necessary for discussions and 
debate to occur, but also why urban space is contested. Such discussions about the nature of 
spatial contestation often take a Marxian perspective. In Marxian economic philosophy, social 
class struggle is sometimes seen spatially, which can generate questions such as “Who owns 
the city?” and “Who has the right to use it?” 
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The French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre raises these questions in two of his 
influential books on the subject, Writings on Cities (Lefebvre, 1996) and The Urban Revolution 
(Lefebvre, 1970/2003). In the former, Lefebvre discusses the capitalist accumulation of money 
in urban centres and how this has led to the exclusion of certain groups (ethnic or national 
minorities, people of certain ages, the disabled, etc.). Lefebvre establishes that all urban 
inhabitants have the right to use the city they live in and to participate in its creation, and he 
urges people to reclaim their rights over the city. In the latter book, Lefebvre describes the 
development and nature of the city, from the Neolithic revolution to his own day. He examines 
how capitalism has shaped urban space, globally, nationally, and locally. According to 
Lefebvre, world society is gradually (i.e., at the time of publication in 1970) going through 
complete urbanisation. By this he means that no part of the world exists in total independence 
of the urban centres (Lefebvre, 1970/2003; see also Lefebvre, 1974/1991). 
The term “right to the city” has been further developed by at least two other Marxian scholars: 
the British economic geographer David Harvey and the US geographer Don Mitchell. Harvey 
explores the relations between capital, politics, and the people (see for example Harvey, 1989; 
2008; 2012), and develops Lefebvre’s arguments about the increasing social and economic 
injustice in urban centres. 
Mitchell also considers inequality in urban space. He is concerned with how contestations occur 
in space and about space (see for example Mitchell, 1998); how wealth is produced and 
distributed in a city (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2008); and the exclusiveness of urban public space, 
e.g. gated communities and how some groups, particularly the homeless, are left with fewer 
rights to the public space than others (Mitchell, 2011; 2016). Mitchell’s recurrent argument is 
that space is contested by different layers of the population, who constantly negotiate and argue 
about how it should be used and by whom. This contestation contributes significantly to the 
Lefebvrian concept of production of space (i.e. how space is given meaning by the acts 
occurring in it). (See 3.2.3, for more on the production of space). 
Public space is thus not only contested in itself, but is a contested term with a wide range of 
viewpoints and definitions. Interpretations of public space range from the metaphysical to the 
physical and include informal meeting places, such as cafés and chat rooms, formal institutions, 
such as parliament buildings, and urban space, such as town squares and parks. In an attempt 
to create a unified understanding of the concept, the US professor of public administration 
Charles Goodsell (2003) identifies six defining characteristics of public space, from a variety 
of academic disciplines: 
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[1] Generic definition of public space: A space-time continuum for connected and 
interactive political discourse. [2] Place-bound public space: The above consisting of 
face-to-face interaction in a single physical location. [3] Electronic public space: The 
above achieved at dispersed geographic locations through information technology. [4] 
Extended public space: The above when broadcast by television, radio, Internet, or other 
means. [5] Pure definition of democratic public space: The above when open to all, 
unrestricted as to conduct, and unconditional as to participation. [6] Practical definition 
of democratic public space: The above when public access is encouraged, the status of 
state authority is muted, barriers between governors and governed are minimized, 
staging is arranged by the people as well as officials, and conditions conducive to 
deliberation are fostered. (Goodsell, 2003, 370) 
The public space discussed in this thesis is naturally positioned within Goodsell’s second, 
place-bound definition. The specific definition of public space will be developed in the next 
chapter (4.2). 
3.2.2 Physical space 
Now that we have discerned the importance of public space as the location of discussion and 
deliberation, as well as the place where contestations occur and meaning is created, it is time to 
move on to the physical aspects of space. Architecture, urban planning, urbanism, and human 
geography are four academic disciplines naturally concerned with physical (urban) space, and 
key studies from each of these can be related to collective action. 
Urban planning, architecture, and urban geography 
Goodsell (2003) provides some assessment of the relevant literature in architecture and urban 
planning. He writes, for instance, that the relationship between political power and people is 
often expressed in architecture, and “a common theme is how the design and symbols of 
physical space reinforce political power” (p. 365). Referring to his own and others’ studies of 
buildings and official institutions, he explains how such places seek to evoke certain feelings, 
such as that of authority, monumentality, or—in the case of court rooms—legitimacy and 
equality (2003, pp. 365–366). (For a similar view, see Bismarck, 2014.) 
In urban planning, public spaces are often seen as places for social interaction and, as in 
architecture, there is much focus on the perception of space. Additionally, urban planners tend 
to focus on the utility of spaces, and how the right planning can increase their usage. Some 
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urbanists also frame such usage in a historical context (see US geographer and urbanist Edward 
Soja, 2010). 
The US urban theorist Kevin Lynch has influenced writing on urban planning for more than 
half a century. For his book The Image of the City (1960), Lynch conducted interviews with 
citizens about their daily travels in, and interactions with, public space. He asked the 
respondents to describe and draw the spaces they went through, what they remember from them, 
and what feelings they evoked. Lynch used the information he collected to identify five 
elements of urban space that dominate people’s mental perception of it: nodes (places of 
destination or transition points); paths (the connections to and between nodes, e.g. roads and 
walkways); landmarks (reference points, such as monuments and buildings); districts (areas of 
the city with distinct characteristics); and edges (boundaries and obstacles that hinder 
movement, e.g. walls and shorelines). (See chapter 6: 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and 6.1.3.) 
Groups of scholars, architects, and urban planners are also concerned with identifying what 
makes spaces inclusive and practical to use. The Feeling of Place project (Nielsen, 2017), for 
example, is an examination of public spaces in Southwark, London, to establish why people 
respond well to certain places and not to others. The researchers asked respondents in London 
what they felt about the spaces they were in, using 13 feelings as a framework to evaluate the 
positive vs. negative value of the spaces.26 As a result, nine key themes were identified that 
affect how people relate to space in everyday life: 1) people’s awareness of what is in the space; 
2) its history and social life; 3) the presence of nature; 4) its level of accessibility for some or 
for all people; 5) whether or not people are visiting or living in the place; 6) how welcome 
people feel there; 7) the scale of buildings and activities in the space (as stated by the authors: 
“Locations with tall towers […] made people feel less happy and were seen as less pleasant 
than places with lower scale houses. Planting and activities on street level helped people feel 
that the […] place [was] more pleasant.”, p. 13); 8) complexity and confusion; and 9) changes 
occurring in the space (Nielsen, 2017). 
Similarly, the Project for Public Spaces—a cross-disciplinary platform for the promotion of 
sustainable urban spaces—has identified 10 principles for a successful (i.e. much-used) square: 
 
26 Happy/unhappy; relaxed/tense; excited/bored; welcome/not welcome; strong/low sense of belonging; 
familiar/unfamiliar; pleasant/unpleasant; want to approach/avoid; interesting/uninteresting; complex/simple; 
crowded/empty; understandable/confusing; not stressful/stressful. (Nielsen, 2017, p. 5). However, this method can 
be criticised for oversimplifying space, as aspects such as ‘crowded’ have been marked with a positive value, 
while ‘empty’ is negative. Arguably, a crowded place might be perceived by some (or in some circumstances) as 
less positive than an empty space. 
Mapping the field 
 35 
1) it has a strong image and identity; 2) there are attractions and destinations on or around the 
square; 3) there is a presence of amenities, such as benches; 4) it has a flexible design, including 
5) different designs for different seasons; 6) it is easy to access, preferably on foot; 7) there is 
a good balance between the outer (i.e. surrounding buildings, roads, amenities) and inner 
(centre) square; 8) its paths (roads, streets, walkways) reach out “like an octopus”; 9) it is well 
managed by people who are familiar with the square; and 10) it has diverse sources of funding 
(“10 principles”, 2005.) 
The principles identified in the two projects outlined above provide valuable clues as to what 
variables create pleasant, accessible, and visible space, which are three important aspects of 
urban protests (see chapter 6). Yet even though the vast majority of architects perceive and 
utilise the feelings that space and buildings evoke, and urban planners look at the various usages 
of public space, neither discipline is explicitly concerned with how these qualities affect 
collective action. A few notable exceptions should be mentioned. One is the US landscape 
architect Jeffrey Hou, who has edited two books on the subject: Insurgent Public Space: 
Guerrilla Urbanism and the Remaking of Contemporary Cities (Hou, 2010) and City 
Unsilenced: Urban Resistance and Public Space in the Age of Shrinking Democracy (Hou & 
Knierbein, 2017). 
In the former book, the authors (including anthropologists, geographers, architects, urban 
planners, and artists) aim to understand the role of public space in the constant changes cities 
undergo, as well as various attempts to create and control public space: “[P]ublic space has 
been an important facet of cities and urban culture […] [Urban spaces] provide opportunities 
for gathering, socialising, recreation, festivals, as well as protests and demonstrations” (Hou, 
2010, p. 2). In the authors’ view, the city is constantly changing, both physically and in the 
ways it is perceived and used: city space can be contested, change meaning, be appropriated, 
made available or unavailable to some or all groups, new meanings can be attributed to it, and 
so on. 
In the latter book, co-edited with the Austrian landscape architect Sabine Knierbein, the authors 
put contestations in urban space into the context of neoliberal economic globalisation. As with 
other scholars, such as Don Mitchell (3.2.1), David Harvey (3.2.1), and the US architect and 
urbanist Paul Knox (2011), they see urban development as driven by global investors who 
gentrify urban centres and increase local and global inequalities (Hou & Knierbein, 2017, p. 6). 
The authors call this tendency “shrinking democracy”. This means that, when public space is 
increasingly controlled by private and commercial actors, its alternative use as an outlet for 
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public discontent against authorities (see chapter 2) is reduced (hence, the utility of space as a 
safety valve in societies is shrinking). 
There is also an emerging interest within human geography and architecture in the physicality, 
organisation, and structure of protest camps; see for example the British human geographer 
Adam Ramadan on the occupation of Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring in Egypt. He argues 
that the protest camp is a public space which functions as a vehicle for political change 
(Ramadan, 2013). Another prominent example is the anthology Protest Camps in International 
Context (Brown, Feigenbaum, Frenzel & McCurdy, 2017), which sees camps as a form of 
organisation. The authors examine the symbolic value, logistics, and possibilities provided by 
protest camps across the world, while analysing what the editors call four ‘infrastructures’: 
media infrastructures, action infrastructures, organisation infrastructures, and re-creation 
infrastructures. These studies thus emphasise that static protests are important, and that they are 
reliant on accessibility and transport networks in order to function properly (see spatial qualities 
as a variable in chapter 6, 6.2.1). 
Prospect-refuge theory 
Before moving on to studies concerned with particular spaces of protest, one final theoretical 
approach with a spatial focus should be mentioned: namely, prospect-refuge theory (PRT). PRT 
was first developed by the British geographer Jay Appleton in The Experience of Landscape 
(1975), in which he explored the aesthetics of open spaces and the forms of landscape people 
tend to respond well to. According to this theory, which sees human preferences as an 
evolutionary trait for survival, people feel safe, and thus prefer to stay, in spaces where they 
can observe the surrounding area and perceive approaching threats or prey (=prospect), but are 
not themselves easily observed or attacked (=refuge). A high-up position, a narrow space in the 
shade looking out onto a wider area, or a place by an edge (such as a river, wall or steep 
mountain) are all preferable to a space without edges or with few exits (such as a narrow 
mountain pass), where one can easily be spotted or dangers can converge from several 
directions. 
PRT is also applied to urban environments (see for example Fisher & Nasar, 1992; Ramanujam, 
2007), in which confined and confusing spaces with few exits—such as a narrow and sparsely 
lit alleyway, or an underground car park—feel uncomfortable while a wide, properly lit street 
with plenty of exits, or the space in the shade of a grove in a lush park, feel pleasant. The theory 
has been criticised for not always being applicable to an urban context, where the need for 
refuge is arguably less psychologically important than in a natural setting (see for example 
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Dosen & Oswald, 2016). But this reservation to the theory might not apply in a contentious 
context, as instincts for personal safety are probably more acute in these situations than in day-
to-day life. 
3.2.3 Contested spaces 
Having reviewed leading theories of protest in the first section of this chapter; and the various 
theories about the nature of political and physical urban space in the previous two subsections, 
I will now turn to case studies of specific spaces, which have been used to explore and illustrate 
the theories and concepts identified in this chapter (i.e. works specifically concerned with the 
location of contestation). 
The case study literature on contested spaces can be divided into two main groups: 1) 
publications describing how contentious actions have shaped people’s perception of urban 
space, and 2) publications looking at the effects locations have on contention. As with other 
categories provided in this chapter, these two groups may not be absolute, and some of the 
literature discusses both: how contention in urban space shapes people’s perception of space, 
and, at the same time, how space provides people with the conditions of and possibilities for 
contention. See for example Karl Schlögel’s book Moscow, 1937, in which Moscow is 
described both as the setting for the terror and traumas of the Stalin Purges (1936–1938), and 
as changed by the omnipresence of informants, paranoia, deportations, and executions during 
that time (Schlögel, 2012). 
In the first group, urban space is often regarded as a dependent variable. People’s perception of 
space is fluent and constantly changing, affected by the contestations about and within the 
space.27 The “production of space” is often a key concept used to understand whole urban areas. 
See for example: Smith & Mitchell (2018) on how the space in New York City has been 
produced by the contestations that occurred in the city throughout its history: Yacobi (2004) on 
the contestations of urban space in ‘mixed’ Palestinian/Israeli cities; or McCann (1999) on how 
civic space in Lexington has changed due to spatial (and racial) policies. The “production of 
space” concept can also be applied to individual spaces, such as a single square or park. See for 
instance Van Deusen (2002) on the production of Clinton Square, New York. 
 
27 This being said, other actions—such as public festivals, trade, criminal acts, military parades, and sporting 
events—might also affect the perception of urban space, as well as who uses the space: e.g. is it public, private, 
commercial, or official. 
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The scholars in the second group often perceive space more as an independent variable that 
wholly or partially affects people’s possibilities of protest. This includes studies of the symbolic 
characteristics of urban space, e.g. Örs (2014) on Gezi park and Taksim Square as a public 
space, and how the attempts by the Turkish authorities to change this symbolic value by 
redesigning their physical layout triggered the 2014 multifaceted pro-democracy protests in 
cities across the country. A further example is Gunning & Baron (2014), who not only describe 
the where, when, who, and whys of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in Tahrir Square, but also 
how the square became a shared symbolic focal point for a range of protest movements. 
Conversely, several scholars highlight the importance of the physical characteristics of space, 
such as layout, size, or location. See for example Lee (2009), who argues that Tiananmen 
Square was chosen by the May Fourth Movement in 1919 because of its physical features and 
availability, even though it had far less symbolic value than other public spaces. Or Salmenkari, 
2009, who puts the emphasis on location in her comparison of protest places in Buenos Aires 
and Seoul, finding that “the majority of protests take place at sites of political authority, places 
that appeal to the public, places connected with a grievance, and symbolically meaningful 
places.” (p. 256) She also points out that historical and symbolic sites are often interpreted 
differently and might not have the same reinforcing nature for all (protest) groups (p. 257). 
Some underscore social features and the traditions around using a space: e.g. Zaazaa (2009) on 
the cultural, social, and historical significance of Tahrir Square. He argues that, since the central 
space is in the political centre of Cairo, heavily trafficked and used by thousands of people 
every day, demonstrations in the square immediately gather local and national attention.  
Finally, some see a combination of the three: such as Hatuka & Kallus (2008), who in their 
study of Rabin Square in Tel Aviv recognise several ways in which the square’s social, 
symbolic, and physical attributes affect protests, albeit with a focus on the physical. All three 
of these aspects of space (perceived/symbolic, social, and physical) have been introduced as 
categories in the theoretical model (6.1). 
3.3 The gap 
In the previous two sections, I set out to survey research literature which identifies the links 
between space and protests and how the two relate to each other. However, as the section on 
protest shows, there is a profound lack of literature making this connection with space, as almost 
none of the theories examined here have any reference to it; and the few that do (e.g. repertoires 
of contention) are limited in scope and do not provide a detailed account of the causal 
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relationship between space and protest. Although the connection between the two has been 
identified in the research literature considered in the second section (on space), and from a 
variety of viewpoints (such as to the location for discussions, deliberations, and contestations), 
this literature, too, lacks a generalised approach to assess the use value of space. 
This lack of a spatial perspective on political action has been highlighted, among others, by 
Parkinson (2012, pp. 6–7). Moreover, two chapters in the anthology The Oxford Handbook of 
Social Movements (della Porta & Diani, 2015) address this lack within the studies of social 
movements: chapter 12 (urban dynamics and social movements) and chapter 24 (geography 
and social movements). 
In the former chapter, the authors attempt to define urban movements, the conditions under 
which they occur, and various forms of urban movements. The authors use POS theory to 
identify why urban movements appear in some spaces and not in others; and, like David Harvey, 
Don Mitchell, and other Marxian economists (3.2.1), the scholars focus on economic and 
political elements in the political environment rather than on pure geography (Andretta, Piazza 
& Subirants, 2015). In the latter chapter, the British political scientist and geographer Paul 
Routledge starts by identifying the lack of geography in theories on social movements, and 
continues by outlining several ways in which urban space is significant. These include: the 
various associations and feelings people have towards space; the inequalities of society that are 
reflected in space; how space can provide different POSs for different people in different 
spaces; the scale of space in which social movements occur; and how these scales might provide 
“a range of opportunities and constraints” (Routledge, 2015, p. 386). Still, none of these two 
chapters suggest an approach to analyse the relationship between protesters and the protest 
space they inhabit. 
In his monograph Space Invaders: Radical Geographies of Protest (2017), Routledge’s focus 
has moved from social movements to protests, and is thus much closer to the spatial perspective 
sought in this thesis. Routledge discusses the acts of planning and realising mass protests from 
a spatial perspective, and he examines various ways in which people can utilise urban space to 
their advantage. This includes: 1) identifying and using local spatial qualities in an optimised 
manner; 2) considering the pros and cons of utilising static and mobile methods of action; 3) 
using the selected space to create a shared culture with which the protesters can identify; and 
4) selecting methods of increasing an action’s media exposure, both offline and online. The 
book is illustrated with examples of spatial strategies from contentious actions across the world, 
to inspire innovation among prospective protesters. 
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What the book does not have, however, is a generalised approach to how one can assess the use 
value, constraints, and limitations that urban spaces provide for mass protest. This shows that 
there is clearly a lack of generalised spatial perspectives in the literature on protest. 
The second aim of this chapter was to find approaches and concepts that can be integrated into 
a generalised spatial perspective of this type. This question yielded more results, as several of 
the various findings, approaches, variables, and systems can be identified as valuable for a 
theoretical model on the causal relationship between space and protest. See for example POS 
theory and the concept of political environment (3.1), which are integrated into the model in 
chapter 5 (5.6) and 6 (6.2.2); or see the account of prospect-refuge theory (3.2.2) in chapter 3. 
Additionally, in section 3.2, several contradicting understandings of what space is were 
identified. In the next chapter, I shall present my own definition of space and protest, to a large 
extent based on the literature presented in this chapter. In the subsequent chapters 5 and 6, I 
will explain how a spatial perspective on mass protest can be articulated, and how it can 
contribute to filling the research gap. 
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4 Definitions and research questions 
The previous chapter concluded by identifying a gap in the research literature on urban mass 
protest. Before moving to the development and layout of a theoretical model to fill this gap, the 
aim of this chapter is to define some key concepts and delimitations. It starts with two sections 
that provide definitions and delimitations of mass protests (4.1) and urban public space (4.2); 
followed by a statement of the major research question and a series of secondary research 
questions (4.3).28 
4.1 What is a mass protest? 
According to Karl-Dieter Opp, a protest might be defined as “[a] joint (i.e. collective) action of 
individuals aimed at achieving their goal or goals by influencing decisions of a target” (Opp, 
2009, p. 38). I have used this definition because it incorporates elements of key sociological 
perspectives on protest (3.1). The ‘target’ of the protests might be institutions or people. 
However, in this thesis and in the three case studies it analyses (Hansen, 2016; 2017, 2019), the 
main targets of the mass protests are governmental authorities. The ‘goal or goals’ of the 
protesters have previously been identified as change of regime, policy, or discourse (I elaborate 
on the goals of protest in Hansen, 2019, p. 8). 
Opp’s definition is still not specific enough, as it does not include a sense of scale. The word 
‘mass’ has therefore been added to convey that the action is carried out by a large number of 
people.29 Even with the inclusion of this additional word, a large number of individuals joined 
in action in order to achieve a goal can protest in a number of ways that would put them outside 
the scope of this project (e.g. using petitions, Internet actions, boycotts, graffiti, or civil 
disobedience). For the purpose of this thesis, “mass protests” are limited to the physical act of 
protesting in urban public space. I concentrate on static protests in the form of encampments 
and spatial occupation, rather than on mobile protests, such as marches.30 The current study is 
also limited to protests ‘on foot’, thus excluding (the usually mobile) protests based on the use 
 
28 Please note that there might be some inconsistencies between the definitions, terms and concepts in these 
chapters and in their three accompanying articles. This is because the spatial perspective has evolved over time, 
and each of the articles represents the model at its different stages of development, before these concrete definitions 
were reached (see chapter 5). 
29 In one of the definitions provided by the Merriam Webster dictionary, ‘mass’ is described as “a large body of 
persons in a group” and “the great body of the people as contrasted with the elite—often used in plural” (Mass, 
n.d.) 
30 Since mobile demonstrations often are a tactical part of an encampment protest (e.g. reacting to events by staging 
demonstrations), the question of how spaces affect demonstrations demands separate attention (see 6.2.1 for 
mobility as a spatial quality). 
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of vehicles, such as cars, bicycles, and trucks.31 The reason for these delimitations is that, in the 
East Slavic region, static encampments on foot are the most prominent form of mass displays 
of discontent, and thus the one I had access to. 
For the sake of simplicity, I have also tried to avoid the inclusion of violent protests such as 
riots and revolts, although some of the mass protests described here turned violent (notably 
Euromaidan). The reason for this exclusion is that, once a mass event turns violent, its nature 
is radically transformed; and the dynamics between demonstrators, law enforcement agencies, 
and urban space significantly change. 
We thus arrive at the following definition of the mass protests examined in this thesis: 
Mass collective actions by pedestrians, engaged in static occupation of urban public 
space and intending to change society by influencing the decisions of a target by 
nonviolent means. 
Mass protests and social movements 
Another concept closely related to mass protests is that of social movements, which are often 
discussed in the same literature as protests. The difference between the two terms is that, while 
social movements develop over time (and the focus of social movement studies is often on the 
causes that create the movement, or on its values, identity, and connections), mass protests are 
independent events or actions that either erupt suddenly or are part of a bigger (social) 
movement for change. (A more elaborate definition of urban social movements can be found in 
Andretta, Piazza & Subirats, 2015.) 
4.2 What is urban public space? 
In order to succinctly define urban public space, it is first necessary to examine the term word-
for-word. Of the three, ‘urban’ is the easiest part to deal with. According to the dictionary, 
‘urban’ relates to, is characteristic of, or constitutes a city (Urban, n.d.). In other words, it 
describes something in, or of, a city. 
However, the next two parts ,‘public’ and ‘space’, are more difficult to define, as the two terms 
cover a broad variety of complex things. The Merriam Webster dictionary, for example, offers 
7 and 10 categories of definitions respectively for each of the two categories. Based on these 
entries, we can deduce that ‘public’ refers to a collection or representation of the people or 
 
31 Such as the truck drivers’ strikes in Russia (“Dal’noboĭshchiki 27 marta,” 2017), or Automaidan in Ukraine 
(Kuzik, 2014). 
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citizens of a community or society; or to something happening where it is easily perceived by, 
or relating to, the population. ‘Space’ covers an even wider range of phenomena, with distance 
between points or obstacles as the common denominator. For the purposes of this research 
project, definitions 2a (“a limited extent in one, two, or three dimensions: [distance, area, 
volume]”) and 2b (“an extent set apart or available”) are the closest in nature to the geographical 
space under examination. (Public, n.d.; Space, n.d.) 
Urban space and public space 
When combined with ‘urban’, ‘space’ becomes ‘an extent set apart in a city environment’; or, 
in other words, ‘outdoor open areas between buildings’, such as squares, parks, streets, and 
walkways. 
So what, then, is ‘urban public space’? Let us leave ‘urban’ aside for the moment and take a 
look at the contested term ‘public space’ first. Based on the literature on public space (3.2.1) 
and a discussion I participated in during a lecture by the US geographer Don Mitchell,32 we can 
identify six questions that can be asked in order to define whether or not a space is public: 
1) Who the space is for: is it for the people or their representatives, or for someone or 
something else? 
2) To whom it is available: do all citizens/inhabitants/individuals/groups have equal access 
to it, or are they equally represented in it? 
3) Who controls it: is it owned by a collective entity, such as a state or a city council? 
4) What happens in it: is the space used for communication, interactions and contentious 
actions, such as protests? 
5) How it is perceived: is it perceived as a place for all, representative of all, and/or used 
by all? 
6) What it is used for/what it might become: is it where people’s perception of the public 
is shaped and/or embodied? (Ukrainian national identity has, for instance, to a large 
extent been shaped by events on Maidan, and most Ukrainians are aware of the potential 
it has in society.) 
Conversely, public space can be defined by what it is not. For instance, public space is not 
commercial or private space; it is not space reserved for only one or some groups (such as a 
 
32 The lecture was part of the University of Oslo Summer School “Public Space: People, Power, and Political 
Economy” in 2018. 
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gated community); it is not dominated by commercial interests or political control (in the form 
of heavy-handed policing or intrusive surveillance); and it is not perceived as exclusive. 
To sum up, public space is a place which, ideally, is equally accessible and open to the whole 
general population. In order for something to be a truly public space, it must be accessible to 
everyone, including all individuals, minorities, political and non-political groups, organisations, 
and so on. This access must also be granted on an equal basis, as outlined by Habermas (3.2.1). 
Urban public space 
When we add ‘urban’ to the definition of public space above, we get the following 
(geographically oriented) definition: 
Urban public space is an outdoor open area between buildings in a city environment, 
equally accessible and open to everyone in the general population.33 
Yet since all urban spaces are regulated in some way and, more often than not, are at least 
partially influenced by commercial, institutional, or political interests, it is possible that no 
urban public space in this ideal form exists. Even so, the six questions outlined above provide 
us with a tool for assessing to what degree an urban space is public. Therefore, we might add 
‘which in its ideal form is’ before ‘equally accessible and open to everyone in the general 
population’, to underline that this is an idealisation and not necessary a reflection of reality. 
In these chapters, the term ‘urban public space’ (often referred to simply as ‘public space’) is 
applied both in a general sense, i.e. to mean all the area between buildings in a city (for instance, 
the urban public space of Moscow); and a specific sense, for geographically defined areas of 
the city space (such as Swamp Square). 
4.3 Research questions 
Chapter 2 outlined the historical and contemporary context around the act of urban contention. 
Chapter 3 then related this to the various research publications on the topic, where a gap in the 
existing research was also defined. Now that the components of the research question have been 
defined in this chapter, the context is fully developed, and we can return to the research question 
as stated in the introduction: 
 
33 Conversely, Goodsell’s place-bound public space definition could be used: “In this […] space all persons 
present are within direct visual and audible range. Their mutual contact is face-to-face, within a reasonable 
distance. Probably this form of public space is the most efficient in terms of achieving true connection and inter- 
activity. This is the kind of public space, contemplated by the urban planners for their plazas and the architectural 
analysts in their ceremonial rooms” (Goodsell, 2003, p. 370). 
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How are mass protests affected by urban public space? 
It can now be expanded by using the definitions developed in this chapter: 
How are mass collective actions by pedestrians, engaged in static occupation of an urban 
public space and aimed at changing society by influencing the decisions of a target by 
nonviolent means, affected by this urban public space (i.e. outdoor open areas between 
buildings in a city environment, which in its ideal form is equally accessible and open 
to everyone in the general population)? 
The question can also be expressed as a causality figure (in which the arrow signifies effect): 
Urban public space (independent variable) → Mass protests (dependent variable) 
This opens up several secondary questions, which naturally need to be answered, in full or in 
part, in order to properly answer the main research question: 
1) What should a theoretical model exploring the causal connections between urban public 
space and mass protests look like? 
2) What variables does urban public space include? 
3) What variables do mass protests include? 
4) What other variables can be identified in the causal chain between urban space and mass 
protests? 
5) How can these variables be mapped and measured? 
These questions are the subject of the discussion in the next chapters on theory development 
(chapter 5) and on the variables of the theoretical model and the methods used to find them 
(chapter 6). The main research question is answered generally in chapter 7, and specifically in 
each of the three articles. These include versions of this main research question: “How is the 
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5 Theorising and development 
This chapter traces the development of the spatial perspective from idea to current model, and 
provides an overview of the three accompanying articles. It starts by defining some of the 
processes that brought the model to its current stage of development, including the approaches 
applied when theorising, and key qualitative methods (5.1). This is followed by a description 
of two ethical dilemmas and concerns encountered during the planning and execution of this 
research, as well as their practical solutions (5.2); and a discussion of a major pitfall of 
geographical determinism that I have aimed to avoid (5.3).  
The fourth section (5.4) recounts how the idea for this project was initially conceived and the 
outline of a relevant research gap was identified, followed by a statement of the initial goals for 
this research project. The theorising process is explicated in the fifth section (5.5), where the 
background for, and the purpose and development of, the first two articles are discussed (i.e. 
article 1, the prestudy, and article 2, the transitional study, in subsections 5.5.1 and 5.5.3, 
respectively). The sixth section discusses the development of the spatial perspective (5.6), 
followed by a seventh section (5.7) on the testing of the model in article 3. The chapter ends 
with a section on the few minor changes added to the model following the main test study (5.8). 
5.1 Approaches to theorising 
In the article “Theorizing in sociology and social science: turning to the context of discovery” 
the Swedish sociologist Richard Swedberg (2012) discusses the process of developing theories 
within social sciences. Drawing heavily on the Austrian-British philosopher Karl R. Popper and 
the German philosopher Hans Reichenbach, Swedberg identifies three elements of theory 
development: theorising, theory, and testing of the theory. According to Swedberg, in social 
sciences—which tend to be overly focused on theory and methodology—there is a lack of 
emphasis on the first (theorising) element (p. 4). 
Swedberg divides the research process in social sciences into two phases: the prestudy, which 
includes theorising and an early discovery of a phenomenon; and the main study, including 
drawing up and executing the research design and writing up the results. The first phase is the 
subject of Swedberg’s article. 
Swedberg attempts to lay out some basic rules for the creative act of theorising (see fig. 6). He 
divides these into two parts: “observation” (part I, p. 11) and “naming, conceptualisation, using 
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analogies, metaphors, and types, developing a tentative theory, including an explanation” (part 
II, p. 14). 
In the first part, Swedberg argues, one should not necessarily start theorising in a structured or 
scientific manner: “[…] one can proceed in whatever way that leads to something interesting—
and that means any way” (p. 6). By starting with facts, observing these with the use of heuristic 
methods, and only then developing a theory to explain the facts, the likelihood of creating 
original research is, according to the author, much higher. He also recommends avoiding 
reading too many secondary works early on (p. 13). 
In the second part, Swedberg suggests that the researcher should take the observed facts and 
give a proper name to the theory; conceptualise; flesh out the theory; give explanations, and so 
on. The theorising process, he argues, would also benefit from including a prestudy before the 
main study. (p. 10) 
Rule # 1 Observe—and Choose Something Interesting 
You can only theorize on the basis of observation. Anything that can stimulate to a 
full view of the phenomenon should be used, from sturdy scientific facts to art in various 
forms. “Don’t think but look!” (Wittgenstein) 
Rule # 2 Name and Formulate the Central Concept 
Give a name to what you observe and try to formulate a central concept based on it. 
Here as elsewhere abduction (Pierce) is the key. 
Rule # 3 Build Out the Theory 
Give body to the central concept by outlining the structure, pattern or organization of 
the phenomenon. Use analogies, metaphors, comparisons—and all in a heuristic way to get 
a better grip on the phenomenon under study. 
Rule # 4 Complete the Tentative Theory, including the Explanation 
Formulate or model a full tentative theory of the phenomenon, with special emphasis 
on the explanation that constitutes the natural end of the theorizing process. 
(Swedberg, 2012, p. 17) 
Figure 6: Swedberg’s basic rules of theorising. 
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Applying Swedberg’s theory 
My theorising with regard to the spatial perspective has, with few exceptions, followed the 
approach promoted by Swedberg’s (2012) article, which will be used below to illustrate the 
conceptualisation process. 
The first part of the approach—conception of the initial idea and observations—began, as I 
describe below (5.4), while doing field work in Ukraine for my master’s thesis, and the idea 
that space is important was developed in the first article for the current thesis (5.5.1), which 
became what Swedberg’s approach calls “a prestudy”. In accordance with Swedberg’s 
approach, my theorising was not limited by an excessive focus on the existing secondary works 
and theoretical approaches developed by other scholars. My background in area studies gave 
me the advantage of intimate knowledge of the case studies, while the absence of “theoretical 
baggage” left me open to theorise freely. 
It is my view, however, that any new theory or approach benefits from being scrutinised at all 
stages of development and from feedback, suggestions, and critique. Receiving this feedback 
throughout the process was particularly important for the development of this spatial 
perspective, since I had little previous knowledge in architecture, urbanism, or sociology 
(subjects that might be perceived as better fits for a project such as this). Moreover, having 
ongoing feedback helped me to avoid writing about a gap in the literature that does not exist, 
or omitting important literature from my articles. 
For these reasons, I endeavoured to present my project in as many settings as I could find, to as 
large and as varied an audience as possible. Over the entire process of the project’s 
development, I gave talks at conferences, seminars, and as guest lectures in Great Britain, 
Norway, Sweden, Ukraine, and Russia. This produced a great number of critical comments, 
thoughts, suggestions, and recommendations, some of which were integrated into my 
theoretical model. Moreover, Mass Protests from a Spatial Perspective: Discontent and Urban 
Public Space in Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow is written as an article-based thesis. The benefit of 
this format is that the two published articles have been reviewed by anonymous peers within 
various research fields (and, as an added bonus, gave me a continuous set of deadlines to meet, 
which propelled me onwards). Finally, I have had the opportunity to present the project to 
scholars of different disciplines by taking part in a diverse choice of PhD coursework options 
in Tromsø (UiT) and Oslo (UiO). Particularly valuable in this respect were the two summer 
school courses at the University of Oslo: “Case Study Research Methods” (2016) by the US 
political scientist Andrew Bennett, and “Public Space: People, Power, and Political Economy” 
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(2018) by Don Mitchell (mentioned above), which allowed me to present the project to leading 
scholars from two highly relevant fields.34 
I used the second part of Swedberg’s approach, which includes “naming, conceptualisation, 
using analogies, metaphors, and types, developing a tentative theory, including an explanation” 
(2012, p. 14), when working on the second article (5.5.3). Arguably, the second article could 
also be characterised as a prestudy, because it forms part of the theorising process and was 
written in preparation for a more thorough study of Moscow in article 3, on which the theory is 
tested. However, since article 2 could neither be described as the result of unstructured 
theorising (i.e. a prestudy) nor as a study with a fully developed theoretical model (i.e. a main 
study), I chose to call it a transitional study. 
The next three subsections describe three main qualitative methods used during the 
development and execution of this study: field work (5.1.1), the use of respondents (5.1.2), and 
mapping (5.1.3). 
5.1.1 Field work 
Field work for this project was conducted in five cities: Kyiv, Minsk, Chișinău, Moscow, and 
Paris. The advantage of conducting field work is that the researcher builds an immediate 
relationship to, and understanding of, the location analysed and events observed: cognitive 
reference points are created. By being physically present, the researcher might also observe 
details that are harder to find in maps, conversations, or in academic literature. The main 
limitations are that field work is time consuming and might not always be practically possible. 
Moreover, when observing a protest, a researcher cannot be in more than one place at a given 
time. So, while the information gathered might be detailed, the scope might also be somewhat 
restricted. The advantages nevertheless greatly outweigh the limitations. 
Although much of the data for the first article was already collected during field work in Kyiv 
for my M.A. thesis (Hansen, 2015), additional field work on Maidan and observations of 
demonstrations in the city was carried out in late 2015 and early 2016. This field work was 
done in order to check various aspects of the square and assist the theorising process. 
Since I have previously lived in Minsk, I had a good knowledge of the public spaces in the city. 
Nonetheless, to refresh my memory of the two urban spaces I planned to write about for the 
second article (October Square and Independence Square), I combined a personal trip to the 
 
34 See the section on process tracing (5.6), below, and the section on public space (3.2.1), above. 
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city in late 2015 with observations of the two squares as well as some of the nearby urban 
spaces. In order to avoid overstepping any legal boundaries created by holding a tourist visa, I 
did not observe protests, approach possible respondents, or conduct interviews while in the city. 
The interviews were conducted at a later point using communication technologies (see 5.1.2). 
When a series of mass protests erupted in Moldova in 2015–2016, I decided to travel to 
Chișinău in August 2016 to conduct preliminary field work there. The aim was to check a) 
whether the city space could become a separate case study for this thesis, and b) what could be 
learned about space and mass protests by observing contention in the city. In Chișinău, as in 
Kyiv, I already knew which specific urban space should be analysed before I arrived. For 
reasons I explain below, my field work was concentrated on mapping the Great National 
Assembly Square (Piața Marii Adunări Naționale), although I also observed other urban spaces 
nearby. I witnessed one small protest against the president at Great National Assembly Square 
during the Independence Day celebrations on 26 August 2016. I also visited museums in order 
to better understand the city and the country’s history, and conducted interviews. For reasons I 
also explain below, the city did not become a full case study (in article form), but my 
observations of its urban space, and of contention and policing of protests in the space and city, 
contributed to the development of the spatial perspective model. (See 5.5.1 for more on 
Chișinău and its contribution to this development.) 
The most structured form of field work was carried out in Moscow in June 2017, as the 
theoretical model and accompanying methodological approach were almost fully developed at 
this point. My field work in Moscow had four goals. The first was to get a general feel for the 
city and what it is like to move around in, and use, its urban public spaces. I did this mainly by 
walking around the city on foot35 and using the underground system. The second goal was to 
collect data from various squares, parks, and other urban public spaces with a tradition of protest 
or proximity to the country’s political institutions. The third and fourth goals were to observe 
mass protests in the city and how the authorities prepared for and reacted to them. I had several 
opportunities to do both.36 I did not, however, have the opportunity to observe any protests or 
 
35 I walked around Boulevard Ring and most main streets within it, notably Tverskaia Street. I also spent a great 
deal of time in the area around the Kremlin (Borovitskaia Square, Aleksandrovskii Garden, Manège Square, Red 
Square, Theater Square/Revolution Square, Chinatown). I walked around most of the western parts of Swamp 
Island (west of Greater River Mouth Bridge), and the four main streets between Rampart Street and Swamp Island 
(Greater Iakimanka Street, Greater Glade Street, Greater Ordynka Street, Piatnitskaia Street). Additionally, I 
walked to other places of interest, such as Academician Sakharov Avenue, the area around the Russian White 
House (government building), and the Arbat district. 
36 At the time, a mass rally against President Putin was planned for Russia Day, June 12, 2017, which was 
sanctioned to be held at Sakharov Avenue. The night before the action, I observed the massive preparations 
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policing strategies on Swamp Square, the urban space ultimately chosen as a case study for 
article 3. My data collection included photographing, drawing, and keeping a journal where I 
recorded data about spatial elements (explained in subsection 6.1). 
In Paris field work was conducted on 5 and 6 January 2019, during two of the demonstrations 
by the Yellow Vests social movement. The aim of this field work was threefold: 1) since Paris 
has a long and well-known history of urban contention, I wanted to see how various repertoires 
of contention and policing involved the city; 2) I also wanted to test whether the spatial 
perspective model could be applied to protests I knew little about, in a city I had never been to 
before; and 3) I wanted to test whether a Western protest could provide any new insights that 
could be added to the spatial perspective. I observed the Yellow Vests on 5 January outside 
Musée d'Orsay, where they were stopped by a wall of riot police on their way to the National 
Assembly, and the clashes that ensued. The next day, I observed a smaller and more peaceful 
demonstration on Republic Square (Place de la République), where the Yellow Vests’ first 
women’s march congregated before they gradually marched towards Champs-Élysées (more 
on this in chapter 7). 
5.1.2 Respondents 
A significant part of the qualitative data set used for this thesis comes from 30 interviews 
conducted with protest participants, politicians and protest organisers, observers, and experts. 
(See appendix 5.) This subsection includes 1) a discussion of the benefits and limitations of 
using interviews; 2) an account of the use of respondents for each of the case studies; and 3) an 
outline of the main interview structure. 
The interviews generated invaluable data for understanding not only specific protest events and 
how specific urban public spaces are shaped, perceived, and used, but also how protesters and 
organisers relate to space when planning and carrying out collective actions. In addition, 
observers and political scientists have contributed with accounts of events from the sidelines. 
From these interviews and conversations, I have identified several variables of space and 
 
beforehand, including the construction of physical obstacles in a large perimeter around the Avenue and the setting 
up of block posts with metal detectors and police command posts. Immediately before the action, the opposition 
leaders announced that the protest would be held at unsanctioned Pushkin Square instead, and that they would 
march on Tverskaia Street. This led me to observe how quickly the police efficiently blocked off the whole area 
around Tverskaia, dividing its southern parts from Pushkinskaia Square. During the action, the police successfully 
diverted the protesters (and their energy) away from the announced place of action by enforcing one-way 
movement in a large number of streets. Being on the southern part of the police blockades, I spent more than an 
hour trying to get around to the other side, ultimately without success. The next day I observed a small protest 
against police brutality outside the State Duma (Federal Assembly, lower house). 
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protest, as well as the goals of protesters. I achieved a nuanced understanding of the mindset of 
protesters and protest organisers, and tested some of my hypotheses on them. Hence, my 
theorising has benefitted a great deal from interviews and conversations. The limitations of 
qualitative interviewing are mainly related to the time and effort it takes to prepare, conduct, 
and process them. Interviews, especially in semi- to fully authoritarian states, also require some 
significant ethical decisions (5.2). 
The interviews used in article 1 on Maidan were conducted for my M.A. thesis in 2014. The 
interviews did not have a unified layout, covered a variety of topics, and consisted, with few 
exceptions, of open-ended questions. The in-depth interviews were with four participants in 
Euromaidan (three Ukrainian and one Belarusian), and two observers of the revolution (one 
Ukrainian and one Norwegian). I also had a large number of conversations in and around the 
protest camp at Maidan in the course of events, with both protesters and observers, and a 
number of pilot interviews and unstructured conversations (some of which are included in 
appendix 5). Since most of the interviews included questions about the respondent’s subjective 
understanding of Maidan and about the square’s function in Ukrainian society, they gave me 
enough material to act as a basis for the arguments presented in article 1 about the function and 
symbolic value of the square. 
For the research on Great National Assembly Square, I carried out six interviews with three 
political scientists (one Moldovan, one East European, and one Scandinavian), one observer 
(from Scandinavia), and two interviews with one protest organiser/activist. The interviews were 
semi-structured around a number of open-ended questions, adapted to each individual 
interviewee, about the situation in the country, the various political actions that had already 
occurred, and the Great National Assembly Square. Some questions were based on Lynch’s 
(1960) methodology for mapping people’s perception of urban space (see the outline of the 
interview structure, as stated below; and 3.2.2 on Lynch). I also had a number of informal and 
unstructured conversations with protesters and other people I met while in the city. 
For article 2 on October Square and Independence Square in Minsk, I interviewed five 
respondents who had participated in protests, three politicians/protest organisers, and one 
observer. All were Belarusians. These interviews were semi-structured with open-ended 
questions about the political situation in the country, their activism or actions they have 
witnessed, and about the city and the two specific urban spaces. At the end of the interviews I 
would often include my own thoughts and hypotheses about the role of space in general and 
about the effect of the two squares on the 2006 and 2010 protests in particular. This frequently 
Mass Protests from a Spatial Perspective 
 54 
generated new discussions, as the interviewees were often sceptical of my hypotheses. But, as 
they had “warmed up” with their own accounts of past events and entered a spatial mindset by 
describing the two squares to me, several new aspects of space and the effects of space on 
protests were identified in discussion. One significant variable in the interview process was the 
location in which the interviews were conducted. Whilst most of the interviews for Maidan and 
Great National Assembly Square were conducted face-to-face (in parks and cafes), all the 
interviews about the squares in Minsk were dependent on communication technology (video 
calls, telephone, and e-mail) (see Hansen, 2017, pp. 35–36). 
For article 3 on Swamp Square in Moscow, I decided not to interview respondents for two main 
reasons. One was ethical, relating to the safety of my respondents (5.2); another practical, 
relating to the planned layout of the third article (5.7). Before I decided not to carry out 
interviews, I conducted one pilot interview, but the data generated from this was not used in the 
article. Not including interviews had several consequences, most importantly a smaller 
qualitative data set. I would also potentially miss important information about events and 
aspects of Swamp Square, and would not be able to fully map the perceived (i.e. subjective, see 
6.1.1) elements of the urban space or to test all of my hypotheses about Swamp Square. To add 
to the data set, I sent out a Google Forms questionnaire on a social media platform I use on and 
off.37 The survey mainly consisted of questions about how citizens of Moscow and other people 
with knowledge of Moscow perceived the city, and one open question about the effect Moscow 
has on public actions, such as demonstrations and parades. The object of the survey was to map 
the perceived and social elements of the city (6.1.1 and 6.1.3), and see what ideas people had 
about spatial effects. Although the questionnaire generated 154 responses of varying quality 
and length, and the answers presented a number of viewpoints about the effects of space 
(ranging from “I have never thought about that” or “we have no space to demonstrate in” to 
“[Moscow affects protests] as a bucket of water on quarks”), these were not included in the 
article, as the scientific value of the survey was questionable. Instead, my research (based on 
field work, mapping, and academic literature) was complemented with informal conversations 
about my hypotheses with colleagues and acquaintances with a knowledge of the city. 
 
37 YouTube (Hansen, n.d.). At the time of writing, the channel has 23,500 subscribers (mostly Russophone and 
Ukrainophone). YouTube does not provide information about the number of Muscovite subscribers, but 49.8 % 
of the channel’s views are from Russia. 
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I decided not to carry out any conversations or qualitative interviews with respondents on 
Republic Square in Paris, as I have little command of French. Besides, my time in the city was 
greatly limited. 
The main interview structure 
All interviews started with my telling the respondent about the project, what it was for, and 
their rights as a respondent. Most importantly, I asked the respondents whether they consented 
to my use of the information they provided (this point is further elaborated in subsection 5.2.1). 
The respondents were then asked to share with me their 
1) description of the political situation in the country today; 
2) account of actions they had attended or observed. 
Once they had spoken about these actions in their own words, I would ask about goals, 
important events, and impact, in order to obtain 
3) a description of the physical space where the action occurred; 
4) a description of the social space (i.e. who uses the space, at what time and for which 
purposes); 
5) a description of the perceived space (i.e. the respondents’ subjective opinion about the 
space). 
If any elements (physical, social, or perceived) were left out, I would sometimes prompt the 
respondents with questions like “What exits were available to you during the protest?”.  
6) Often, I would present some of my findings to the respondents and ask them to comment 
on them. These questions often stimulated a whole new discussion about the importance 
of space, the impact of which the respondents initially downplayed almost without 
exception, yet which often produced new insights.38 
The semi-structuring of the interviews was due to my not knowing exactly what I was looking 
for at first; most of the variables were not yet identified at this stage, and the independent 
variables had not yet been thoroughly defined. My aim was to get the respondents themselves 
to tell me about the protest in the space and to identify the variables they found important, 
before looking into the specific spatial elements and qualities. 
 
38 See for example this excerpt from the conversation with a respondent by the name of Paŭliuk: “Come to think 
about it, [we associate the square…] with the authorities, with failed desires, dreams, [...] yes, and with 
disappointment.” (Hansen, 2017, p. 43). 
Mass Protests from a Spatial Perspective 
 56 
5.1.3 Mapping 
The maps used for this project were created using the vector programming tool Adobe 
Illustrator CS6 and based on a wide range of sources, including: online mapping services, such 
as OpenStreetMap, Google Maps, and Yandex Maps; field notes and drawings; research 
literature; news articles; Wikipedia; and protest sites, groups, and channels on social media 
platforms (mainly Facebook and YouTube). All the case studies have benefitted from the use 
of mapping as a tool at four stages of development: 
As preparation for field work. Mapping was of great assistance to me while creating a list of 
points of interest and routes to walk while in the city (although, once on site, I often deviated 
from these lists and routes for various reasons). In Minsk and Chișinău I knew exactly which 
spaces to analyse, and in Paris I had a general idea (Republic Square, Champs-Élysées, and 
Bastille Square), but mapping these spaces identified districts, spots, and objects I marked as 
interesting. Mapping was especially important for the study of Moscow, as I had only a few 
initial ideas about which within-case studies to include in article 3. 
During field work. Digital or hand-drawn maps were used on location in all the spaces 
analysed as part of the field diary. In the diary, notes about elements and other aspects of urban 
spaces were continually added for later reference. 
During analysis. The mapping of cities and urban spaces facilitated the process of examining 
sites, as maps can function both as visual guides to places and events and as reference points 
while writing the analysis. 
Presenting the results. The developed maps also functioned as illustrations for paper 
presentations and in the articles. The unnecessary parts of the maps were removed in order to 
leave only the relevant points; the reader should, if I have done my job properly, be presented 
with a simplified illustration of the points I make about the space under consideration. 
5.2 Ethical considerations 
Researching mass protests in authoritarian countries is no easy matter and requires a number of 
practical and ethical decisions. This study is no exception, and two key dilemmas had to be 
resolved. The first concern is how to handle respondents with proper care, respecting their rights 
and protecting them from potential repercussions. The second is related to the possible misuse 
of my research. 
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The decisions I have made are based on The National (Norwegian) Committee for Research 
Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities’ “Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social 
Sciences, Humanities, Law and Theology” (NESH, 2016). Although all the committee’s 
guidelines have been read through and form the ethical foundation for this study, chapters B 
“Respect for individuals” and C “Respect for groups and institutions” are of particular 
importance. 
5.2.1 Interview ethics 
While preparing for and carrying out the interviews, as well as processing them, the rights and 
safety of the respondents were always my highest priority. An account of how the interviews 
were conducted in this regard is provided below. This is followed by a discussion about gaining 
access to Russia and one practical implication of being open about my work. 
Pre-interview 
Before the interviews, I did my best to inform the respondents about my project, where I 
worked, how the respondents’ information would be handled and where it would be published. 
They were also informed that, up until the moment of publication, they had the right to review 
their answers or withdraw them altogether, and that I would not question their decision to do 
so. 
I informed the interviewees in advance that they would be given pseudonyms. Exceptions were 
made for some of the elite interviewees (politicians, observers, and experts), who participated 
as public figures; they were explicitly informed that I would attach their names to their answers. 
None of the respondents thus informed had any objections to being referred to by name, and no 
one withdrew their participation. This is probably because elites—and particularly high-profile 
politicians—already have a visible and well-known political standpoint. Leaders of the 
opposition talk to foreign media and researchers on a regular basis, and this project would not 
worsen their situation in any notable way. Moreover, the extra publicity such a study might 
produce can be beneficial for a politician or opposition leader. 
It must be noted, however, that even though some public figures were identified, I have omitted 
any irrelevant or personally sensitive information I may have acquired during these interviews. 
If, for some reason, I was unable to inform the respondents of some or all of these aspects in 
advance of the interview, these were explained at the start of the interview itself and the 
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respondents were given the opportunity to take some time to think this over and, if they wished, 
to discontinue the interview. 
Interview 
At the start of each interview, I once again informed each respondent about the project and their 
rights as a respondent, and asked them if they consented to participate. I told them how the 
interviews would be conducted and about their rights to withdraw from participation at any 
moment without needing to provide a reason for doing so. I also informed them how their 
personal and sensitive information would be handled afterwards. 
Post-interview 
The interviews were processed by myself alone, and personally sensitive information that could 
be used to identify the respondents was stored on a password-protected external hard drive 
accessible only by me. The information was not stored for any longer than strictly necessary. 
At the time of writing, all personal and potentially sensitive information has been permanently 
deleted. 
Russia 
Gaining access to the countries in which I intended to conduct field work usually did not pose 
any practical problems. Both Ukraine and Moldova have a visa-free regime for citizens of EEA 
countries; the visit to Minsk, a city I know very well, was (as stated above, 5.1.1) limited to 
observations; and France is located in the EU. By contrast, I did not have the same access to 
Russia, as travel to the country requires a visa. Nor did I have the same previous knowledge of 
Moscow as of Minsk and Kyiv, since I had only visited the city for shorter periods. 
I wanted to be open about my work in Russia, especially as I was co-organising a seminar at 
the Norwegian University Centre in St. Petersburg on the centenary of the October Revolution, 
where I wanted to talk about my project. The decision had some practical implications, 
however, and I was determined to act with extra caution in case the Russian authorities took an 
interest in my work. I could no longer be absolutely sure that conversations and interviews with 
respondents would not come to the attention of the authorities and so put respondents in a 
difficult situation. For this reason, as well as the practical reasons explained in section 5.7, I 
concentrated on the development of the theoretical aspects of the spatial perspective, which by 
that time had become more important than the qualitative interviews. 
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5.2.2 Practical utility 
When presenting this project, I have often been confronted with the potential consequences and 
misuses of my thesis. One critical argument has been that my study could be used by 
authoritarian leaders to design public spaces in such a way as to ease the suppression of mass 
protests. Another has been that my research could be used by radical groupings and violent 
mobs in order to overthrow peaceful governments and stable democracies. 
I believe such criticism to be naïve. 
The short answer to the first argument is that my research probably does not provide authorities 
or police strategists with any new knowledge of importance. In all three case studies, I have 
shown examples of authorities using space in order to limit public protests (Hansen, 2016, p. 
128/11; 2017, pp. 50–51, 53; 2019, pp. 18–20). It is only natural that law enforcement agents 
sit down before a planned march or protest to discuss the possibilities and limitations that 
various spaces provide and how to avoid damages, minimise injuries, etc. What I might have 
done, however, is provide them with updated language to discuss such space more efficiently. 
Moreover, taking the long view, rebuilding a city so as to avoid protest would require great 
time and effort. It is, of course, a possibility which cannot be excluded; but I highly doubt that 
any future dictator would look at my dissertation and design a city full of Swamp and October 
squares.  
My response to the second argument is similar. Although protesters may not think about spatial 
features in the same way as the police do, my research shows that protesters are aware of their 
surroundings and instinctively know which possibilities and/or obstacles they might encounter. 
My contribution is making these observations available for academic study. 
5.3 Geographical determinism 
Before I proceed to delineate the process of conceptualising and theorising the spatial 
perspective model, I must mention my main reservation. Often, when examining the causal 
effects of geography, it is easy to become caught up in the geographical context, finding cause 
only in geography and disregarding other factors. Few if any illustrate this problem of 
deterministic argumentation better than the British journalist Tim Marshall who, in his book 
Prisoners of Geography (2015), demonstrates how the researcher can be trapped by the 
geographical argument. 
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In the book, the world is presented as a geopolitical battleground, a zero-sum game for resources 
and strategic positions between superpowers. Yet, even though most of Marshall’s ten 
geopolitical case studies arguably are affected by geography, it is by far not the only factor in 
international relations, and Marshall often exaggerates its importance. An example of this is his 
case study of Russia. In his assessment of the country’s geography, Marshall states that Russia’s 
foreign policy has, historically and presently, been determined by the country’s lack of warm-
water ports as well as the lack of a prominent mountain range between Russia and the rest of 
Europe. Viewed in isolation, these statements probably hold true; but the argumentation 
disregards a number of other factors, such as the effectiveness of rulers, religion, random 
events, etc. 
Marshall proceeds to explain the Russo-Ukrainian conflict on the basis of this same 
geographical argument. He presents the conflict largely as a result of, firstly, Crimea and the 
Black Sea Fleet’s strategic importance for Russia; and, secondly, NATO and EU meddling in 
Russia’s sphere of influence. Therefore, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was allegedly the only 
viable option open to Putin, and the crisis was near-inevitable. Moreover, Marshall’s argument 
is supported by oft-repeated simplifications of two complex and multifaceted countries. 
Ukraine, for instance, is presented as a country with two clearly definable regions (shaped, of 
course, by geography), a pro-European West and a pro-Russian East, even though this is far 
from the case;39 the whole formal political opposition to Yanukovych is called “anti-Russian”, 
although the majority of it (represented by the UDAR and Fatherland political parties) was 
decidedly not so; and Ukrainians are depicted as pawns in a geopolitical chess game, without a 
will of their own. 
The upshot of this argumentation is that geography and geopolitical interests are indeed to 
blame for the Ukrainian crisis. But such a one-dimensional macro perspective cannot possibly 
explain by itself Russia’s interventions in Ukraine. At the least, the claim should not be made 
without first examining alternative/complementary explanations of the conflict. 
Having read Marshall’s book,40 I became very aware of the dangers of such a deterministic 
argumentation; and I decided early in the theorising process not to become yet another prisoner 
of geography. This is one of the reasons why the importance of the political environment is 
emphasised in this study (5.6). 
 
39 See for instance Barrington and Herron (2004) and Onuch & Hale (2018). 
40 I feel obliged to add that I thoroughly enjoyed the book. Despite its oversimplifications, it was easy to read, 
informative and witty. 
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5.4 Conception 
In the introduction to this thesis, I described one of the many moments during Euromaidan 
when I experienced first-hand the value of using Maidan for protests. During the events in Kyiv, 
I observed that the square was not only an ideological platform, as the place where Ukrainians 
demand more democracy and civil rights. The architecture, history, and geography of the square 
also reinforced the protesters, both practically and symbolically. This realisation made me want 
to investigate this phenomenon closer, to pinpoint the characteristics that made Maidan so 
special. 
5.4.1 M.A. thesis 
Although I have presented this as an eureka moment, more development was needed before I 
could start theorising. I had travelled to Kyiv in June 2013 because I wanted to write my 
Master’s thesis about some of the contention in the region, which had fascinated me ever since 
I first moved to Belarus in 2006. Mass protests were frequent when I lived in Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Russia, but their means, methods, and results were often different. 
By chance, I arrived in Kyiv five months before Euromaidan began, and I was able to witness 
the 2013–2014 revolution from its early beginning through to its political aftermath. Fascinated 
by the events that were unfolding in the Ukrainian capital, I decided in December 2013 to 
change the topic of my M.A. thesis to an examination of the driving forces of Euromaidan. 
In the introductory chapter to that thesis, I wanted to address the space where the revolution 
occurred and explain some of its historic and socio-political significance. The reason for this 
was threefold. 1) The protesters made many references to Maidan. The protest was called 
Euromaidan (Ukr. ievromaidan: ievro [Europe] + maidan), and the protesters were 
maidanovtsy (maidan + ovtsy [people of]). A group of mobile protesters in cars contributed to 
the protests, and this was called Avtomaidan (avto [automobile] + maidan). And the pro-
governmental countermovement was called Antimaidan, and often used derogatory terms for 
the maidanovtsy, such as maidaunovtsy (maidan + daun, for the medical condition Down’s 
syndrome). 2) The protesters talked about the square with reverence, as if it were a physical 
manifestation of an ideal democratic institution. Several of my respondents perceived Maidan 
as a modern form of medieval public assemblies, such as the Old Slavic Viche or the Old Norse 
Thing. 3) Some of the physical characteristics of the square indicated that it was suitable, not 
only as a symbol, but also as a strategic location for protests. 
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In order to better understand the importance of Maidan, I turned my attention to concepts in 
political philosophy, such as Habermas’s public sphere and Arendt’s public space, and to 
architecture and urban planning (Kevin Lynch, 1960); but I did not find a satisfactory 
explanation for the success of Maidan Square as a protest space. At the same time, while 
working on the other (main) parts of the master’s thesis, I realised that the chapter on Maidan 
was growing and threatening to become the main subject of the thesis. For this reason, I 
narrowed down the chapter and put some of my findings aside for a future project. 
5.4.2 PhD proposal 
From the first project draft, one of my main aims has been to examine the power of space, while 
at the same time researching the opposition in a region I know well and am very much intrigued 
by. The three countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia) have—despite a similar historic and 
political background—very different forms of opposition, and the three capital cities are quite 
different from each other. Starting from this proposition, the original research questions were 
stated in the research proposal as follows: 
Are there urban spaces [similar to Maidan Square] in Russia and Belarus, in which the 
population can express their discontent? If so, where are these spaces located, what 
characterises them, how do they function [as public spaces] or why do they not 
function?41 
These initial questions are not far removed from the current research question: 
How are mass protests affected by urban public space? 
The difference is that the current question is more generalised, while the original questions were 
embedded within each of the case studies, expressed (with some variations) in the following, 
condensed manner: 
How is the opposition in Ukraine/Belarus/Russia affected by the urban public space in 
Kyiv/Minsk/Moscow? 
The initial hypothesis, formulated in the research proposal was that… 
 
41 From the research proposal (in Norwegian): “Finnes det tilsvarende rom i Russland og Hviterussland hvor 
befolkningen kan uttrykke sin misnøye? Hvor er i så fall disse, hva kjennetegner dem, hvordan fungerer de eller 
hvorfor fungerer de ikke? Dette ph.d-prosjektet tar sikte på å kartlegge, analysere og sammenligne offentlige 
byrom som brukes, eller inviterer til å brukes, til protester i Moskva, Minsk og Kyiv.” 
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[…] not only reprehensible social, political, and economic conditions need to be present 
for larger demonstrations to occur, gain momentum/popular support, and persevere for 
a long time. The access to a symbolic gathering place that possesses a variety of practical 
and physical properties is probably a necessary condition, too.42 
— 
Based on the methods, ethical considerations, and reservation described above, the next four 
sections describe how the initial hypothesis developed into a full-fledged theoretical model, 
from the various stages of theorising (5.5), through a development of a causality model (5.6), 
to the main study of Moscow (5.7), ending with the adjustments made to the theory after the 
main study (5.8). 
5.5 Theorising 
Starting from the initial hypothesis stated above, I had to conduct some initial examinations of 
the effects of urban public space on oppositional activity in order to identify the phenomenon’s 
variables. The best option, by my estimation, was to perform a prestudy of Maidan Square, 
which I knew very well as a place with positive spatial characteristics. 
5.5.1 Prestudy 
Without much previous theoretical knowledge from urbanism, architecture, or sociology, I set 
out to describe Maidan Nezalezhnosti’s effect on mass protests. Interestingly, even though 
spaces of contention had been discussed in a variety of cases (3.2), I could not find a theory 
that addressed why some locations were more suitable for protest than others. For this reason, 
I used Kevin Lynch’s (1960) theories of urban planning (3.2.2) as a loose frame of reference to 
identify some key physical and social features of the square. This framework formed the basis 
for discussing the value of these features. The lack of a strict theoretical framework allowed me 
to cast my net wide and identify as many explanations as possible as to why Maidan had become 
Ukraine’s preferred urban public space for mass protest. 
The field work and interviews conducted in Kyiv during and after Euromaidan contributed 
considerably to my theorising and to my assessment of how the square was perceived in 
Ukraine. I also looked into academic literature on the square’s history, daily uses, layout, and 
 
42 “Min hypotese er at det ikke bare er kritikkverdige sosiale, politiske og økonomiske forhold som må være tilstede 
for at større demonstrasjoner skal oppstå, få moment/oppslutning og vare lenge. Tilgjengeligheten av et symbolsk 
samlingssted som innehar en rekke praktiske og fysiske egenskaper er antageligvis også et nødvendig forhold.” 
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position, as well as its local and regional significance, and found that there were several reasons 
for the special significance and symbolic value of the square: Maidan’s history, architecture, 
symbolic monuments, landmarks, and location all signify that it is a central part of Ukrainian 
history and represents a majority of the population. Its current and previous names43 imply a 
revolutionary quality that can be perceived as a protest against Russian hegemony. Its visibility 
in the centre of the city, in a location of local, regional, and geopolitical significance (political, 
religious, and cultural), attracts national and international attention to protests, including media 
coverage. Additionally, it is easily defendable, hard to supress with normal policing strategies, 
and easy to get to and get away from. In Ukraine, Maidan is perceived as a safety valve in a 
corrupt and dysfunctional political system: the only place where the actions of the people are 
viewed as having a real impact on politics. 
The first case study thus served to open up the field and identify some key categories in the 
relationship between space and protest. It confirmed that, in the Ukrainian context, my initial 
hypothesis was—at the very least—not wrong. Urban public space had a positive impact on 
contentious actions in the city, and my findings indicated that the spatial qualities of the square 
contributed to the success of Euromaidan. Moreover, since there seemed to be few theoretical 
approaches to the analysis of protest spaces, it led to the realisation that a new theoretical model 
was required if I was to take the analysis of urban space to the level I wanted. 
5.5.2 Formulating a theory 
The knowledge I gained from the prestudy led me to what Swedberg’s terminology (2012) 
identifies as the second part of theorising: “naming, conceptualisation, using analogies, 
metaphors, and types, developing a tentative theory, including an explanation” (p. 14). 
Swedberg argues that naming, if possible, should be descriptive but simple, and he urges 
caution in inventing new words and expressions (pp. 19–20). I chose to name my model “a 
spatial perspective on mass protests” because this describes the essence of what I am trying to 
do—looking at mass protests from the viewpoint of space—and also employs accessible, clear, 
and consistent language. 
Swedberg proposes a wide range of heuristic methods to conceptualise and “flesh out” the 
theory, to help the researcher understand the phenomenon he or she is studying. (Swedberg, 
2012, pp. 23–24) I used analogies, such as comparing public space to democratic and/or 
 
43 October Revolution Square, 1977–1991; Maidan Nezalezhnosti, since 1991. 
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representative institutions, or, in the case of an occupation protest, as a separate society. 
Another of Swedberg’s suggested methods is testing explanations using counterfactual 
arguments. To take one example: a square with many entrances (such as Maidan) is arguably 
hard to control by the authorities. The counterfactual argument would be that a square with few 
entrances would by default be easy to control by the authorities. 
Categorisation and typologies also emerged as efficient tools of theorising. Based on data from 
field work and interviews, 18 new elements with particular relevance to mass protests were 
added to Lynch’s (1960) original five, and these were divided into three categories: perceived, 
social, and physical elements (see fig. 7). By naming the different parts of urban space and 
dividing them into categories, it became easier to discuss space based on its variations, but also 
to identify how different spaces contain many of the same or similar elements (floor, exits, 
entrances etc.). Categorisation was especially fruitful when combined with the counterfactual 
tool of “ideal types” (Swedberg, 2012, p. 25). What might be considered a perfect space for 
protests? What might be considered a functional space for displaying the might of the 
authorities, while also discouraging protests? This method highlights the use value of the 
different elements and categories of public spaces. Observing protests in Kyiv and Chișinău 
also led to the discovery that non-physical elements—such as the history of a space, people’s 
relation to the space, its traditions and day-to-day usage, and so on—can affect protests, and 
should therefore also form part of the theory. 
Perceived elements Social elements Physical elements 
History Paths Location 
Ideological symbols Nodes Size 
Buildings Buildings Shape 
Landmarks Landmarks Entrances 
Monuments Districts Exits 
History of protests Traditions Walls 
 Official use Floor 
  Objects 
  Obstacles 
  Edges 
  Public works 
  Focal points 
Figure 7: Elements of the city, from article 2 (Hansen, 2017, p. 36). 
Following this unstructured conceptualising, the updated theoretical model consisted of 
mapping the spatial elements which, if properly identified and examined, would be a good 
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foundation for discussing the space’s value as a protest location. Once this was combined with 
field work, interviews, and academic literature on history and past collective actions, I would 
be able to create a fuller picture of the possibilities and limitations that a given space provides. 
5.5.3 Transitional study 
In order to test my post-Kyivan spatial perspective, I needed a second case study. I had already 
planned a study of public space in Minsk, but it so happened that in 2016, while I was 
conceptualising and developing my model, mass protests flared up in the Moldovan capital 
Chișinău.44 Still living in Kyiv, I decided to travel to Chișinău in August 2016 to establish 
whether the urban public space of Chișinău would make a suitable second case study. 
Chișinău 
There seemed to be many similarities between the Ukrainian and Moldovan cases. The 
international media had dubbed the social movement in the city “the Moldovan Maidan” 
(“‘Maidan’ pașnic la Chișinău,” 2015; “Moldova\’s [sic] Maidan,” 2016), partly because of the 
similarities with the initial Euromaidan protests in Kyiv in 2013 and partly because in Chișinău, 
too, the protesters occupied a central square. In 2015, they had established an encampment on 
Great National Assembly Square (Piața Marii Adunări Naționale), and parts of the opposition 
were working on organising a similar event in 2016. Both Moldova and Ukraine are post-Soviet 
countries with a history of widespread corruption. Both had experienced a colour revolution in 
the 2000s (Ukraine in 2004, Moldova in 2009), the aftermath of which still affected both 
countries. Both had a square in their capital cities where there was a tradition of mass protest. 
And Russian is spoken by a large minority in both countries, too. 
However, when I arrived in Chișinău in August 2016, it immediately became clear to me that 
this would be a more difficult case study than Kyiv. First of all, even though many Moldovans 
speak English, Russian, or Ukrainian to a sufficient level, I encountered several Moldovans 
(especially young ones) who did not know or did not want to speak the two latter languages, 
while speaking very basic English. As I do not speak Romanian, I would not have access to a 
significant part of the population. Secondly, while Chișinău is a small city of approximately 
686,000 inhabitants (“Populaţia şi,” n.d.), Kyiv is a metropolis with 2.9 million registered 
citizens (“Chysel’nist’ naselennia,” 2019). (The actual number of inhabitants is probably a great 
 
44 These were part of a continuing protest movement against corruption in one of Europe’s poorest countries. The 
protests of 2015–2016 were triggered by the disappearance of 1 billion USD from Moldovan banks, and were 
largely directed against the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc (see Całus, 2016). 
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deal higher [“Naselennia Kyïvs’koï ahlomeratsiï,” 2019].) Additionally, although the centres 
of both cities were badly damaged during the Second World War and rebuilt as examples of 
Stalinist Soviet classist architecture, the architecture of the remaining parts of Chișinău differed 
a great deal from the architecture of Kyiv (topography, size of buildings, width of streets, 
layout, etc.). Thirdly, in Moldova, the culture (both traditional and popular) also came in no 
small degree from neighbouring Romania, which differs from Slavic, and especially Russian, 
culture. Fourthly, while Moldova is no more ethnically diverse than Ukraine, the tensions 
between Moldovans, Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Gagauzians have been a bigger 
part of the political picture than ethnic tensions in Ukraine (at least up until 2014). Moldova 
has an unresolved conflict (from 1992) between Russia-supported separatists in the Transnistria 
Region in the East and an autonomous Gagauzian territory in the South, which in 2014 held a 
non-binding referendum in favour of declaring independence if Moldova joins the EU. Last but 
not least, there is a large social movement among Moldovans identifying themselves as 
ethnically Romanian, which calls for Moldova to unite with neighbouring Romania. 
Although the goal of my second article was to create an approach that, in theory, would be 
applicable to all cities, it would complicate the theorising process and make comparison more 
difficult and speculative if I did not have a thorough knowledge and full command of my 
research material. I therefore decided to leave Great National Assembly Square and Chișinău 
as a possible case study for a later point. Nonetheless, I used the time allotted in Moldova to 
practice mapping the central square; learning about Moldova’s political, cultural, and 
architectural history; conducting interviews; and talking to people I met about the situation in 
the country and their views about life, which, as stated repeatedly in this chapter, assisted me 
in theorising about space and protests in general. 
Minsk 
Leaving Chișinău aside, I turned my attention to Minsk, where I already had a network of 
friends and contacts. As I explored in chapter two, Minsk and Kyiv have many similarities 
(2.2), which make the differences stand out even more. While Ukraine’s two revolutions of 
2004–2005 and 2013–2014 were successful, the two attempted Belarusian colour revolutions 
of 2006 and 2010 were violently suppressed, and virtually no mass protest in Minsk has 
achieved any political impact during Aliaksandr Lukashėnka’s 25-year reign. Moreover, the 
Belarusian opposition did not have a single preferred protest space. This could be attributed to 
the fact that Minsk was built post-WWII as a model Soviet city, with wide avenues, massive 
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buildings and open spaces—a style that Belarus’ only president so far, Lukashėnka, has 
continued to endorse. 
Based on the methods described above (5.1.1–5.1.3), I analysed two urban public spaces, 
October Square and Independence Square, which were used during Minsk’s two failed 
Belarusian colour revolutions. This case study showed that the three categories (6.1) had 
(almost universally) a negative impact on mass protests in the city, and that there is little room 
for protests in Lukashėnka’s meticulously controlled and highly Sovietised space. Finally, the 
article demonstrated that there was room and possible utility for my approach, even in places 
less suitable for protest, and that a spatial perspective could provide new insights into the 
difficulties facing the Belarusian opposition today. 
5.6 Causal chains 
At this point, the spatial perspective had developed from the observation of an idea into a 
hypothesis about the importance of urban public space, which had then been tested on a 
prestudy, developed into a tentative theory, and applied to a second case study. 
Importantly, the transitional study identified some structural weaknesses in the model. It is one 
thing to provide a detailed description of a city and its spaces and then, in relation to previous 
actions, to discuss how protesters and protest organisers perceive the said space. An approach 
like this might give a good indication of the practical (dis-)advantages of a square. To prove a 
causality relation or effect is another matter. The model required a theory that linked the 
independent variable (urban public space) to the dependent variable (mass protests). 
I therefore turned to process tracing (PT). Inspired by the methods used in criminology, PT was 
developed by the US political scientists Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel to study causality 
in political sciences and international relations. PT systematically traces causal mechanisms by 
finding and examining evidence for every observable point within causal chains between 
independent and dependent variables. Key pieces of evidence are described and analysed in 
order to prove (or falsify) a correlation between the variables of case studies. Additionally, PT 
recommends that all parts of a causality relationship are tested thoroughly and suggests using a 
mix of different methods, depending on the case study at hand. (Bennett & Checkel, 2015) 
In Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, Beach & Pedersen (2013) criticise 
the lack of a unified way to implement the PT approach, and provide a set of guidelines to 
overcome this limitation. They identify three main uses of process tracing, of which theory-
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testing PT and theory-building PT are of particular relevance to this thesis. On one hand, theory-
testing PT starts with a phenomenon and the mechanisms which propose to explain it, and 
examines case studies in order to find evidence supporting or undermining the hypotheses in 
the theory (pp. 14–16). Theory building PT, on the other hand, starts from the other side, with 
the case studies, and uses evidence to generate hypotheses for the mechanisms that create a 
phenomenon. In turn, these hypotheses are used to create a theory (pp. 16–18). Both approaches 
are adopted in my spatial perspective model. 
From this point onwards, I expanded and regrouped the independent variables (i.e. the spatial 
elements).45 I also found that the spatial elements could be assessed on the basis of the spatial 
qualities they formed. By analysing past events in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, I identified 
seven such spatial qualities: accessibility, mobility, defensibility/policeability, sense of safety, 
visibility, symbolic value, and motivation. 
The dependent variables could in turn be subdivided into more practical units. I found that all 
mass protests have a preparation phase, an execution phase, and some level of impact. This 
could be used as a tool for assessing three areas potentially affected by urban public space: the 
emergence, realisation, and impact of mass protests. 
Another key element of process tracing is that one should be equally thorough with all theories 
applied to a target phenomenon. Proving or falsifying one’s own hypotheses is not considered 
more important than proving or disproving other people’s hypotheses. These hypotheses are, 
essentially, other factors that may or may not affect the dependent variable. To identify such 
factors and other explanations of why protests sometimes occur and have great impact, I looked 
for explanations in academic literature on specific case studies, as well as the general conditions 
that could be found in the relevant literature on sociology and on colour revolutions (3.1). 
For the model to work, it had to examine not only how spatial qualities affect the emergence, 
realisation, and impact of mass protests, but also the impact of space on other factors. For 
example, in the case of Belarus, research literature often finds that the sense of national identity 
within the country is prevalently weak (e.g. Törnquist-Plewa, 2001, p. 81; Rudling, 2008). 
Rather than dismissing this as a rival hypothesis to explain the low impact of previous mass 
protests, the Belarusian identity—which to a large extent is based on Belarus’s Soviet past and 
 
45 Three elements (emotions, feelings, associations) were added to the perceived elements and put in a separate 
subcategory, based on methodology (6.1.1); one element was removed (obstacles); one was added (open/empty 
space), and one element changed name (from traditions to traditional use). These changes were made in order to 
clarify the independent variables. 
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Lukashėnkian present—could be examined with a view to how it is reinforced by the city’s 
perceived elements (6.1.1). The Soviet monumentality of the city creates an urban space that 
confirms the grandeur and immortality of the stable status quo, and might lessen people’s 
motivation to go out and join a protest. 
Because such spatial and non-spatial factors might have a correlative effect on mass protests, 
the factors have been grouped together as the collective term “political environment”; a term 
originating in POS theory. See subsection 3.1.4 for an overview of the political environment. 
The model is illustrated with two figures. Figure 8 (below) is a (theoretical) diagram of the 
causality, while figure 9 (next chapter) explains how the causality (methodologically) can be 
found. The figures demonstrate that the combined effect of spatial qualities (shaped by the 
spatial elements) and other factors in the political environment can significantly affect urban 
mass protests. 
 
Figure 8: Causality diagram. Arrows (→) signify effect. 
Independent variables:
Spatial elements
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5.7 Main study 
The third step of theory building consists of testing the model to see how it works when applied 
to a case study. In addition to the similarities and differences between Moscow, Kyiv and Minsk 
(see 2.2), the Russian capital was chosen because it is a metropolis consisting of a wide range 
of different spaces. Moreover, while Maidan is a space almost universally suited for protest, 
and October and Independence squares in Minsk almost universally unsuited, there are multiple 
urban public spaces in Moscow that have a history of protest, with varied outcomes. 
The article on Moscow became more of a theoretical paper than the previous two articles, as 
the object of the study was not only to see how space in the city creates opportunities and 
obstacles for the Russian opposition (which had been done in the transitional study), but 
primarily to test the more complex theoretical model and argue that the spatial perspective is 
useful as a methodological tool. An argumentation of this type needs plenty of room. It was 
therefore necessary either to apply the model to only one urban space, or to discard most 
descriptions from the within-case studies conducted. The former option seemed the most 
logical, as the argumentation needed examples in order to be effective, and so the article was 
divided in two parts: one theoretical, which describes the model; and another practical, in which 
the model is applied. 
Swamp Square was chosen from five possible within-case studies (Manège Square, Triumph 
Square, Pushkin Square, Sakharov Avenue, and Swamp Square), all urban spaces in proximity 
to the political centre, or—as is the case with the latter two—spaces which were previously 
sanctioned by the authorities for mass demonstrations. Because of its location, Swamp Square 
was chosen for the March of Millions collective action during the For free elections protest 
wave in Russia in 2011–2012, which would have negative consequences for the Russian 
opposition for years to come. My major reservation about choosing this within-case study was 
that, like the two squares in Minsk, it provided almost universally negative spatial qualities. 
Yet, compared to the two squares in Minsk, it was negative for a different set of reasons46 and, 
since my goal was to study an urban space that had been significant for the outcome of previous 
protests, Swamp Square emerged as an obvious choice. Additionally, both to make space for 
 
46 A major difference is that while October Square and Independence Square in Minsk are wide-open spaces, with 
little room for the protesters to move or hide, Swamp Square is claustrophobic since it is closed on all sides and 
offers only limited visibility. 
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the theory and for practical/ethical reasons (5.2.1), I decided not to use respondents for the third 
case study. 
The case study of Swamp Square demonstrates that the square’s physical, perceived, and social 
spatial elements form qualities that might discourage people from starting or joining an action 
in said square. Swamp Square has a negative symbolic value, is not particularly visible in spite 
of its central location, and its layout greatly affects the protesters’ room to manoeuvre (amongst 
other things). The spatial qualities of Swamp Square create obstacles to the realisation of 
protest, and the space does little to increase the impact of the protest on national politics or 
society. 
On a more general level, the case study shows that the spatial perspective could be used as a 
tool for assessing the use value of urban public space for mass protest, and that it can provide 
new insights into the understanding of the political and spatial contention in the city. It can also 
provide a practical “wrapping” for descriptions of how political control is asserted. 
5.8 Post-test theorising 
Some minor tweaks to the theoretical model were added following the main study of Moscow, 
and these require comment. 
Firstly, the causal connections in the model are more fully explained in section 5.6 and in 
chapter 6 than in the article itself. Secondly, the spatial qualities have been expanded with a 
proposed list of elements and other qualities thought to have a hypothetical impact, as well as 
some key questions that can be asked in order to assess various spatial qualities (6.2.1). Thirdly, 
the methodological structure of figure 9 has been added to clarify the process of identifying 
points in the causality chain. Fourthly, a list of micro, meso, and macro factors which may or 
may not influence protests, and an overview of the political environment (fig. 4 and 5, 
respectively), have been added to systematise the non-spatial factors in the political 
environment. And fifthly, the causal mechanisms described in figure 8 have been updated with 
a separate line between the spatial qualities and the protest areas. This is to emphasise that these 
qualities may have a direct impact on protests regardless of the other factors in the political 
environment (e.g. the size of an urban space). 
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6  Variables and methodology 
The previous chapter provided a description of the theorising process, including an overview 
of the three case studies and an explication of the spatial perspective. This chapter proceeds to 
a detailed elaboration of the variables in the model. The independent variables are described in 
section 6.1, the intermediary variables in section 6.2, and the dependent variables in section 6.3, 
in addition to the specific methods used to gather information about the variables. 
Figure 9 outlines the methodology used to trace the causal relationship between urban public 
space and mass protests. 
A Urban public space can be observed, and a variety of qualitative methods can produce 
empirical data for describing single elements and categories of elements. 
B When spatial elements are seen in combination, certain spatial qualities can be induced 
on the basis of logical reasoning. 
C Based on the spatial qualities, three main types of hypotheses can be made: 
1 Hypotheses about the effect of spatial qualities on three protest areas (emergence, 
realisation, impact). 
2 Hypotheses about the correlation between spatial qualities and non-spatial 
intermediary variables in the political environment – i.e., how they affect each other. 
3 Hypotheses about the cumulative effect (of spatial qualities and non-spatial 
intermediary variables in the political environment) on three protest areas. 
D The hypotheses may be confirmed or disproved by: 
1 Observation 
2 Interviews 
3 Research literature 
E Finally, all other non-spatial factors should be examined with a view to their effect 
(independent of space) on the three protest areas. 
Figure 9: Methodology. 
6.1 Independent variables 
The independent variables need to be reintroduced in their current form, since their 
categorisations have changed several times during their development. Notably, figure 7, which 
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is used in article 2 (2017, p. 36) differs from figure 10, below (from article 3, 2019, p. 5) (5.6fn. 
for an accurate description of the changes made). 
Perceived (subjective) elements Physical elements Social elements 
Measurable: Abstract: Measurable: Measurable: 
History Emotions Location Traditional use 
Ideological symbols Feelings Size Official use 
Buildings Associations Shape Districts 
Monuments  Entrances Paths 
History of protests  Exits Nodes 
Landmarks  Walls  
  Floor  
  Objects  
  Edges  
  Public works  
  Focal points  
  Open/empty space  
Figure 10: Independent variables. 
To facilitate the gathering of data and the analysis itself, the elements have been divided into 
three categories which are described in the following three subsections, together with the main 
methods used to gather information about them. It should be noted that the definitions of these 
elements may occasionally be fleeting and overlapping. This is especially true for the perceived 
elements, which are mostly cognitive in nature. However, the purpose of identifying and 
describing the elements is not to create a definite categorisation of separate elements, but to 
provide a detailed enough data set for a systematised induction of spatial qualities. 
6.1.1 Perceived elements 
The first category of elements contains the non-physical objects of urban public space that are 
experienced subjectively. Some of the perceived elements come in physical forms, such as 
monuments and buildings. When the physicality of such perceived elements is discussed, they 
are categorised as physical elements, such as objects and walls (see corresponding elements 
below, 6.1.2). 
The perceived elements have been divided into two subcategories based on the methods that 
can best be utilised to map them. While the first category contains measurable elements that 
can be found by reading research literature and by analysing their meaning and possible impact, 
the second subcategory involves personal emotions, feelings, and associations (i.e. mental 
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connections)—elements that can only be found qualitatively in conversations and interviews 
with protesters and organisers, or in research literature and museum exhibitions based on such 
qualitative sources. 
Perceived elements should also be examined with a view to who perceives them. Two groups 
might, for example, relate to a symbol in widely different ways (see for example Thornton, 
1996, on the perception of the Confederate flag in the Southern US). The researcher’s own 
subjective perception (through field work) of a space might be added as a complementary 
source. Although data of this type might not provide an accurate representation of how the 
space is perceived by the general population, it can form the basis of discussion with 
respondents. 
History includes the circumstances in which an urban public space first came to be; who created 
it and for what purpose; who has used it and for what purposes since; previous names of the 
space; what destructions or reconstructions have occurred in it and in its proximity. 
Ideological symbols might appear in the form of monuments or buildings with special 
significance, but could also include abstractions about the status of a place or an object: for 
example, the Bastille in July 1789, or the abstract notion of Maidan as a popular assembly. 
The buildings in a space can, as explained in subsection 3.2.2, express power. Who owns the 
buildings in and around the space, what they signify and what feelings the architecture invokes 
might all be meaningful in order to understand how they are perceived by the various actors in 
society. 
The potential power of monuments lies in their ability to evoke feelings and emotions, in much 
the same way as architecture. But monuments are also references to points in history or 
historical persons, and they often have a pragmatic (i.e. unifying) purpose. This might, however, 
not always be the only effect. See, for example, how the Independence Monument in Kyiv is 
referred to by nicknames such as “the pole” (Hansen, 2016, p. 123/6). 
The history of protests is closely related to the history element. It is singled out as a separate 
element because it contains important information about the history and repertoires of 
contention (or lack thereof) in a given space. Which protests have occurred in the space and in 
the city? What was the result of previous protests? What are the traditional repertoires of 
contention and repertoires of policing here (3.1.1), and what changes have they undergone? 
Kevin Lynch defines landmarks as points of reference that people do not enter. “Some 
landmarks are typically seen from many angles and distances, over the tops of smaller elements, 
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and used as radial references. […] Other landmarks are primarily local, being visible only in 
restricted localities and from certain approaches.” Thus, Lynch differentiates between major 
landmarks, such as towers and tall monuments, and smaller landmarks, such as “signs, store 
fronts, trees […]”. (Lynch, 1960, p. 48) 
Emotions and feelings represent two complex and interconnected elements that may be 
generated by space. While there is no clearly defined difference between the two, the former is 
usually seen as instinctive and the latter as a combination of emotions and thoughts (i.e. 
processed emotions). Both can trigger physical and psychological reactions and influence 
people’s behaviour. 
Finally, space often comes with a single association or sets thereof. These associations might 
be connected with past events, monuments, architecture, social and physical elements (see next 
subsections), etc. 
6.1.2 Physical elements 
In contrast to the first, the second category of elements is tangible and fully measurable. The 
most important method for gathering data about physical elements is mapping (5.1.3), from 
which a great deal can be learned about an urban space. Field work should also be part of the 
examination, in order to fully describe the physical elements involved; and interviews could be 
added to gain information not easily mapped or found during field work. A respondent can, for 
example, inform the researcher of alternative entrances that are not visible, or easily located by 
the uninitiated. 
The location of an urban space is to a large degree defined by its distance from practical or 
symbolic points of interest, including proximity to political institutions (see for example Lee, 
2009 on the location of Tiananmen Square), to physical manifestations of whom or what the 
protests are directed against (e.g. Wall Street during OWS), and to nodes (6.1.3). 
The size and shape of urban space are important for a number of practical reasons, including 
walking distances, the number of people that can fit into the space simultaneously, their 
overview of the space, and how visible they are within it. 
Entrances and exits are often the same thing, but are kept as separate categories because they 
might facilitate one-way movement only (e.g. a police blockade which only allows for 
movement in one direction). 
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Walls are a form of tall edges that potentially limit movement. The shape and layout of the 
walls can affect a number of qualities, including visibility, sense of safety, policing, etc. 
The urban floor might consist of various materials (cobblestone, asphalt, grass), colours, 
obstacles (fences, signs, kiosks), heights, etc. The floor affects the overall feel of a place, might 
hinder or enhance movement, produce noise (e.g. traffic on cobblestones), or become 
improvised weaponry (cobblestones again). 
Virtually all objects in an urban space may have an effect on crowds, and should therefore be 
examined. For instance, kiosks, benches, signs, and fountains, which might appear as obstacles, 
platforms for addressing a crowd, etc. The element is included in this list because it is important 
to map, or at least consider, everything. 
According to Lynch, edges are “linear elements not used or considered as paths […].” They 
include, but are not limited to, “railroad cuts, edges of development, walls”, water fronts, rivers, 
and façades. They “may be barriers, more or less penetrable […], or they may be seams, lines 
along which two regions are related and joined together.” (1960, p. 47). 
Public works are infrastructure, resources, public buildings, services, and utilities, 
“constructed for public use or enjoyment especially when financed and owned by the 
government” (Public works, n.d.). Electricity, sewage, schools, tram rails etc. are included in 
this category. This element may be of importance for the maintenance of a protest that continues 
for weeks or months. 
Focal points can be defined as “a center of activity, attraction, or attention” (Focus, n.d.): in 
other words, the most prominent elements (e.g. landmarks, monuments, and buildings) that 
attract a viewer’s attention. Examples include the Independence Monument in Kyiv (Hansen, 
2016, p. 123/6) or the Palace of the Republic in Minsk (Hansen, 2017, pp. 41–42) 
Finally, open/empty spaces might be important, too, as they can be used both for movement 
and to contain people or vehicles. Therefore, they should also be mapped with regard to size, 
shape, etc. 
6.1.3 Social elements 
The third category consists of various uses of space, and the social elements are based on the 
architectural and urbanistic literature reviewed in subsection 3.2.2. The collection of data on 
social elements is mainly based on field work and mapping, but the data can be checked and 
improved by presenting and discussing findings with respondents. 
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Traditional use describes the traditions connected with the usage of a space by the public (i.e. 
the citizens). This includes daily and cultural uses and interactions (e.g. shopping, dates, 
tourism, rites and rituals, etc.), whether recurrent (such as ice skating, yoga or parkour) or 
sporadic (e.g. unofficial fairs and flash mobs). The difference between traditional use and 
history (perceived element) is that, while history represents the past, traditional use is in the 
present. This element also includes who uses particular bits of space and when. 
Official use is similar to traditional use, since it also describes the daily, recurrent or sporadic 
uses of the space. The difference is that the latter is arranged by local, regional, or national 
authorities. Examples are festivals, religious celebrations, parades, etc. The data can be 
complemented by official sources (e.g. government websites). 
Districts are described by Lynch as “medium-to-large sections of the city, conceived of as 
having two-dimensional extent, which [one] mentally enters ‘inside of,’ and which are 
recognizable as having some common, identifying character” (Lynch, 1960, p. 47). Different 
districts are used by different people at different times, and the perception of an urban public 
space in a district might be affected by the general feel of said district and vice versa. 
Paths are “the channels along which [one] customarily, occasionally, or potentially moves. 
These may be streets, walkways, transit lines, […]” (Lynch, 1960, p. 47). This element shows 
how people move in relation to the space. 
Nodes are “points, the strategic spots in a city into which an observer can enter, and which are 
the intensive foci to and from which he is traveling” (Lynch, 1960, p. 47). Nodes therefore 
include transportation hubs; meeting places; places were paths start, stop, or cross; places of 
interest, and so on. 
The three latter elements (districts, paths, nodes) all have a great potential effect on protests, 
particularly on their visibility. In a contentious setting, the users of the district within which the 
space is located will have a greater chance of noticing a mass action; the same applies to the 
people who use paths on or along the protesters’ space. The visibility is even greater when a 
number of paths end or intersect on the space, and thus constitute nodes. Compare, for instance, 
the visibility of Manège Square and Swamp Square in Moscow. The former is located in a 
district frequented by large amounts of people, in proximity to a number of paths, several of 
which intersect and end (as nodes) on Manège Square itself. Conversely, the latter is in a 
sparsely used district with few paths nearby and with virtually no nodes of importance (Hansen, 
2019, pp. 16). 
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6.2 Intermediary variables 
The second level of causality consists of the intermediary variables, which include both spatial 
qualities and non-spatial factors in the political environment. 
6.2.1 Spatial qualities 
The spatial qualities can be found by means of inductive reasoning. Some of the qualities are 
testable (e.g. accessibility and visibility), while others are less concrete (e.g. symbolic value 
and motivation). Here, the object of reasoning is to create a sense of the facilitating and/or 
inhibiting factors collectively provided by spatial elements. 
The following list is retrieved from article 3 (Hansen, 2019, pp. 6–7), and has been expanded 
with a proposed list of elements and other qualities of hypothetical impact, as well as some key 
questions that can be asked in order to assess various spatial qualities. 
“Accessibility affects several aspects of a protest, such as getting to a location, furnishing 
protesters with necessary supplies, and the possibility for people to join the protest 
spontaneously.” (p. 6) 
– Accessibility may be affected by physical elements (location, entrances, walls, objects, 
edges, public works) and social elements (paths, nodes). 
– Questions to pose: How easy is it to get to the space? How is it controlled and by whom? 
Is it public (i.e. open to all)? 
“Mobility is closely related to accessibility, yet it includes the protesters’ ability to move and 
be flexible, once they are on location. Some tactics, such as demonstrations starting from a 
space occupied by protesters, is harder to organise if the public space has few exits, many 
obstacles or can be easily surrounded by police forces.” (p. 6) 
– Mobility may be affected by physical elements (location, shape, entrances, exits, walls, 
objects, edges, public works), social elements (paths, nodes), and accessibility. 
– Questions to pose: How easy is it to move from the space to other places? Are there 
many possibilities for movement? What means of transportation are available?  
“The level of difficulty in defending and/or policing a space is important for the realisation of 
protests in societies where protests are either unsanctioned or have a high probability of being 
met with hostility, provocations, violence, and/or arrests.” (p. 7) 
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– Defensibility/policeability may be affected by physical elements (size, shape, entrances, 
exits, walls, floor, objects, edges, open/empty space), and spatial qualities (accessibility, 
mobility, motivation). 
– Questions to pose: How vulnerable is the space to police tactics? Is the space easy to 
surround and ‘kettle’? How easy or difficult is it to block movement to the space (i.e. 
are there many roads that need to be blocked)? Are there any physical obstacles that 
would stop police vehicles or inhibit police movement? How are coercive, persuasive, 
and informative policing strategies (3.1.1) affected by the space?  
“The sense of safety is shaped by the physical layout of space (see for example Dosen & 
Oswald, 2016, on the prospect refuge theory), as well as the protesters’ actual ability to defend 
themselves (e.g. against heavy-handed policing).” (p. 7) 
– Sense of safety may be affected by perceived elements (history of protests, emotions, 
feelings, associations), physical elements (location, size, shape, entrances, exits, walls, 
objects, edges, open/empty space) and spatial qualities (defensibility/policeability, 
mobility, visibility (internal). 
– Questions to pose: Does the space induce feelings of protection and/or refuge (3.2.2)? 
Does the space provide protesters with opportunities to get away if they are met with 
provocation or violence? 
“Visibility is, on the one hand, the protesters’ ability to be seen externally, by the public, by 
the authorities, by national and international observers and audiences (including media outlets). 
Visibility might thus affect the number of outside people who notice and observe the action. 
On the other hand, visibility is internal. It is the protesters’ ability to see what is going on around 
them, and it affects their coordination and communication within the protest camp.” (p. 7) 
– Visibility may be affected by perceived elements (monuments, landmarks), physical 
elements (all), social elements (all), and spatial qualities (accessibility, mobility). 
– Questions to pose: How noticeable are protests in the space, by whom are they 
noticeable, and in which parts of the city? How much can protesters see within the 
space? How much can they perceive of what is going on outside the space? 
“Several elements influence the symbolic value of a space, ranging from the physical (e.g. its 
proximity to the institutions targeted) to the social (whether the protesters are occupying a space 
commonly used by others), and to the perceived (such as the history of a space, and the outcome 
of previous collective actions).” (p. 7) 
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– Symbolic value may be affected by perceived elements (all), and a physical element 
(location). 
– Questions to pose: What does the space mean, and for which sections of the public? 
How important is the space? 
“Finally, motivation is perhaps the most important of the spatial qualities, since it has a direct 
impact on the number of participants of a collective action and their belief in the potential of 
achieving their goals (I elaborate on the goals of protests in Hansen, 2019, pp. 7–8). This quality 
is shaped both by physical and perceived elements, as well as other spatial qualities (e.g. sense 
of safety – if it feels safe, the chances of going out to protest might be higher).” (p. 7) 
– Motivation may be affected by perceived elements (all), social elements (all), and 
spatial qualities (defensibility/policeability, sense of safety, visibility, symbolic value). 
– Questions to pose: Are people more or less willing to join in when the protest is taking 
place in this particular space? 
6.2.2 The political environment 
The political environment is understood as “a generic term used variously in the literature of 
political science to refer to, among other things, aspects of formal political structure, the climate 
of governmental responsiveness, social structure, and social stability” (Eisinger, 1973, p. 11). 
In other words, it is the context of and location in which contention (might) occur, and it 
comprises a wide range of factors and conditions. The methods for identifying such factors may 
differ from study to study. However, for research on a post-Soviet region such as this, McFaul’s 
(2005) seven conditions (or a similar type of checklist) is a good starting point (see 3.1.3 and 
3.1.4). It should nevertheless be complemented by case-specific research literature. 
Having identified the presence or absence of factors in the political environment, two questions 
can be asked about their correlative effect: 1) How do these factors affect the spatial qualities? 
and 2) How do the spatial qualities affect the factors? 
This correlative effect can be illustrated by an example from article 2 (Hansen, 2017). McFaul 
states that a necessary condition for a colour revolution to occur is that there must be a modicum 
of independent media. In Minsk, where virtually all media outlets are controlled by the 
government, this condition is not present (p. 54); which, according to McFaul, diminishes the 
chances of a colour revolution occurring. Additionally, the visibility of Minsk’s two main 
protest squares is limited, which enhances the effect of McFaul’s condition, since protests in 
areas with little visibility are more dependent on mass media to get their message out. 
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6.3 Dependent variables 
The third level of analysis brings in the systematic creation of hypotheses about the political 
environment’s impact on three areas of mass protests, as well as the testing of these hypotheses. 
The testing includes observation and/or interviews with protesters, protest organisers, and 
observers. 
6.3.1 Emergence 
“Emergence” means the protesters and protest organisers’ ability to “organise and implement 
an action” (Hansen, 2019, p. 8). This includes planning, informing, and mobilising people to 
protest. This crucial part of protest is probably more affected by non-spatial factors in the 
political environment (such as intolerable living standards or the presence of widespread 
election fraud) than by spatial qualities, and should therefore be identified by other means (e.g. 
sociological: POS, CAT, RMP, etc.). Space should nonetheless be considered as a contributing 
factor. As demonstrated in all three articles, spatial qualities such as motivation and sense of 
safety may encourage (2016, p. 130–132/13–14) or discourage people from protesting (2017, 
pp. 36–37, 44; 2019, p. 18). 
The optimal way of testing whether the spatial qualities affect the emergence of protest would 
be to conduct qualitative interviews with a large number of protesters, during or right after a 
protest. However, this may not always be practically possible. 
6.3.2 Realisation 
“Realisation” is understood here as “the protesters’ ability to execute their planned action (their 
level of communication, coordination, and organisation, how they are resisting aggressive 
policing, and so on)” (Hansen, 2019, p. 8). This area of protest is affected by all the spatial 
qualities and may greatly facilitate and/or inhibit protest. Nevertheless, non-spatial independent 
variables may also have an effect here, and these should be analysed as well. 
Hypotheses formed about the spatial qualities are best confirmed by direct observation of 
protests in the space, but research literature, video footage, and/or interviews with participants 
or observers of an action might also provide data to corroborate or contradict these hypotheses. 
6.3.3 Impact 
“Impact” means the protesters’ “ability to be seen and to use this visibility effectively in order 
to change public discourse, policy, or leadership.” These three points flow directly from the 
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protesters’ goals, which I identified through my qualitative interviews with members of the 
opposition in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Russia. Based on these conversations, the goals 
of virtually all mass protests relate to change: change of public discourse, change of policy, or 
change of regime. These goals are interrelated and overlapping, and one goal often evolves into 
another (Hansen, 2019, pp. 7–8). 
Three spatial qualities have a direct influence on a protest’s impact: namely visibility, 
defensibility/policeability, and symbolic value. External visibility naturally affects the number 
of people who notice the protest; as does defensibility, especially in authoritarian regimes where 
the length of time people stand and protest (and thus get noticed) is greatly affected by their 
ability to withstand coercive policing strategies. Finally, the symbolic value of the space may 
influence impact, which is why most protest organisers prefer to protest outside political 
institutions (e.g. Manège Square in Moscow) or in urban spaces with a history of successful 
protest (Triumph Square), rather than a secluded space with an unimpressive name (Swamp 
Square). 
As with emergence and realisation, impact too may be influenced by other, non-spatial factors 
in the political environment, such as popular support of the regime, levels of control over the 
media, etc. These factors may be identified with the help of sociological methods (e.g. POS 
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7 To Paris and beyond 
Found the protesters on [Place de la République…]. Police [try to] control the streets 
[leading] to [Champs-Élysées] [,] separate the protesters in groups. Protesters [still] 
managed to communicate and regroup […]. Getting closer and closer to the city centre. 
Paris, 6th January 2019 
Urban public space is not just open areas between buildings. It is where interactions, recreation, 
deliberations, and contention occur, and these are vital for the functioning of our political 
systems. How these spaces are shaped, what they contain, how they are used, and how they are 
subjectively perceived—by the people, by the authorities, and by observers—affect our 
political systems and influence society in several ways. 
This project is not the first to highlight geography as important for mass protest. A long history 
of urban contention bears witness to the power of space, and a range of academic disciplines 
explains this importance from different points of view. But what effects exactly do urban spaces 
have on mass protests? And how can these effects be measured? The aim of this article-based 
thesis has been to develop a theoretical model for assessing the limitations and possibilities 
urban public spaces provide, for the first time, in a structured and generalised way. The three 
articles, which supply case studies from the East Slavic region, illustrate and contribute to the 
development of this model: 
The prestudy of Kyiv was written to open up the field and establish the effects Maidan—a space 
with a history of successful mass protests—has on contention in the city and country. Maidan 
supplies protesters with visibility, room enough for tens of thousands of protesters, and a 
powerful symbolic significance—whether the protest is against corruption, election fraud, or 
against a Russian-leaning president. The square is easily accessible and creates flexibility and 
mobility. If there is a sufficient number of protesters, Maidan provides them with a sense of 
safety, since it is difficult for the police to control, clear, or hinder movement to the square. To 
put the findings of the first article in terms of my current theoretical framework, Maidan’s 
spatial elements produce favourable conditions for the protesters, and these, despite some 
unfavourable conditions in the political environment, laid the foundation for the success of 
Euromaidan and other protests before it. (Hansen, 2016) 
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The transitional study adds a new dimension to the understanding of how and why 
demonstrations might fail, as it investigates the widely different space of Minsk. The already 
marginalised opposition in Belarus is affected negatively by the capital’s urban space. The 
architecture of the city symbolises the greatness and success of the Soviet Union and President 
Lukashėnka, and the only two squares near the political centre with enough room for thousands 
of protesters are not much frequented, easy to police, and hard to defend. They do not offer 
much in terms of accessibility, communication, or movement. These aspects are limiting in an 
already autocratic society in which law enforcement agencies and the media are directly 
controlled from the top down. Minsk is thus a negative case study, which shows that the 
elements of the city’s two main squares produce spatial conditions that, combined with the 
repressive factors in the political environment, greatly limit the possibilities for the opposition 
in the city to express itself in the form of mass protests (Hansen, 2017). 
The main test-study takes the theoretical model a step further and explicates the structure of the 
causal mechanisms between urban space and mass protests in Moscow, followed by a case 
study of Swamp Square, to which the spatial perspective is applied in its current form. While 
Moscow has many urban public spaces, several of which provide room for thousands of people 
and are located in the middle of, and in proximity to, the political centre, the Russian authorities 
have chosen a different tactic than their Belarusian colleagues to diminish the emergence, 
realisation, and impact of urban protests. Protests critical of the regime are permitted to manifest 
in urban spaces with poor spatial qualities, such as the distant Sakharov Avenue or the secluded 
Swamp Square. Swamp Square provides the police with full control over the protesters, which 
are effectively at the authorities’ mercy. Protests here are largely invisible and have little room 
for movement and a very negative symbolic value. The third article thus shows that the spatial 
elements of Swamp Square in Moscow produce negative spatial qualities that hinder protests 
from emerging, realising their potential, and having an impact (Hansen, 2019). 
In sum, urban public space can affect mass protests in a variety of ways. 
For reasons explained in chapter 2 (2.2), this study has been limited to a single geographic and 
cultural region. How does the model fare when it is applied to a case study in another political 
environment? In the following section, the primary and secondary research questions outlined 
in chapter 4 (4.3) are presented in the form of a pilot study, in order to show how the theory can 
be practically applied to a case study outside the former Soviet Union. This pilot study is not 
intended to be a full study, but to demonstrate the potential of the spatial perspective for further 
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studies in different and wider contexts. Therefore, some of the methods have not been fully 
applied and others only in a limited extent. 
After this practical demonstration, I provide a summary of the contents of this thesis and its 
findings, followed by a discussion of the utility of the spatial perspective model and a few 
suggestions for how it can be developed further. 
7.1 Republic Square and the Yellow Vests 
As outlined in chapter 2, the urban conditions of late-eighteenth-century Paris fostered 
discontent, and gave the revolutionaries of the time the chance to gain upper hand in their 
struggle against the monarchy by barricading the narrow streets (2.1.1). Several troublesome 
decades later, after many upheavals, insurgencies, riots, and revolutions, Paris was radically 
renovated in a grandiose reform project (1853–1870), supervised by the prefect Georges-
Eugène Haussmann. One consequence of Hausmann’s project was that several conditions for 
urban discontent disappeared, along with many opportunities supplied to insurgents by the 
previous shape of the city. A new underground sewer system and large, illuminated open spaces 
were effective means to battle disease and criminality, while plenty of new open squares and 
straight wide avenues provided troops with enough room for manoeuvre and made new 
weaponry such as muskets and cannons effective against crowds of urban rioters. 
A century and a half later, in November 2018, contention arose in the city once more. A social 
movement known as the Yellow Vests (Fr.: Mouvement des gilets jaunes) organised several 
mass actions against the government in urban centres in France, and new protests were planned 
in the capital for 5 and 6 January 2019. This provided a good opportunity for me to visit the 
city to see how the spatial environment of this “birthplace” of urban contention affects protests 
in the twenty-first century. 
Applying the model 
In chapter four (4.3) the primary research question for this thesis is stated as follows: 
How are mass protests affected by urban public space? 
In order to analyse the spatial conditions of Paris, this question can be adjusted and narrowed 
down significantly by focusing only on Republic Square (Fr.: Place de la République) and the 
collective action by the Yellow Vests I observed there on 6 January 2019. This should provide 
sufficient data for testing the spatial perspective by asking: 
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How was the French Yellow Vests’ action of 6 January 2019 affected by the spatial 
features of Republic Square, Paris? 
To answer such a question, a theoretical framework is needed, which leads to the following 
secondary research question: 
1. What should a theoretical model exploring the causal connections between urban public 
space and mass protests look like? 
A spatial perspective on protest in Paris needs to explore the causal links between space (the 
independent variable) and protest (the dependent variable). As discussed in chapter 5, there are 
pitfalls in geographical determination that should be avoided (5.3). For this reason, other factors 
in the political environment in Paris and France must also be identified and analysed in order 
to establish their effects on protest. (A more thorough answer to this secondary research 
question is elaborated in chapter 5). This proposed model leads to four new secondary 
questions: 
2. What variables does Republic Square include? 
First of all, Republic Square has symbolic and historic value, and it produces various feelings, 
emotions, memories, and associations, which people can relate to and may be affected by. (For 
a detailed description of perceived elements, see chapter 6, 6.1.1.) This specific urban space 
contains several symbols related to the French Republic, including its name, history, and central 
monument. 
Republic Square was given its current name during Hausmann’s post-revolutionary and radical 
city development in 1879, which included this particular square. The Monument to the French 
Republic (Fr.: Le monument à la République), the centrepiece of the square, consists of a 9.5-
metre-tall figure of a woman in bronze standing on a 15.5-metre-high pedestal in marble 
(Didier, n.d.). The woman is Marianne, the symbolic figure used by revolutionaries during the 
French Revolution, who is seen as a symbol and an embodiment of the French Republic 
(“Marianne”, 2014). Other notable symbols are the national motto—Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity (Fr.: Liberté, égalité, fraternité)—represented in three smaller statues, along with a 
bronze lion symbolising universal suffrage; a bronze ballot box for democracy; and a series of 
bronze reliefs from important events in the history of the revolution and in the life of the French 
Republic (Didier, n.d.). Thus, the monument evokes a wide range of associations, most of which 
are directly or indirectly revolutionary and related to women. 
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The actions of protesters, police, and commercial interests (in the form of a pink van, see below) 
on 5 and 6 January bear witness to a strong sense of repertoires of contention in Paris. One of 
these ROCs includes Republic Square itself, which has been used for numerous mass actions 
in its history of protest (6.1.1). Demonstrations in Paris often start at the symbolic Bastille 
Square (Fr.: Place de la Bastille) and march up to the larger (and no less symbolic) Republic 
Square.47 
 
Figure 11: Republic Square, Paris. Photo: Google Maps. 
Secondly, Republic Square consists of a range of physical elements. (For a detailed description 
of physical elements, see 6.1.2.) It is located on the intersection between several main avenues, 
about 2 km from the Louvre Museum. After a major redesign in 2013, it went from a heavily 
trafficked roundabout to Paris’ largest pedestrian square (it is approximately 120 by 300 metres) 
(Frearson, 2014). It is rectangular, surrounded by roads on all four sides (although the traffic 
on its north-eastern side is regulated to low levels), and with entrances and exits in all directions. 
Except for the monument as the focal point in the middle, a few lines of trees—generously 
spaced—a café in the north-western corner and an abundance of benches, there are few objects 
on the square, which generally feels open. The central monument is the square’s only massive 
structure. 
 
47 Notably during the mass protests on the verge of revolution in May 1968 (Keller, 2018), as well several more 
recent actions. For instance, the protests against the Israeli offensive in Gaza in 2014 (Rose, 2014); it was here the 
“I am Charlie” (Fr.: Je suis Charlie) demonstrations occurred in 2015 (Fage, 2015), and the Standing Up All Night 
(Fr.: Nuit Debout) protests in 2016 (Harsin, 2018); etc. 
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Thirdly, Republic Square has daily, official, and traditional uses. (For a detailed description of 
social elements, see 6.1.3.) Although I have not observed or researched the space at great length, 
the square seems to be popular amongst Parisians, including people out strolling, young 
skateboarders, and tourists. The latter group is probably attracted by the points of interest in the 
vicinity of the public space.48 It is situated along several paths for pedestrians, cars, and public 
transportation, and five metro lines stop underneath at Republic Metro Station (Fr.: 
Republique). 
3. What variables does the Yellow Vests’ action of 6 January 2019 include? 
Any protest consists of a context, set of actors, and three protest areas: emergence (6.3.1), 
realisation (6.3.2), and impact (6.3.3). The protest in Republic Square on 6 January 2019 must 
be viewed in the wider context of the Yellow Vests movement (ongoing at the time of writing). 
When they first erupted in November 2018, the protests were mostly rural and involved people 
with lower education levels and low-paying jobs, but they quickly turned into a broader 
movement against unwanted taxation, unpopular laws, the French establishment, globalism, 
and President Emmanuel Macron. The protesters wore yellow emergency reflective vests, 
which are required in all cars in France, and usually occupied central, affluent areas of urban 
centres in the country (Chamorel, 2019, pp. 50–52). 
The demonstration in question was held the day after violent clashes between protesters and 
police during the Yellow Vests’ ACT VIII.49 It was the movement’s first women’s march, 
intended to show a human face to the inequalities of French society and demonstrate that the 
violent events of the previous day were not representative of the whole movement (“Hundreds” 
2019). The protesters had gathered earlier that day on Bastille Square, from where they marched 
to Republic Square, where I caught up with them. When I arrived, speeches and appeals were 
being directed against the French establishment. After a while, the women marched, singing 
and playing drums, towards Champs-Élysées (one of the main shopping streets). The protests 
were followed closely by the police and a pink van, which specialised in selling food, snacks, 
 
48 In the words of a local guide: “Three neighbourhoods converge [on the square] – the youthful Canal Saint-
Martin, the historic yet hip Upper Marais and the trendy 11th arrondissement [administrative district], which is 
brimming with some of Paris’s best restaurants […]” (Monaco, 2019). 
49 I observed the Yellow Vests on 5 January outside Musée d'Orsay where they were stopped by echelons of riot 
police on their way to the National Assembly, as well as the clashes that ensued. This was the eighth mass protest 
in Paris since the social movement against economic inequality began seven weeks earlier (although numerous 
supportive protests, such as the one of 6 January, were organised throughout urban centres in France). 
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beverages, and other necessities to the protesters, perhaps responding to the regularity of such 
contentious actions in the city.50 
Since their initial action, the women’s marches have become a regular occurrence in Paris and 
other cities. Judging by the media coverage of the protests, the women’s march 6 January 
received far more positive coverage that the other acts by the movement. Cf. France 24’s 
coverage of the actions of 5 (“Quelques accrochages durant,” 2019) and 6 January 2019 
(“Hundreds of female,” 2019). Therefore, the protest had some level of impact. 
 
Figure 12: The pink van, Paris, 5th January 2019. Photo: Arve Hansen 
4. What other variables can be identified in the causal chain between Republic Square and 
the Yellow Vests’ action of 6 January 2019? 
A monument, tree, or node does not have a great effect on mass protests when considered 
individually. It is when they are combined their qualities appear and influence protests. We can 
identify seven such spatial qualities: accessibility, mobility, defensibility/policeability, sense of 
safety, visibility, symbolic value, and motivation (see chapter 6, 6.2.1). 
 
50 I had observed the same van several times during the street fighting the previous day, usually located right 
behind the protesters and often dangerously close to the clashes. The people operating the van seemed, however, 
unfazed and familiar with working in such an environment. 
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Considering the travel nodes on and under the square, and its many entrances and exits, we can 
safely assume that the square has high levels of accessibility and mobility. These qualities 
improve the square’s already high visibility due to its openness and central location in Paris, 
nearby travel nodes and paths, and the much-frequented districts in the area. The only hindrance 
to visibility is the monument, which is so wide and massive that speakers who use it as a 
platform for addressing the crowds can only be visible to the people on one side of the square 
at a time. 
In situations of confrontation, the square will probably have some of the same qualities as 
Independence Square in Minsk, which benefits the Belarusian law enforcement agencies 
(Hansen, 2017, pp. 51–53). The main roads encircling Republic square on three sides naturally 
concentrate people in the area around the monument, which leaves the protesters open to 
policing manoeuvres from three sides. Nonetheless, in contrast to Independence Square, there 
is enough mobility in Republic Square that the sense of safety remains high. There is virtually 
always an exit available, so it is relatively easy to avoid being kettled by the police. 
The symbolic value of Republic Square is difficult to overestimate. As a large open square in 
the city centre, with historical and allegorical symbols that most French can relate to—including 
a history of protest —the square is associated with a feeling of “people power”. It is likely that 
the square has an even a stronger symbolic value for women, as their role in demanding and 
achieving revolutionary change is emphasised by the monument to Marianne (some of the 
women on 6 January 2019 wore red Phrygian caps, related to the French Revolution, apparently 
to reinforce this association). The mainly positive qualities of Republic Square probably have 
a motivating effect on prospective protesters. 
Protests may also be affected by other micro, meso, and macro factors in the political 
environment, as well as by events and external influences. Therefore, non-spatial independent 
and intermediary variables (i.e. combined with space) should also be identified. (For a detailed 
description of intermediary variables, see chapter 6, 6.2.) 
A quick investigation into the research literature has resulted in some examples of macro 
factors, such as economic inequalities, a non-inclusive establishment (Baulaigue, 2018), and an 
increase in anti-protest legislation in the wake of the January 2015 terrorist attacks (Harsin, 
2018, pp. 1822–1823); meso factors, such as a nationwide network of protest groups, and media 
outlets critical to the protests (Chamorel, 2019, pp. 54–55); and micro factors, such as the goal 
of the protesters to oust President Emmanuel Macron (“Yellow Vests plan,” 2019), or the lack 
of a shared purpose and direction (Chamorel, 2019, p. 55). Taxation on diesel and Macron’s 
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“blunt and provocative public statements” (Chamorel, 2019, pp. 50–51) have been identified as 
some of the main triggering events that started the protests and kept them going. Regarding 
external influences, the protesters may have been inspired by global protest waves, such as the 
Arab Spring, Occupy, and others. Even Russian interference has been suggested by the French 
government as a possible factor in the emergence of the Yellow Vests (Matlack & Williams, 
2018), a claim routinely denied by the Kremlin (“La Russie nie,” 2018). 
5. How can these variables be mapped and measured? 
The best way to identify the effects a given space has on protest is by observing protests in the 
space first-hand (see chapter 5, 5.1.1). Although my time in the square was limited, I had the 
opportunity to observe the protesters and their interactions with the urban space and law 
enforcement agencies, as well as to write a few notes about the square and its most prominent 
elements. 
Interviews with participants, organisers, and other observers (see chapter 5, 5.1.2), as well as 
the use of research literature and other sources (such as video footage and news articles), can 
provide detailed and alternative descriptions of the space. For this demonstration of the spatial 
perspective model, I did not conduct any interviews and have consulted only a limited amount 
of research literature and news articles. 
To facilitate analysis, mapping should be utilised at all four stages of development (preparation, 
field work, analysis, presentation – see chapter 5, 5.1.3). Mapping was done in preparation for 
the study of Paris and during field work, but not as a part of the analysis or of this presentation. 
A satellite photo of the square is provided to compensate for the lack of maps (fig. 11). 
Based on the data collected using these methods, the above spatial qualities have been induced 
by logical reasoning. Three types of hypotheses can then be made: 1) the effect of the spatial 
qualities on the emergence, realisation and impact of protests; 2) the correlation between spatial 
qualities and non-spatial variables; and 3) their cumulative effect on protests. These hypotheses 
can be confirmed or disproved by interviews and observations. To control for spatial 
determinism, the effect of other independent variables in the political environment should also 
be examined. See chapter 5 (5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.6) and chapter 6 for more on the model’s 
methodology. 
The high level of motivation as a spatial quality probably encourages the emergence of protests 
on Republic Square. It is, at the very least, hard to imagine a situation in which people might 
be discouraged by the thought of protesting in this location, least of all women protesting for 
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inclusivity and social change. Additionally, as far as I have been able to detect, the realisation 
of the women’s march was not hampered by holding their action at this square, either. They 
were able to enter the urban space, hold their action, and leave, despite the police attempting to 
impede their movement towards the city centre (more on this below, 7.3). Moreover, the impact 
of the protesters, visible as they were on a square symbolising the French people and the power 
of women and at an intersection of paths, roads, and districts, did not diminish the effect of the 
protests. 
Regarding the second and third types of hypothesis, some can be made on the basis of the 
limited data set available. Here are a few examples:  
1) The protesters’ choice of space, in the form of a highly affluent urban area, is in contrast 
to the poor and (initially) rural protest movement, thus highlighting the inequalities they 
are fighting against. 
2) If the media, as the protesters have implied (Chamorel, 2019, pp. 54–55), has a negative 
attitude to the movement and regularly focuses too much on violence, it might be harder 
to create this type of impression of protests that take place in the middle of the city 
where more people can see what is (really) going on. 
3) Several recent protests and revolutions have been started on central squares across the 
world, in Baghdad, Cairo, Istanbul, Tehran, and Tripoli—therefore, if a protest is held 
on one of the largest squares in Paris, the threat of revolution might seem more plausible 
(and thus result in concessions and/or increased violence). 
This account is first and foremost intended as an illustration. Since it is based on limited data 
and only selected parts of the method are applied, it remains speculative in its current form. It 
could be researched further in a full analysis, including maps and detailed descriptions of the 
variables of the urban space and in the political environment. It could include more hypotheses, 
and interviews with protesters, organisers, experts, and observers. Nonetheless, even at this 
initial level it generates discussion of overall key issues and, if compared to other sources of 
information and used actively in interviews, it might be possible to attain a detailed 
understanding of the square and the possibilities and limitations it provides. 
7.2 Summary and conclusions 
The seven chapters of this thesis have traced the development of a theoretical model that 
provides a spatial perspective on mass protests. It started with the initial question that motivated 
me to study the potentials of Maidan (see chapter 1, and chapter 5, 5.4), and viewed the recent 
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Ukrainian revolution in the context of other contemporary and historic tendencies of urban 
contention (chapter 2). A mapping of research literature on protest and space showed that there 
is no systematic approach available to analyse protest spaces (chapter 3). After defining key 
concepts, such as mass protests and urban public space, the aim of developing such a theory in 
this thesis was clarified (chapter 4). This was followed by a description of the theorising 
processes; the methods and considerations used in the development; how causal inference 
between space and protest can be made; and the testing of the theory (chapter 5). The variables 
in the spatial perspective model, along with the methods used for identifying them, were then 
explicated (chapter 6). Finally, key elements of the spatial perspective were applied to a pilot 
study of Paris (chapter 7). 
Let us return to the full research question stated in chapter 4 (4.3): 
How are mass collective actions by pedestrians, engaged in static occupation of an urban 
public space and aimed at changing society by influencing the decisions of a target by 
nonviolent means, affected by this urban public space (i.e. outdoor open areas between 
buildings in a city environment, which in its ideal form is equally accessible and open 
to everyone in the general population)? 
When factors and conditions in the political environment produce discontent to such an extent 
that people are prepared to protest, these protests might be affected by urban space in a number 
of ways. 
Initially, prospective protesters and organisers look to the urban public space available to them 
and, whether consciously or not, assess spaces by: their proximity to the political centre or other 
target institutions; how visible protests located there would be; whether protesters would be 
safe or vulnerable; whether there would be room to move; and what symbolic value that space 
might supply to the protesters. They would ask one key question: will our protest in this space 
have an impact? And the answer to this question might motivate them to or discourage them 
from protest. 
When discontent starts to manifest itself in an urban space, protesters are affected by the square 
or park into which they have ventured. The walls and entrances, landmarks and monuments, 
and the people passing and crossing the urban space, all might have an effect on the people 
congregated there. Protesters have practical needs, such as communication within the camp and 
getting necessary supplies to it; they want to be seen and heard by the public and by those 
against whom their protest is aimed. They would want to keep motivation up, and hinder 
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attempts to stop them from carrying out their protest. At the same time, they would be affected 
by instincts, such as the need for safety; by memories of past events; and by thoughts about the 
symbolic value of their action. 
Once the demonstration of discontent has ended, the goal or goals of the protesters may or may 
not have been achieved. And this result may have been affected by the length of time the 
protesters managed to stay in their space of contention; how visible their protest was to the 
general public and to the authorities; and whether their action was enhanced by the symbolic 
value of the space. 
To conclude, the three areas of protest—emergence, realisation, and impact—might be 
considerably affected by the spatial qualities produced by urban public space. 
7.2.1 “So what?” 
After presenting my research project and preliminary results from Kyiv and Minsk to a group 
of scholars at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in November 2016, one established researcher in the 
audience commented (paraphrased): 
You might very well be right that space has affected such actions. Space might, as you 
say, have an influence on protests […] but so might weather [long pause…]. So what? 
The answer to such a blunt question is that in order to analyse an event, all aspects of it need to 
be examined for their potential effect. Urban public space has greatly affected protests in Kyiv, 
had a considerable impact on protests in Minsk and Moscow, and the pilot study above (7.1) 
indicates that protests in Paris are also affected to a large extent by public space. If we omit 
space from analyses of collective actions, we do not acquire a full picture, and this reductionism 
entails a risk of misinterpretation—even if only potentially. 
The questioner might have been aware of such instances, however; and, yes, it is not difficult 
to find examples of protesters being stopped or helped by space, but the researcher probably 
wanted to know whether the spatial perspective could be put into practical use. What could a 
spatial perspective be used for? Is it just an interesting thought experiment, or can it be used as 
a tool for researchers, protesters, or police? 
I firmly believe that the spatial perspective model can be of assistance to researchers within 
sociology, political science, urbanism, jurisprudence, and more. It contributes to our general 
understanding of protest: a complex issue that should be analysed from all perspectives, 
including the spatial one. The model can be used as a tool for assessing one of many factors 
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that may or may not be significant in the occurrence and outcome of a collective action. 
Considering the many static protests that have occurred and made an impact on world politics 
in the last two decades alone, the importance of a spatial perspective becomes even more 
evident. 
The pilot study, used as an illustration above, shows that the model does not have to be applied 
in its most detailed form in order to contribute to our understanding of a given location. It could 
be developed further to produce a more accurate picture of why this space is chosen, what it 
means to the protesters and to Parisians, and what effect it has on the emergence, realisation, 
and impact of protests. Conversely, the analysis could be kept to a minimum, and the results 
included in a larger study of the Yellow Vests. It could also be part of a study of the city 
(because any study of Paris should, in one form or another, include urban contention). 
In other words, the model can be applied in its entirety or selectively. It contributes a language 
that can be used to discuss space by researchers, who may not necessarily focus on the spatial 
features of protests, but may need to describe the scene of an action or some important spatial 
quality. The model can also have some utility for protesters and police, although I doubt that 
the perspective itself will teach them anything new. Local inhabitants tend to have more 
intimate knowledge of their cities and its potentials than any generalised theoretical model ever 
will. But the language this model supplies to researchers may help protesters, police, and 
observers to more adequately discuss unfolding events and their consequences. 
Finally, much can be learned about a society, its level of democracy, and relations between 
power holders and ordinary people by looking at the contention in, and the control of, city 
space. We do not inhibit space randomly, and space is not arbitrary. Understanding the social 
line of space is necessary in order to describe society and its ongoing processes. The model can 
thus be used as a framework in order to establish whether there is space available for protesters. 
Or, put another way, whether the ideal form of urban public space as described in chapter 4 
exists in the city (4.2). 
Take for instance Kyiv, which has Maidan, a symbolic and accessible urban public space with 
an important role as a safety valve in Ukrainian society. If, after two popular revolutions and a 
number of mass protests, people still feel the need to use this safety value—to demonstrate, to 
make demands, and to repeat the threat of “a new Maidan” (i.e. mass protest, Hansen, 2016, 
pp. 131–132/13–14)—it shows that the Ukrainian democratic system is far from perfect. 
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The urban spaces of Minsk and how they are governed bear witness to fundamental problems 
in the Belarusian political system. An oft-repeated label for Belarus is “Europe’s last 
dictatorship”, coined by former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Whether this label is 
correct or not, looking at the empty but clean streets and monumental buildings of Minsk and 
its absence of public protest, one might be led to think that Rice was right. 
In Moscow, too, urban space bears witness to the authoritarian nature of the regime. Although 
protests do occur in the Russian capital and often attract thousands of people, they are usually 
repressed with violence and arrests. Nothing demonstrates the Russian authorities’ power over 
the capital city more effectively than their ability to empty the city centre of people in 
celebration of Putin’s third re-election as president in 2012. 
7.2.2 Limitations 
The causal model proposed in these chapters still has room for development. More empirical 
tests can be applied, and the variables in the model can probably be elaborated and expanded. 
It might also benefit from being applied to urban public spaces with clear positive and negative 
spatial qualities, as this would demonstrate that spatial elements can produce different qualities 
with various effects on various areas of protest. 
Except for the work done in Chișinău and Paris, the thesis has been limited geographically to 
the East Slavic region, and would thus benefit from being applied to more case studies in other 
regions of the world, where new variables and causal connections might be identified. 
The theory would probably also benefit from further exploring the relationship between actors, 
events, and space. Whereas this thesis has focused mainly on the viewpoints of single groups 
of protesters, limited to one or two collective actions, interesting results might be found by a 
spatial perspective applied to a variety of urban protests in a single urban space over a long 
period of time. For instance, an analysis of how Republic Square has affected protests between 
1968 and 2019. 
7.3 Moving on 
When the women’s march in Paris moved away from Republic Square on their way to the city 
centre, my observations were technically finished. The limitations I had set for this study 
dictated that I focus on static demonstrations and occupations. Moving marches such as this 
were not part of my study (4.1). But, spurred by curiosity, I decided to move along with the 
protesters. 
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The epigraph in the introduction to this chapter is from my field notes made when observing 
the protesters that day. The police obviously had orders to stop or delay the women marching 
to the city centre, and they repeatedly attempted to block the demonstrators’ movement. Despite 
a large police presence—possibly as large as the protest group itself—the authorities had a hard 
time trying to keep the protesters out of the area around Champs-Élysées. Their strategy was to 
have two police forces: one in the rear, following the protesters, and one more mobile, which 
attempted to predict where the women would go and quickly block the streets before they got 
there. Sometimes, if they saw fit, they would run through the protesters at a weak spot in the 
crowd and divide them into separate groups. But the protesters would always locate their co-
protesters, regroup somewhere, and continue their march. 
 
Figure 13: Yellow Vests, Paris, 6th January 2019. Photo: Arve Hansen 
Moving protests are a bigger part of the repertoire of contention in Paris than in Kyiv, Minsk, 
and Moscow. Why? By looking at the women’s march of 6 January 2019, we can create an 
hypothesis that the avenues of Paris, which lack the common European grid street plan (see fig. 
11), made the protesters’ movement unpredictable and difficult to control. However, in order 
to check this hypothesis, a greater study is needed that maps all the ways urban space affects 
mobile protests. But the events in Paris show that the spatial perspective model can (and should) 
be developed further to include mobile protests, too. What, then, about violent protests? Or 
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protests in vehicles? Or, conversely, non-contentious actions such as public celebrations? 
Perhaps the perspective can teach us something about events far back in history, too? 
There are several possibilities, but one thing is certain: urban contention is not going to 
disappear any time soon. 
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Majdan Nezalezjnosti: symbolikk og
funksjon
Arve Hansen*
PhD-stipendiat, Universitetet i Tromsø ! Norges arktiske universitet
Abstract
Much has been said and written about the Ukrainian revolution of 2013!14, yet research on
Maidan Nezalezhnosti, the protests’ most iconic location, has thus far been rather limited.
This article analyses the history, attributes and symbolism of this particular city space. What
function does Maidan have in the Ukrainian society? In the cause of my fieldwork in Kyiv
2013!15 on the recent revolution, I found that Maidan has many features that make it a
particularly suitable site for protests. In the current article I argue that several factors related
to the square’s physical space, from its location between the religious, historical and political
centres of Ukraine, to its proximity to important landmarks, as well as its infrastructure,
shape, architecture, and size, make Maidan both a symbolic and a practical space to occupy
for people demanding change. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Maidan has acquired a
special significance for Ukrainians. The name of the square itself could be interpreted as a
protest against Russia, and the many protests and three revolutions on Maidan have given it
a particular revolutionary meaning. I argue that Maidan functions as a socio-political safety
valve ! a place people turn to and turn up at to demand change when the formal political
institutions fail to deliver.
Keywords: City space, Independence square, Maidan, protests, revolution, Ukraine
I sentrum av den ukrainske hovedstaden Kyiv ligger Majdan Nezalezjnosti !
Uavhengighetsplassen ! et av Kyivs større byrom.1 Majdan fikk mye oppmerksomhet
under Euromajdan-protestene vinteren 2013!14 som etter tre dramatiske måneder
endte med minst 82 drepte demonstranter (Helseministeriet i Ukraina 2014) og
et maktskifte i landet. Protestene ble også opptakten til krisen på Krimhalvøya og
krigen i Donbas. Så langt har krigen krevet over 9100 menneskeliv (UN News Centre
2015), mens 1,38 millioner er internt fordrevet (UNHCR 2015a) og 1,1 millioner
har flyktet fra landet (UNHCR 2015b: 2).
I mitt feltarbeid i Kyiv mellom november 2013 og mai 2015, hvor jeg undersøkte
drivkreftene bak protestene, var det flere ting som tydet på at Uavhengighetsplassen
*Kontaktinformasjon: Arve Hansen. Email: arve.hansen@uit.no
1I denne artikkelen benytter jeg meg av den ukrainske formen av ukrainske egennavn (Kyiv,
Donbas, Janukovytsj), ikke den russiske (Kiev, Donbass, Janukovitsj) (i samsvar med Norsk
språkråd 2014). Alle egennavn er transliterert i henhold til språkrådets anbefalinger. Ukrainsk: VL
24.10.6 (Norsk språkråd u.d. b). Russisk: VL 6.2.05 (Norsk språkråd u.d. a).
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hadde en viktig symbolsk betydning for ukrainere. Det tydeligste eksempelet på dette
var at protestene tok Euromajdan som navn ! en kombinasjon av ordene Europa og
Majdan. Men det er kanskje enda mer illustrerende at opprørspolitiets første angrep
på demonstrantene i Kyiv, som fant sted natt til 30. november 2013 og førte til
at mange ukrainere begynte å støtte protestene (Hansen 2015: 44!45), ble omtalt
som Angrepet på Majdan (Rozhin Majdanu).2 Det var også interessant å se at Majdan
som begrep ikke var låst til det fysiske byrommet på Uavhengighetsplassen, men ble
en samlebetegnelse for alle områdene okkupert av de protesterende: Det dukket opp
såkalte lokale majdan-er også i andre ukrainske byer. En respondent, lokalhistor-
ikeren Serhij, beskriver Majdan som noe bevegelig: «Etter angrepet på Majdan (. . .)
[dukket det opp] et morsomt uttrykk: ‘Majdan har flyttet til Mykhajlivskaplassen’
(. . .) det vil si at Majdan ikke er knyttet til plassen, den er allerede en protestaksjon.
Det er ikke viktig hvor den er.»3
Selv om mye av den internasjonale oppmerksomheten nå har flyttet fra Kyiv til
Donbas, blir Majdan fremdeles diskutert i Ukraina. I forbindelse med president- og
parlamentsvalgene i 2014 og før lokalvalget i oktober 2015, truet opposisjonelle
partier og grupperinger med «å gå ut på Majdan» om Porosjenko-administrasjonen
ikke får slutt på krigen og fart på reformvirksomheten. Myndighetene har på sin side
prøvd å vise at symbolikken rundt Majdan er viktig for dem, og arrangerte sommeren
2015 en stor arkitektkonkurranse for å rekonstruere byrommet, med store midler stilt
til rådighet ! til tross for en vaklende økonomi (Terra Dignitas 2015). Blant annet ble
det diskutert hvordan minnesmerket for Euromajdan og de falne demonstrantene
skal se ut.
For å forstå de omveltningene som foregikk i Kyiv i februar 2014 og dermed
bakgrunnen for de begivenhetene som nå utspiller seg i landet, er det nødvendig å se
nærmere på hva Majdan betyr for ukrainere. Hva er det som gjør at protester oppstår
på Uavhengighetsplassen? Hva symboliserer Majdan? Hvilke funksjoner har plassen i
det ukrainske samfunnet?
Jeg har av plasshensyn begrenset artikkelen til å handle om protester i Kyiv, og
sammenhengen mellom dem og byrommet de oftest arrangeres i. Jeg vil derfor ikke
analysere andre byrom, eller å gå inn på de enkelte protestaksjonenes struktur eller
organisering.
Denne artikkelen er inndelt i tre deler: Først ser jeg på Uavhengighetsplassens
fysiske utforming, posisjon, lokalhistorie og daglig bruk. Deretter diskuterer jeg
symbolikken knyttet til Majdan. Til slutt diskuterer jeg hvilke funksjoner Majdan har
i det ukrainske samfunnet i dag.
2Rozhin kan oversettes med spredning, bortjaging, rydding, storming eller angrep. Siden en plass
verken kan spres eller jages bort, «Ryddingen av Majdan»ikke fanger alvorlighetsgraden av det som
skjedde, og «Stormingen av Majdan» ble brukt om politiets storming av plassen 18.!19. februar
2014, har jeg valgt å omtale hendelsen som et angrep.
3«Posle razgona Majdana (. . .) byla takaja fraza smesjnaja: ‘Majdan peremestilsja na Mikhajlovs-
kuju plosjtsjad (. . .) polutsjajetsia, sjto Majdan ne privjazan k plosjtsjadi ! eto uzje protestnaja
aktsija. Ne vazjno gde on.»
MAJDAN NEZALEZJNOSTI: SYMBOLIKK OG FUNKSJON | 119
Jeg argumenterer for at Uavhengighetsplassen har blitt et naturlig sted å
protestere, som til tross for et par ulemper, egner seg godt for store folkemengder.
Samtidig har Majdan en spesiell symbolsk betydning som folkets plass ! et sted
assosiert med flere revolusjoner og det eneste stedet folket føler de har direkte
innflytelse på landets politikk. Mine funn støtter ideen om at Majdan i dag fungerer
som en sosio-politisk sikkerhetsventil i et dysfunksjonelt og korrupt politisk system.
Metoder og teori
I analysen av Majdans fysiske utforming har jeg basert meg på egne observasjoner i
Kyiv mellom november 2013 og juli 2015.4 Det teoretiske grunnlaget for analysen
har vært Lynch’ (1960) teorier om byers funksjonalitet og betydning.5 I løpet av
revolusjonen utførte jeg 23 befaringer på Majdan, og jeg fikk kontakt med mange
mennesker. Av disse valgte jeg ut seks respondenter til syv semistrukturerte
dybdeintervjuer. I denne artikkelen benytter jeg meg av utdrag fra disse intervjuene.6
Siden jeg har hatt to lengre opphold i Kyiv (fra januar til juni 2011, og fra juli 2013
til desember 2015) og jevnlig reist til byen (fra mai 2007), har jeg også mange
personlige erfaringer fra byen. Disse refererer jeg til som egne erfaringer.
I forskningslitteraturen finnes det inngående analyser av forholdet mellom
demokrati, protester og enkelte byrom (se Parkinson 2012). Mer konkret har
Occupy-bevegelsens forhold til okkuperte byrom i vestlige byer blitt analysert
(Hammond 2013); parken som ble okkupert av Gezi-park-protestene i Istanbul
i 2013 har blitt drøftet (Göle 2013a, 2013b; Inceoglu 2014, 2015;
Örs 2014); og det samme gjelder flere av protestene i byrom under Den arabiske
våren fra 2011 (se for eksempel Lopes de Souza & Lipietz 2011), protestene på Den
himmelske freds plass i 1989 (Hershkovitz 1993; Lee 2009), og så videre. Det er
imidlertid gjort få analyser av byrom i forbindelse med protester i Kyiv. Mens det har
vært analyser av Uavhengighetsplassens utforming og historie, som Hrysjtsjenkos
(2013) drøfting av byrommets post-sovjetiske forandringer, verk om byens historie og
arbeider om Euromajdan protestene i et historisk perspektiv (som henholdsvis
Cybriwsky 2014a og Cybriwsky 2014b), så er det såvidt meg bekjent ingen som
inngående har diskutert forholdet mellom Majdans form, historie, symbolikk og
funksjon.
4Jeg har benyttet meg av mye av det samme kvalitative kildematerialet som i min masteravhandling
om Euromajdan (Hansen 2015).
5Lynch legger blant annet vekt på menneskers vanlige og mulige bevegelsesmønstre (paths);
landemerker og punkter mennesker skal til, relaterer til eller drar gjennom (landmarks og nodes);
ting som hindrer bevegelse (edges); og områder i byen med distinkt karakter (districts). Her er ikke
disse termene brukt direkte, men de ligger likevel til grunn for analysen.
6Av hensyn til respondentenes sikkerhet er navnene deres anonymisert og oppført i teksten i kursiv.
Det gjelder imidlertid ikke den ukrainske fotojournalisten Oleksandr Klymenko, som har ønsket å
framstå med fullt navn.
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Byrommets posisjon og utforming
Ukrainas hovedstad ligger sentralt i landet, mellom Polen i vest (440 km fra Kyiv) og
Russland i øst (300 km). Selv om det er større avstander til områder som Donbas
og Krimhalvøya (henholdsvis 600 og 550 km) enn til for eksempel Hviterussland
(95 km), gjør infrastruktur som vei, tog og elva Dnipro Kyiv til en mer sentral by enn
noen annen i landet.
Ifølge legendene ble Kyiv grunnlagt i år 482, og Kievriket regnes som det
historiske grunnlaget for de tre moderne nasjonene Ukraina, Hviterussland og
Russland. Det var i Kyiv Kievriket i år 988 først skal ha bli kristnet, og byen er
dermed viktig for flere ortodokse kirker.7 Noen av den ortodokse kristendommens
mest hellige bygninger, blant annet Sofiakatedralen og grotteklosteret Kyjevo-
Petsjerska Lavra, er plassert i byen. I tillegg til å være et viktig historisk og religiøst
sentrum, finner man i Kyiv mange av Ukrainas viktigste politiske institusjoner, samt
noen av landets eldste og mest prestisjefylte universiteter.
Uavhengighetsplassen ligger midt i Kyiv, mellom tre bakketopper, høyt oppe på
den vestre (høyre) bredden av Dnipro. Seks små gater (Borysa Hrintsjenka, Provulok
Tarasa Sjevtsjenka, Sofijivska, Mala Zjytomyrska, Mykhajlivska og Kostjolna) løper
opp fra plassens nordvestre del (heretter NV-delen) mot byens historiske og religiøse
sentrum på Starokyjivska og Zamokva-høydene. Fra den sydøstre delen av plassen
(heretter SØ-delen) peker to gater (Instytutska og Arkhitektora Horodetskoho)
oppover mot det politiske sentrum på Petsjerskhøyden. Her oppe ligger Presiden-
tadministrasjonen, Verkhovna rada (parlamentet), Regjeringsbygget, Sentralbanken
og flere partiers hovedkontorer. Den 1,3 kilometer lange hovedgaten Khresjtsjatyk
går gjennom Uavhengighetsplassen på sin vei mellom Europaplassen i nordøst og
Bessarabskyj i sør. Uavhengighetsplassen er stor, omtrent 370 meter lang og mellom
110 og 200 meter bred (avhengig av hvor og hvordan man måler). Khresjtsjatyk, med
sine åtte kjørefelt og 60 meters bredde, fortau inkludert, er også en naturlig del av
byrommet. Samlet kan plassen og gaten derfor romme hundretusenvis av mennesker.
I området rundt Uavhengighetsplassen ligger det mange møtesteder, blant annet
flere parker, store byrom og utdanningsinstitusjoner.
Plass og byhistorie
En måte å se Kyivs utvikling gjennom tidene er gjennom sentrumsplassens mange
navn. Det var først på 1700-tallet området der Uavhengighetsplassen nå ligger ble
bygget ut, men det var også her Ljadskyjporten ! en av middelalderbyens tre
innganger lå. Gjennom denne porten skal mongolene ha invadert Kyiv i 1240 og
markert slutten på Kievriket. Fra midten av 1800-tallet vokste byen kraftig. Den lille
7Spesielt viktig er byen for: Den russisk-ortodokse kirke; Den ukrainsk-ortodokse kirke, som har
hovedsete i Kyiv, men er underlagt Moskvapatriarkatet; Den ukrainsk-ortodokse kirke med eget
patriarkat i Kyiv; Den ukrainske gresk-katolske kirke (denne er offisielt katolsk, men følger det
bysantinske ritus); og Den ukrainske autokefale ortodokse kirke.
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plassen ble først kalt Khresjtsjatykplassen i 1869 etter den tettbygde handelsgaten.
Da bydumaen ble bygget i 1876 skiftet plassen navn til Dumaplassen (GUOKS u.d.).
Etter bolsjevikenes maktovertagelse i 1919 forandret plassens navn seg mange
ganger. Først ble den hetende Sovjetunionens plass, og fra 1935 ble den kalt
Kalininplassen etter den sovjetiske politikeren Mikhail Kalinin. Mellom 1941 og
1943 ble plassen kalt Nittende septembers plass, etter datoen for Nazi-Tysklands
okkupasjon av byen, og da byen ble gjenerobret av den røde hær ble plassen igjen
hetende Kalininplassen (GUOKS u.d.).
I forbindelse med Oktoberrevolusjonens 60-årsjubileum i 1977 ble byrommet
renovert og fikk navnet Oktoberplassen. NV-delen som tidligere hadde vært godt
trafikkert og som hadde mange fysiske hindringer, ble omstrukturert til et grønt,
åpent parkområde med mindre trafikk og med gode muligheter for større folke-
samlinger. I enden av SØ-delen ble det bygget et stort granittmonument til Lenin og
Oktoberrevolusjonen (Hrysjtsjenko 2013: 86). Etter Sovjetunionens fall i 1991 skiftet
plassen navn til Uavhengighetsplassen, som den fortsatt heter i dag.
Byrommets fasader viser også noen av forandringene byen har gått gjennom.
Kun Oktoberpalasset (nå et kunstsenter) ! på toppen av en stor gressbakke i østenden
av plassen ! og Konservatoriet står igjen fra før andre verdenskrig. Mangelen på
bygninger fra før krigen vitner om ødeleggelsene byen og folket opplevde i krigsårene.
Bilde 1: Majdan sett ovenfra. 1: Fagforeningenes hus. 2: Hotell Ukraina. 3: Oktoberpalasset. 4:
Ukrajinskyj dim. 5: Byadministrasjonen. 6: Sikkerhetstjenesten (SBU). 7: Sofiakatedralen. 8:
Gullporten. 9. Nasjonalbanken. 10: Konservatoriet. 11: Operaen. Illustrasjon: Arve Hansen.
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Etter krigen gjenoppbygde Stalin byen i sovjetisk klassisistisk stil ved hjelp av
krigsfangers slavearbeid: Khresjtsjatyk ble til et bredt sovjetprospekt og Kalininplas-
sen ble byens sentrale torg ! dumaen hadde brent ned under krigen og ble ikke
gjenoppbygget. Bygningene langs Khresjtsjatyk og på NV-delen av Kalininplassen ble
alle bygget i gul naturstein med samme, majestetiske design (sarkastisk kalt Stalins
bløtkake[-stil] av byens borgere).8
Stalins død i 1953 førte imidlertid til en brå stans i denne arkitektoniske
nyklassisismen. Khrusjtsjov forkastet de grandiose planene og fullførte gjenoppbyg-
gingen i en svært forenklet form. Hotell Moskva (fra 2001 Hotell Ukraina) er et godt
eksempel på denne forenklingen. Hotellet som står på toppen av bakken i enden av SØ-
delen var ment å bygges som en av Stalins vysotki (skyskrapere), men ble hurtig gjort
ferdig, lavere enn planlagt og uten den klassiske dekoren. Plassens to største bygninger,
Postbygget og Fagforeningenes hus, står også stilmessig i kontrast til hverandre.
Postbygget er bygget i tradisjonell sovjetisk klassisisme, mens Fagforeningenes hus er
postmoderne, toppet av et 24 meter høyt klokketårn ! med digitale visere.
Etter Sovjetunionens fall gikk Kyiv gjennom en brå overgang til kapitalisme.
På toppen av alle Uavhengighetsplassens bygninger er det nå store lysreklamer.
Før Fagforeningenes hus ble totalskadd under Euromajdan, var nesten hele dets
fasade dekket av enorme reklameplakater. På bakkeplan har banker, fastfood-kjeder
og kiosker tatt over bybildet.
I løpet av vinteren 2000!01 startet en storstilt rekonstruksjon av byrommet, og
et kjøpesenter ble bygget på Uavhengighetsplassen. Kjøpesenteret er to etasjer dypt
og strekker seg under hele NV-delen. En seks meter høy glasskuppel i enden av
plassen fører lys ned til senteret. I den andre, sørøstlige, enden av plassen, står en
enorm speilglassfasade i tre etasjer. Det er kjøpesenterets andre del, plassert foran
Hotell Ukraina. Kjøpesenteret ble sterkt kritisert for å skjemme Majdans utseende,
og selv utbyggeren, Hari Korohodskyj, uttalte i 2007 at han var enig i kritikken
(Fokus 2007). Parallelt med byggingen av kjøpesenteret ble det satt opp mange nye
monumenter som framstiller Ukrainas historiske og mytiske figurer. Dette var en del
av president Leonid Kutsjmas nasjonaliseringsprosjekt for å samle landet om en ny
felles historieframstilling.
Hrysjtsjenko har skrevet om rekonstrueringen av byrommet og om hvordan
plassen gikk fra å være et grønt samlingspunkt til et grått og uframkommelig
område som har mistet mye av sin sjarm. Det er betegnende for måten Kutsjmas
nasjonaliseringsprosjekt ikke ble spesielt populært i befolkningen, at Uavhengig-
hetsmonumentet ! byrommets mest kjente landemerke ! ofte bare nevnes med tilnavn
som «Stolpen», «Damen med kvisten» eller «Batman» (Hrysjtsjenko 2013: 86!87).
Daglig bruk
Majdans byrom ! tross dets noe uryddige utforming ! blir i det daglige brukt av
svært mange mennesker. Khresjtsjatyk fungerer som den naturlige bilveien mellom
8Fra ekskursjon med firmaet Interesnyj Kiev, 27. juli 2013.
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Bilde 2: Uavhengighetsmonumentet (eller Stolpen). Statuen er 62 meter høy og forestiller Berehynia
! beskytteren, en kvinnelig ånd fra slavisk mytologi. Foto: Pedro J Pacheco CC BY-SA 4.0.
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flere viktige innfartsruter: Naberezjne ! som går langs Dnipro på høyre bredd; Bulvar
Tarasa Sjevtsjenka ! en forlengelse av Prospekt Peremohy som er en viktig trafikkåre
fra de vestlige delene av Kyiv til sentrum; og Lesi Ukrajinky som via Basejna går
fra sydøst til sentrum. Alle er brede, tett trafikkerte veier. Instytutska, som krysser
Khresjtsjatyk og går over til Mykhajlivska er også godt trafikkert og er en viktig vei for
å komme fra det politiske sentrum og ut i byen.
Kyiv har tre t-banelinjer. Under Uavhengighetsplassen ligger overgangen mellom
Uavhengighetsplassen stasjon på den røde linjen og Khresjtsjatyk stasjon på den blå
linjen. Det er også kort gangavstand til Zoloti vorota stasjon («Gullporten») på den
grønne linjen. Både buss, minibuss og trolleybuss har ruter over Uavhengighetsplas-
sen, og det er omtrent 3,5 km til jernbanens sentralstasjon.
Det er også mange fotgjengere som benytter seg av byrommet. Uavhengighets-
monumentet har blitt et av områdets naturlige møtesteder for folk, enten man skal
spasere i en av parkene i sentrum eller shoppe i et av Kyivs stadig voksende antall
kjøpesentre. Det ligger også mange kafeer, restauranter og uteplasser i området som
tiltrekker seg mengder med mennesker i løpet av dagen og kvelden. I helga stenges
Khresjtsjatyk for biltrafikk og blir gågate, og den fylles ofte med iskremkiosker,
gatemusikanter, gjøglere og mye annet, hele veien mellom Majdan og Bessarabskyj.
Blant turister er plassen et av Kyivs mest besøkte steder, ikke bare på grunn av dens
Bilde 3: Kyiv innenfor Ringveien. 1: Uavhengighetsplassen. 2: Kontraktova Plosjtsja. 3: Hovedtog-
stasjonen 4: Kyivs nasjonale universitet. 5: Grotteklosteret Kyjevo-Petsjerska Lavra. Illustrasjon: Arve
Hansen.
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historie, beliggenhet og arrangementer, men også fordi mange av byens hoteller er
plassert på og rundt Majdan.
Siden byrommet er stort og sentralt plassert blir det også brukt i sammenheng
med festivaler, konserter og offisielle merkedager. På Arbeidernes internasjonale
kampdag (1. mai), Seiersdagen over Nazi-Tyskland (9. mai) og Uavhengighetsdagen
(24. august) foregår det opptog og militære parader, og 1. desember hvert år settes
det opp en stor nyttårsgran på plassen.
Protestplass
Rent praktisk er det mange fordeler ved å bruke Uavhengighetsplassen til protester
og demonstrasjoner. De mange parkene, store byrommene og utdanningsinstitusjo-
nene i kort gangavstand fra plassen, gjør at demonstrasjoner kan arrangeres samtidig
på flere steder i byen og senere føres ned til Majdan når de er store nok til å
fylle plassen. Parken foran Sjevtsjenko-universitetet, Kontraktova-plassen og St.
Mikhailsplassen har ofte blitt brukt på denne måten, blant annet under den såkalte
Revolusjonen på granitten i 1990 (se nedenfor), Oransjerevolusjonen i 2004!05 og
Euromajdan i 2013!14.
Uavhengighetsplassen har blitt et naturlig møtested for forskjellige grupperinger
og organisasjoner både fordi den rommer mange mennesker, og fordi det er kort
avstand til det politiske sentrum. En protestleir på Majdan kan raskt organisere
aksjoner for å reagere på politikernes handlinger. Under Euromajdan, for å ta et
eksempel, reagerte demonstrantene på nye lover og at aktivister ble fengslet ved å
arrangere demonstrasjoner foran blant annet Verkhovna rada og bydomstolen.
Siden mange mennesker av forskjellige grunner bruker Uavhengighetsplassen,
blir en protest raskt lagt merke til og kan potensielt vokse fort. Kyivs posisjon som
politisk sentrum og byens religiøse og historiske betydning langt utenfor lande-
grensene gjør at en protest her snart får mye oppmerksomhet. Samtidig er de mange
platåene over SØ-delen praktiske utkikkspunkter hvor medier og andre som ønsker å
ta bilder av protestene får god oversikt over det som foregår på Majdan.
Det er likevel noen ulemper for protester i byrommet. Plassens ti innganger og
store størrelse gjør det lett for demonstranter å komme seg dit, men gjør også
området sårbart for angrep fra politi og andre sikkerhetsmyndigheter. Dette gjelder
hovedsakelig små demonstrasjoner. Store folkemengder har derimot vist seg svært
vanskelig å rydde bort. Selv da militære kjøretøy og skarpe våpen ble brukt i februar
2014 klarte ikke myndighetene å rydde mer enn en brøkdel av Euromajdan.
Noe som imidlertid utgjør en utfordring for store protester er alle de fysiske
hindringene som dukket opp på plassen etter rekonstrueringen av byrommet i 2000.
NV-delens mange gjerder, fontener og benker hindrer ferdsel på tvers av plassen, og
gjør at mennesker der både har lite handlerom og begrenset oversikt over det som
foregår. SØ-delen er mer åpen, men Uavhengighetsmonumentet står i veien for at
plassens naturlige fokalpunkt kan brukes til å sette opp en scene så alle kan se den.
Derfor settes ofte protestenes scene tett opp mot Khresjtsjatyk, vendt mot SØ-delen
og pressefotografenes utkikkspunkter, og med ryggen til NV-delen.
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Ulempene oppveies likevel av fordelene ved å arrangere protester på Uavhen-
gighetsplassen. Og det er sannsynlig at plassens fysiske egnethet har vært en viktig
faktor for at store protester der har blitt en suksess (blant annet Oransjerevolusjonen i
2004!05 og Euromajdan i 2013!14). De fysiske egenskapene forklarer imidlertid
ikke alene hvorfor Majdan har blitt et så sterkt symbol i Ukraina eller hvilken
funksjon Majdan har i samfunnet.
Byrommets symbolikk
Majdan Nezalezjnosti består av to ord: majdan og uavhengighet. Ordet majdan ble en
del av det ukrainske språket under det mongolske åket fra midten av 1200-tallet, og
stammer fra det middelpersiske og arabiske ordet (mæjdān [persisk], midān
[arabisk]). Majdan betyr plass eller arena på middelpersisk; og størrelse, sfære eller
sted for spill på arabisk (majdan 1989). På ukrainsk har man to ord for torg/åpent
byrom: majdan og plosjtsja. En majdan er i motsetning til en plosjtsja en større arena
med mange innløpende gater (Vasjanovytsj 2011).
Ordet majdan finnes ikke på russisk, hvor man kun har ordet plosjtsjad. Etter
at Sovjetunionen kollapset i 1991 og Ukraina erklærte seg uavhengig, skiftet
Oktoberrevolusjonens plass (plosjtsja) navn til Uavhengighetsmajdan. Det nye navnet
symboliserer derfor ikke bare at Ukraina er et selvstendig land, men vektlegger
samtidig at landet ikke er russisk.
I tillegg til navnet på plassen, som er et symbol på ukrainernes selvstendighet,
er det noe folkelig med Majdan. I det tilsynelatende rotet man finner på
Uavhengighetsplassen, bestående av monumenter, bygninger i forskjellige stiler,
enorme reklamebannere og mye annet, er det mulig å finne symboler på store deler
av byens og landets historie. I tillegg fungerer Fagforeningenes hus ! den store
hjørnesteinen på NV-delen av plassen ! som et symbol på kampen for arbeidernes
rettigheter. Ukrainas kulturelle liv er representert med Kunstsenteret og Konserva-
toriet på den andre siden. At Majdan ligger nedenfor de religiøse og politiske
institusjonene, men likevel regnes som sentrum av Kyiv og Ukraina, forsterker
betydningen av at Majdan tilhører folket.
25 år med protest
Den første store protesten i dette konkrete byrommet foregikk på Oktoberrevolusjo-
nens plass i oktober 1990. Ukraina var som mange andre sovjetrepublikker herjet av
dårlig økonomi, korrupsjon og utbredt varemangel, samt følgene av Tsjernobyl-
katastrofen i 1986. Gorbatsjovs perestrojka- og glasnost-reformer hadde gjort
protester mulig, og to studentorganisasjoner fra Kyiv og Lviv organiserte en
sultestreik på granitten foran Lenin-monumentet, kalt Revolusjonen på granitten
(heretter Granittrevolusjonen). Studentene krevde blant annet at Ukraina skulle
melde seg ut av Sovjetunionen, omvalg i parlamentet og at vernepliktige skulle slippe å
tjenestegjøre i konfliktområder som Afghanistan eller Nagorno-Karabakh. Protestene
som startet med noen hundre studenter vokste seg snart store, og da gruvearbeidere
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fra Donbas sluttet seg til protestene begynte myndighetene å reagere. Det viktigste
Granittrevolusjonen oppnådde, etter 16 dagers sultestreik, var at Oleksandr Donij,
lederen for studentorganisasjonen i Kyiv, fikk direktesendt taletid i Verkhovna rada,
hvor han gjentok demonstrantenes krav, og vernepliktige ble lovet å få tjenestegjøre i
Ukraina (Divaki production 2011).
Sovjetunionen opphørte å eksistere ett år etter Granittrevolusjonen. Likevel ble
ikke alt bedre med den nye uavhengigheten. En brå overgang til det kapitalistiske
systemet, ukontrollert privatisering og noen forhastede økonomiske beslutninger
førte til inflasjon og varemangel (Morrison 1993: 686). I kjølvannet av den
økonomiske krisen fulgte økt korrupsjon og kriminalitet. Tre rivaliserende oligark-
klaner (Kyiv-klanen, Dnipropetrovsk-klanen og Donetsk-klanen) etablerte seg på
1990-tallet, og disse var ofte i en økonomisk, og i mange tilfeller også voldelig,
konflikt med hverandre (Matuszak 2012: 13!15).
Ukrainas andre president, Leonid Kutsjma, fikk stoppet det økonomiske kaoset
som hadde herjet under president Leonid Kravtsjuk. I løpet av sin første president-
periode (1994!1999) stabiliserte han økonomien, fikk innført landets første grunnlov
og oppnådde en stor vekst i middelklassen. I Kutsjmas andre periode (1999!2005)
stoppet imidlertid den positive utviklingen, og oligarkene fikk mer makt enn før.
Korrupsjonen steg og presidenten økte sensuren i massemediene (Dyczok 2006;
Hansen 2015: 15!16).
I år 2000 kom president Kutsjma i sentrum av en stor skandale: Tre uker etter at
den regimekritiske journalisten Heorhij Gongadze ble funnet torturert og halshugget
i en skog utenfor Kyiv, ble lydopptak fra presidentens telefon lekket av presidentens
tidligere livvakt, Mykola Melnytsjenko. Opptakene skal ha vist at presidenten blant
annet beordret drapet på Gongadze, at han drev med valgfusk og korrupsjon og at
han stod bak en rekke andre kriminelle handlinger (Kuzio 2007: 42). Den såkalte
kassettskandalen utløste «Ukraina uten Kutsjma»-protestene vinteren 2000!01, hvor
tusenvis av demonstranter krevde presidentens avgang. Protestene slo seg først ned
på Majdan, men den store ombyggingen av plassen, som er nevnt ovenfor, ble et
påskudd for å tvinge protestleiren vekk fra Majdan. Demonstrantene ble nødt til å
flytte til parken foran Sjevtsjenko-universitetet, hvor de ble i nesten tre måneder før
teltleiren brutalt ble fjernet av opprørspolitiet i mars 2001. Cybriwsky (2014a: 167)
hevder at myndighetene brukte arbeidene på Majdan den vinteren både for å fjerne
protestene og for å bygge om plassen så den ble mindre egnet for store protester.
Til tross for de nye hindrene ble Uavhengighetsplassen likevel åstedet for
Oransjerevolusjonen i 2004!05. Etter en dramatisk valgkamp mellom Kutsjmas
kandidat, Viktor Janukovytsj, og tidligere statsbanksjef Viktor Jusjtsjenko, ble
førstnevnte erklært som vinner. Jusjtsjenko hadde blitt forgiftet under valgkampen,
men overlevde, og det var mange rapporter om valgfusk (Wilson 2005: 70!121).
Den til da største protesten i Ukraina ble ledet av Jusjtsjenko og Julia Tymosjenko.
Etter to måneder på Majdan, med til tider hundretusenvis av demonstranter, gikk
myndighetene med på å endre grunnloven og en ny valgrunde. Jusjtsjenko vant det
nye valget.
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Jusjtsjenko hadde gått til valg på å få gjennom reformer, fjerne korrupsjonen
og løfte økonomien, men Jusjtsjenko og den nye politiske ledelsen ble en stor
skuffelse. Presidenten slet med å få gjennomført de varslede reformene og klarte
verken å samarbeide med parlamentet eller med Tymosjenko. Sistnevntes kritikk mot
Jusjtsjenko ble stadig mer høyrøstet, og de to ble snart politiske fiender. I 2010, fem
år etter at Jusjtsjenko ble president, hadde han fått til lite. Korrupsjonen hadde steget
og verdien på den ukrainske hryvnjaen hadde falt med 38% i forhold til dollaren
(BBC 2009), fremdeles stod drapet på Gongadze uoppklart og oligarkene hadde
stadig minst like mye makt. I presidentvalget i 2010 stilte Janukovytsj på nytt og vant
mot Tymosjenko med 48,95% mot 45,47% av stemmene. Jusjtsjenko gikk ut etter
første runde med kun 5,5% oppslutning (Kireev 2007).
Janukovytsj fikk snart kritikk fra mange hold. Han ble anklaget for å føre en
unasjonal politikk (Kuzio 2012; Zik 2010), for å gjøre det vanskelig for små bedrifter
(Hansen 2015: 19), for at korrupsjon og kriminalitet økte, og for en forverring i
menneskerettighetssituasjonen (Zakharov 2014: 13!28, 161!173). Mange protester
mot myndighetene ble arrangert på Majdan. Noen av de største var «Skattemajdan»
i 2010, mot en økning av statens kontroll over små og mellomstore bedrifter; «Frihet
til Julija»-demonstrasjonene (Juli voli) i 2011, mot den strafferettslige forfølgelsen
av Janukovytsj’ rival Julija Tymosjenko; og Vradijivka-protestene, som etter en
bortføring og brutal gjengvoldtekt av en kvinne i den lille byen Vradijivka, var rettet
mot embetsmenn i rettssystemet ! anklaget av demonstrantene for å beskytte en av
de mistenkte politimennene (Hansen 2015: 19!20).
Bilde 4: Oransjerevolusjonen på Uavhengighetsplassen 2004. Foto: Oleksandr Klymenko.
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Euromajdan var altså kun den siste av flere protester mot Janukovytsj og en av
svært mange protester som har foregått på Majdan siden Ukraina ble selvstendig.
Protestene beskrevet ovenfor omfatter bare noen av de mest kjente av disse, og det har
blitt en form for tradisjon å gå ut på Majdan når man ønsker å protestere mot
myndighetene.9 Siden Majdan samtidig kan assosieres med fire revolusjoner, har
plassen også en revolusjonær symbolikk. Granittrevolusjonen, Oransjerevolusjonen
og Euromajdan foregikk på Majdan, mens Oktoberrevolusjonen var navnet på plassen
fram til 1991. Fotojournalisten Oleksandr Klymenko mener at navnet på Oktoberre-
volusjonens plass var en av grunnene til at studentene i 1990 valgte den som åsted for
Granittrevolusjonen. Den revolusjonære symbolikken har ikke blitt svakere etter at så
mange demonstranter døde i sammenstøtene i februar 2014. De drepte demonstran-
tene presenteres i Ukraina som helter, samlet er de en del av «Himmelhundringen»
(Nebesnja sotnja) ! et symbol på ukraineres vilje til å dø for forandringer i landet.
Majdan er selvfølgelig ikke det eneste byrommet som kan brukes til protester i
storbyen Kyiv. Byrommene på Sofiaplassen og St. Mikhailsplassen kan samlet
romme mange mennesker. Sjevtsjenkoparken foran universitetet med samme navn
har stor symbolsk verdi fordi dikteren Taras Sjevtsjenko (1814!61) regnes som en av
Ukrainas viktigste opposisjonelle skikkelser. Parlamentsplassen foran Verkhovna rada
ligger sentralt i forhold til politiske institusjoner. Alle disse byrommene kan og blir
ofte brukt til demonstrasjoner, men som nevnt ovenfor benyttes disse i mindre grad
og ofte i forbindelse med større protester på Majdan. Utforming og beliggenhet er
nok en viktig grunn til at de ikke blir brukt så ofte (Hansen 2015: 37!38), men at
Majdan har fått en bredere symbolsk verdi er nok enda viktigere.
Funksjon
Så hvilke funksjoner har Majdan for det ukrainske samfunnet? Mange av
respondentene mine forteller at de oppfatter Majdan som en viktig del av det
politiske systemet. Hanna, en aktiv internettaktivist, mener at Majdan oppstod som
en reaksjon på korrupsjonen i det politiske systemet, og nå har blitt en bevegelse for å
bli kvitt denne:
Vår politikk er så til de grader korrumpert at Majdan har blitt en nødvendighet. (. . .)
Majdan det er en spontan aksjon, protest, refleks (. . .). Men etterhvert oppstod et felles
mål: å bli helt kvitt det korrupte systemet. Man kan si at dette er en sosial bevegelse mot
korrupsjon eller gjenferdet etter Sovjetunionen.10
Når jeg spør respondentene hvilken funksjon de mener Majdan har, sammen-
ligner flere av dem Majdan med forskjellige politiske institusjoner. Både fotojourna-
9I løpet av mine to bostedsopphold i Kyiv og hyppige reiser til byen har det tilsynelatende «alltid»
foregått eller vært planlagt protester på Uavhengighetsplassen.
10Nasja polityka nastilky korumpovana, (. . .) sjtsjo nam prosto neobkhidnyj Majdan. (. . .) Majdan
! tse spontanna aktsija, protest, refleks (. . .). Ale zhodom zjavylas spilna meta ! povnistju zminyty
korumpovanu systemu. Mozjna skazaty, sjtsjo tse sotialnyj rukh proty koruptsiji abo pryzraku
Radjanskoho Sojuzu.
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listen Oleksandr Klymenko og lokalhistorikeren Serhij, som begge har sett flere
protester på plassen gjennom tidene; og Stanislau ! en hviterussisk aktivist som kom for
å støtte Euromajdan, kaller plassen for en form for folkeparlament hvor man drar for å
ordne opp i problemer. Serhij sammenligner Majdan med to former for folkestyrte
forsamlinger:
(. . .) ordet Majdan har bare blitt betydningen på en eller annen form for aksjon med
mange mennesker. Som en form for det gammelrussiske fenomenet vitsje. Eller som det
norske ordet ting. Det vil si en folkesamling som tar en eller annen viktig avgjørelse
[mine uthevinger].11
Den amerikanske historieprofessoren Timothy Snyder trekker på sin side en
parallell fra Majdan til den greske agoraen:
(. . .) a maidan now means in Ukrainian what the Greek word agora means in English: not
just a marketplace where people happen to meet, but a place where they deliberately meet,
precisely in order to deliberate, to speak, and to create a political society (Snyder 2014).
Flere andre, blant annet den ukrainske journalisten og bloggeren Volodymyr
Zolotorjov, legger også vekt på Majdan som et sted for diskusjon: «Majdan, det er
sosial trening for felles handling og felles kommunikasjon. Ukrainere lærer seg å bli et
samfunn, samhandle og kommunisere»12 (Zolotorjov 2013).
Det er selvfølgelig mulig å stille kritiske spørsmål ved påstandene om at Majdan
er som et ting eller en agora. Under Euromajdan ble den politiske situasjonen og hva
som må gjøres selvfølgelig diskutert av de ulike grupperingene, men likevel var det få
tegn under mine befaringer på at Majdan var et sted hvor diskusjon sto i sentrum.
Det var ikke åpent for at myndighetene eller andre meningsmotstandere kunne delta
i debattene på Majdan, og de frammøtte var som regel enige om hva og hvem de var
mot, selv om det til tider var uenighet om virkemidlene. Dermed virket Majdan mer
som et sted for aksjon enn for demokratisk diskusjon.
Likevel er det her kanskje mindre relevant å spørre i hvilken grad Majdan
fungerer som et folkeparlament, og viktigere å spørre hvilken funksjon Majdan har i
Ukraina. For hvis det eksisterer et sted man stadig går for å aksjonere mot
myndighetene, så har det en viktig funksjon: Protester dukker opp på Majdan når
det er stor misnøye med en sak og ukrainere ikke er fornøyd med hvordan
myndighetene behandler saken. Derfor er det mulig å se på Majdans funksjon som
en form for sikkerhetsventil for det ukrainske samfunnet. Et sted ukrainere føler de
har mulighet til å påvirke politikken direkte, om presset blir for stort.
Alle kan okkupere Majdan, og forskjellige grupper og sjikt av befolkningen har
startet protester på plassen. Under Granittrevolusjonen i 1990 og Euromajdan i
11(. . .) slovo Majdan prosto stalo oznatsjat imenno kakuju-to mnogoljudnuju aktsiju. Kak tipa
drevnorusskoje javlenije vetsje. Ili podobnoje k norvezjskomu slovu ting. To jest eto narodnoje
sobranije, kotoroje prinimajet kakoje-to resjenije vazjnoje.
12«Majdan ! eto sotsialnaja praktika vzaimo-dejstvija, so-obsjtsjenija. Ukraintsy utsjatsja byt
obsjtsjestvom, vzaimo-dejstvovat i so-obsjtsjatsia» (sic).
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2013!14 var det studenter som startet protestene, men protester har også blitt startet
av politikere, som under Oransjerevolusjonen i 2004!05; forretningsmenn, som
under Skattemajdan i 2010; og mennesker fra lokale tettsteder, som under
Vradijivka-protestene i 2013. Det er imidlertid appelleringsevnen til den konkrete
saken som avgjør om andre grupper av samfunnet slår seg til og, som de sier i
Ukraina, «en ny Majdan begynner» (novyj Majdan potsjynaetsia).
Konklusjoner
Jeg spurte innledningsvis hva det er som gjør Uavhengighetsplassen til Ukrainas
protestplass, hva plassen symboliserer, og hvilken funksjon Majdan har.
Protester har lenge vært en del av det politiske bildet i Ukraina. I løpet av minst
25 år med sosial misnøye og 30 år med økonomiske problemer, har tilliten til de
politiske institusjonene i landet blitt svekket. Korrupsjon og kriminalitet i landets lille
elite har ført til at mange ukrainere oppfatter politikere som representanter kun for
sine egne interesser ! ikke folkets. Skuffelsene etter Oransjerevolusjonen har ført til at
denne oppfatningen gjelder alle politikere, enten de er i parlamentet eller en del av
opposisjonen. Når folket mener politikerne gjør en dårlig jobb med å ivareta deres
interesser, trekker de ut på Uavhengighetsplassen. Til tross for forsøk på starten av
2000-tallet på å gjøre byrommet mindre tilgjengelig for store folkemengder, har
området likevel blitt stedet folk samles for å protestere.
Uavhengighetsplassen er fysisk godt egnet som protestplass. Den ligger
strategisk plassert mellom andre møtesteder i byen, noe som gjør at demonstrasjoner
kan arrangeres på flere steder samtidig og føres ned til Majdan, og den er kort vei fra
politisk sentrum på Petsjersk-høyden. Det samlede byrommet på Majdan og
Khresjtsjatyk er også stort og åpner for at store folkemengder kan demonstrere
samtidig. De mange innfartsårene og plassinngangene gjør at det er lett å komme seg
til Majdan, og myndighetene sliter med å kontrollere hva som foregår der. Plassens
konstruksjon gjør at det er svært vanskelig å rydde folk vekk fra plassen, om de har
fått anledning til å slå seg ned.
Uavhengighetsplassen er også symbolsk og kulturelt egnet for protester. Navnet
symboliserer en avstand til Russland, da begge ordene majdan og uavhengighet
knyttes til uavhengigheten i 1991. Plassens posisjon er nedenfor de politiske, religiøse
og historiske sentrene, men likevel sentrum av byen. Det gjør at byrommet har en
spesiell folkenær symbolikk. Symbolikken forsterkes av Arbeiderforeningenes hus, de
kulturelle bygningene, og all lokalhistorien ! i form av bygninger og monumenter.
Siden Majdan samtidig assosieres med fire vellykkede revolusjoner, hvorav tre kan
kobles direkte til plassen, minnes byen og landets borgere om mulighetene et slikt
byrom gir dem.
Det er til Majdan ukrainere drar for å bli hørt når politikken ikke fungerer, og
Majdan kan ses på som en form for sikkerhetsventil ! et sted hvor folket kan gå ut og
kaste ledelsen, om de går for langt vekk fra folkets ønske. At det har vært så mange
protester på Majdan sier både noe om hvor viktig denne sikkerhetsventilen er, og
hvor vanskelig det er å reformere det ukrainske samfunnet. Målet med de fleste
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protestene har vært å fjerne det korrupte lederskapet, men det er ikke gitt at en ny
ledelse fører til et nytt og reformert samfunn.
Ukrainas nåværende politiske ledelse kjenner betydningen av Majdan. Politi-
kerne fikk posisjonene sine etter at president- og parlamentsvalgene i 2014 hadde
blitt framskyndt på grunn av revolusjonen. Når så Porosjenko-administrasjonen blir
truet med en ny Majdan vet de hva det kan bety. I et klima herjet av krig og
ustabilitet, men samtidig mange reformer, vil det være interessant å se hvordan
Majdan vil bli brukt i tiden framover.
Om artikkelen
Jeg vil gjerne takke Instituttet for historie og religionsvitenskap ved UiT Norges
arktiske universitet, som ga meg stipend for å utarbeide denne artikkelen. En stor
takk går også til Oleksandr Klymenko som tillot meg å bruke fotografiet hans fra
Oransjerevolusjonen.
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Studies. Tilgjengelig på https://itunes.apple.com/no/podcast/2012-parliamentary-%20elections/id383698
245?i"123419448&l"nb&mt"2@. Lesedato 10. desember 2014.
Lee, Nelson, K. (2009) «How is a Political Public Space Made? ! The Birth of Tiananmen Square and the May
Fourth Movement». Political Geography 28 (1): 32!43.
Lopes de Souza, Marcelo & Barbara Lipietz (2011) «The ‘Arab Spring’ and the City: Hopes, Contradictions
and Spatiality». City 15 (6): 618!624.
Lynch, Kevin (1960) The Image of the City. Cambridge: MIT Press.
majdan (1989) O.S. Melnytsjuk, V.T. Kolomijets, V.H. Skljarenko, T.B Lukinova & O.B. Tkatsjenko (red.)
Etymolohitsjnyj slovnyk ukrajinskoji movy. Bind 3. Kyiv: Naukova dumka.
Matuszak, Slawomir (2012) «The Oligarchic Democracy: The Influence of Business Groups on Ukrainian
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Abstract 
Much has been said and written about the Ukrainian revolution of 2013–14, yet research on Maidan 
Nezalezhnosti, the protests’ most iconic location, has so far been rather limited. This article analyses the history, 
attributes and symbolism of this particular city space. What function does Maidan have in Ukrainian society? In 
the course of my fieldwork in Kyiv 2013–15 on the recent revolution, I have found that Maidan has many features 
that make it a particularly suitable site for protests. In the current article I argue that several factors related to the 
square’s physical space, from its location between the religious, historical and political centres of Ukraine, to its 
proximity to important landmarks, as well as its infrastructure, shape, architecture, and size, make Maidan both 
a symbolic and a practical space to occupy for people demanding change. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
Maidan has acquired a special significance for Ukrainians. The name of the square itself could be interpreted as 
a protest against Russia, and the many protests and three revolutions on Maidan have given it a particular 
revolutionary meaning. I argue that Maidan functions as a socio-political safety valve – a place people turn to 
and turn up at to demand change when the formal political institutions fail to deliver.  
 
Keywords: City space, Independence Square, Maidan, protests, revolution, Ukraine  
 
 
In the centre of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv lies Maidan Nezalezhnosti – Independence Square – one 
of Kyiv’s larger open urban spaces.1 In the winter of 2013–14, Maidan attracted much attention 
during the Euromaidan protests, which after three dramatic months saw at least 82 demonstrators 
killed (Ukrainian Ministry of Health, 2014) and a political power shift in the country. The protests 
also became a prelude to the crisis on the Crimean Peninsula and the War in Donbas. Thus far, the 
war has claimed more than 9100 human lives (UN News Centre, 2015), 1,38 million people are 
internally displaced (UNHCR, 2015a), and 1,1 million people have fled the country (UNHCR, 2015b, 
p. 2). 
During my fieldwork in Kyiv from November 2013 to May 2015, which examined the driving 
forces behind the protests, I noted several aspects indicating Independence Square’s important 
symbolic meaning for Ukrainians. The most prominent example is that the protests took the name of 
Euromaidan – a combination of the words Europe and Maidan. Yet it is perhaps even more 
illustrative that the first attack by the riot police on the demonstrations in Kyiv was referred to in 
Ukraine as the Attack on Maidan (Rozhin Maidanu).2 The attack took place during the night of 30 
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Perspective: Discontent and Urban Public Space in Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow. 
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provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. 
 
1 In this article, I use the Ukrainian forms of Ukrainian proper nouns (Kyiv, Donbas, Ianukovych), not the Russian ones (Kiev, 
Donbass, Ianukovich). All proper nouns are Romanised in accordance with the Library of Congress system (2011; 2012). 
2 Rozhin could be translated as scattering, driving away, dispersal, storming, or attacking. Yet since the context is a square, 
neither scattering nor driving away fit as a translation; the “dispersal of Maidan” does not capture the serious nature of the 








November 2013 and led to a surge of popular support for the protests amongst Ukrainians (Hansen, 
2015, p. 44–45). It was also interesting to see that Maidan as a concept was not limited to the physical 
space of Independence Square alone but also became a generic term for the areas occupied by the 
protesters as so-called maidan-y appeared in other Ukrainian cities. A respondent, the local historian 
Serhii, describes Maidan as something mobile: “After the attack on Maidan […] a funny expression 
[appeared]: ‘Maidan has moved to Mykhailivs’ka Square’ […] that is, Maidan is not attached to the 
space, it is already an act of protest. It is not important where it is.”3 
Even though significant parts of the international attention moved from Kyiv to Donbas, 
Maidan is still a subject for discussions in Ukraine. In connection with the presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2014, and before the local elections in October 2015, oppositional parties 
and other groupings threatened to “go to Maidan” if the Poroshenko administration did not end the 
war and speed up the reform process. The authorities have, in turn, attempted to show that the 
symbolic value of Maidan is important to them, and during the summer of 2015, a large-scale 
architectural competition to reconstruct the city space was launched, with large funds made available 
– a faltering economy notwithstanding (Terra Dignitas, 2015). Among other things, it was discussed 
what the memorial to Euromaidan and the fallen demonstrators should look like. 
In order to understand the turmoil which occurred in Kyiv in February 2014, and thus the 
background for the events which are unfolding in the country at present, it is necessary to look more 
closely at what Maidan signifies for Ukrainians. Why do protests appear on Independence Square? 
What does Maidan symbolise? Which functions does the square have in Ukrainian society? 
Due to space constraints, I have limited this article to protests in Kyiv and the correlation 
between them and the city space in which they most frequently were arranged. Thus, I do not analyse 
other urban spaces, or examine the structures or organisation of individual protest actions. 
This article is divided into three parts: The first looks at the physical layout, position, local 
history, and daily use of Independence Square. The second discusses the symbolic meanings 
associated with Maidan. Finally, I discuss the functions of Maidan in Ukrainian society today. 
I argue that Independence Square has become a natural place to carry out protests, and despite 
a couple of disadvantages, it is well suited for larger crowds. Also, Maidan has a special symbolic 
significance as the people’s square – a location associated with several revolutions and the only place 
where people feel they have a direct influence on the country’s politics. My findings support the idea 
that Maidan today functions as a socio-political safety valve in a dysfunctional and corrupt political 
system. 
Methods and theory 
The current analysis of the physical layout of Maidan is based on my own observations in Kyiv 
between November 2013 and July 2015.4 The theoretical framework for the analysis is derived from 
 
event; and the “storming of Maidan” has been used for the police action of 18 and 19 February 2014. I have chosen to define 
the incident as an attack. 
3 «Posle razgona Maidana […] byla takaia fraza smeshnaia: ‘Maidan peremestilsia na Mikhailovs’kuiu ploshchad’ […] 
poluchaetsia, chto Maidan ne priviazan k ploshchadi – eto uzhe protestnaia aktsiia. Nevazhno, gde on.» 
4 I have used much of the same qualitative source material as in my master’s thesis on Euromaidan (Hansen, 2015). 








Lynch’s (1960) theories about the functionality and significance of cities.5 During the revolution I 
made 23 field trips to the Maidan, and established contact with numerous people. From these I chose 
six respondents for seven semi-structured in-depth interviews. Excerpts from these interviews are 
used in this article.6 Since I have had two longer stays in Kyiv (from January to June 2011, and from 
July 2013 to December 2015), and travelled regularly to the city (from May 2007), I have also had 
many experiences of my own in the city. I refer to these as personal experiences. 
In research literature, there exist in-depth analyses of the relationship between democracy, 
protests, and individual urban spaces (see Parkinson, 2012). More specifically, the Occupy 
movement’s relations to occupied space in cities in the West have been analysed (Hammond, 2013); 
the space occupied by the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in 2013 has been thoroughly discussed (Göle, 
2013a, 2013b; Inceoglu, 2014, 2015; Örs, 2014); and the same applies to several protests in urban 
space during the Arab Spring from 2011 (see, for example, Lopes de Souza & Lipietz, 2011), the 
protests on Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Hershkovitz, 1993; Lee, 2009) and so on. However, few 
analyses of urban space in connection with the protests in Kyiv have been conducted. Whilst analyses 
have been made of the layout and history of Independence Square – such as the discussion of the 
urban space’s post-Soviet transformations (Hryshchenko, 2013), publications about the history of the 
city, and about the Euromaidan protests in a historical perspective (Cybriwsky, 2014a and Cybriwsky, 
2014b, respectively) – there are, as far as I am aware, no in-depth discussions to be found about the 
relationship between the layout, symbolic value, and function of Maidan.  
The Position and Layout of the Urban Space 
The capital of Ukraine is centrally located in the country, between Poland in the west (440 km from 
Kyiv) and Russia in the east (300 km). Kyiv is more central than any other city in the country, even 
if there are greater distances to regions, such as Donbas and Crimea (600 km and 550 km, 
respectively), than for example to Belarus (95 km). This is due to the country’s infrastructure, such 
as roads, railways, and the river Dnipro. 
According to legend, Kyiv was founded in year 482, and is considered the historical basis for 
the three modern nations, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. It was in Kyiv that Kievan Rus’ converted to 
Christianity in 988, and the city therefore remains important for several orthodox churches.7 Some of 
the holiest buildings of Orthodox Christianity, among them Saint Sophia’s Cathedral and the cave 
monastery Kyievo-Pechers’ka lavra, are located in the city. In addition to being an important historic 
and religious centre, several of Ukraine’s most important political institutions can be found in Kyiv, 
as well as some of the country’s oldest and most prestigious universities. 
 
5 Lynch emphasises, among other things, people’s regular and possible patterns of movement (paths); landmarks and points, 
which people go to or through, and/or relate to (landmarks and nodes); things that hinder movement (edges); and areas in the 
city with distinct characteristics (districts). The terms are not used in this text directly, but they still form the basis of my 
analysis. 
6 For the sake of respondents' security, their names are pseudonymized and listed in the text in italics. This does not apply, 
however, to Ukrainian photojournalist Oleksandr Klymenko, who wanted to appear under his full name. 
7 The city is particularly important for: The Russian Orthodox Church; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, whose leadership is 
located in Kyiv, even though it is a subject of the Moscow Patriarchate; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with its own patriarchate 
in Kyiv; the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Catholic Church (this is officially Catholic, yet follows the same Byzantine Rite as the 
orthodox believers do); and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. 








Independence Square is located in the middle of Kyiv, between three hills, high up on the 
western (right) bank of Dnipro. Six small streets (Borysa Hrinchenka, Provulok Tarasa Shevchenka, 
Sofiivs’ka, Mala Zhytomyrs’ka, Mykhailivs’ka, and Kostiolna) stretch upwards from the north-
western part of the square (henceforth, the NW part) towards the city’s historical and religious centre 
on Starokyivs’ka and Zamkova hills. From the south-eastern part of the square (henceforth, the SE 
part) two streets (Instytuts’ka and Arkhitektora Horodets’koho) point towards the political centre on 
Pechers’k Hill. Up here, the Presidential Administration, Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament), the 
House of Government, the Central Bank, and several party headquarters are located. The 1,3 km long 
main street, Khreshchatyk Avenue, crosses Independence Square on its way between European 
Square in the north-east and Bessarabs’ka Square in the south. Independence Square is large, about 
370 meters long and between 110 and 200 meters wide (depending on how and where it is measured). 
Khreshchatyk Avenue, with its eight lanes and 60-meter width, pavements included, is also an 
intrinsic part of the urban space. Overall, on the square and avenue, there is plenty of room for 
hundreds of thousands of people. In the area around Independence Square there are several meeting 
places, amongst them parks, large squares, and educational institutions. 
Spatial and urban history 
One way of observing Kyiv’s development through the ages is through the many names of the central 
square. Only in the middle of the eighteenth century was the area developed where Independence 
Square is presently located; although Liads’ki Gate – one of the city’s three entrances in the middle 
ages – was situated in the area, too. The Mongols allegedly invaded Kyiv through this gate in 1240, 
marking the end of Kievan Rus’. From the middle of the nineteenth century the city grew rapidly. 
The small square was first named Khreshchatyk Square in 1869 after the densely built commercial 
street. When the city Duma was built in 1876, the name of the square changed to Duma Square 
(GUOKS, n.d.). 
After the Bolsheviks came to power in 1919, the square changed names several times. First, 
it became Soviet Union Square, and from 1935 Kalinin Square, after the Soviet politician, Mikhail 
Kalinin. Between 1941 and 1943 the square was re-named Nineteenth September Square, after the 
date when Nazi Germany first occupied the city. And when the city was reclaimed by the Red Army, 
it became Kalinin Square once more (GUOKS, n.d.). 
Before the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1977, the urban space was renovated 
and received the name October Revolution Square. The NW part, which until then had been heavily 
trafficked and had many physical obstacles, was converted into an open, green area with park-like 
qualities, with less traffic and plenty of opportunities for large crowds to gather. At the end of the SE 
part a large monument in memory of Lenin and the October Revolution was raised (Hryshchenko, 
2013, p. 86). After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the square changed its name to Independence 
Square, a name it still possesses today. 
The façades of the urban space also show some of the transitions the city has gone through. 
Only the October Palace (now an art centre) at the top of a large grass hill in the eastern end of the 
square, and the Conservatoire are left from before World War II. The lack of buildings from before 
the war bears witness to the destruction the city and the people went through during the war years. 








After the war, Stalin redeveloped the city in Soviet classicist style with the help of the forced slave 
labour of POWs: Khreshchatyk became a wide Soviet avenue, and Kalinin Square became the city’s 
central square. The Duma had burned to the ground during the war and was not re-erected. The 
buildings along Khreshchatyk Avenue and in the NW part of Kalinin Square were all built with a 
yellow type of natural rock, with similar majestic design (sarcastically called Stalin Cream Cake [-
style] by the city’s inhabitants).8 
 
Figure 1: Maidan from above. 1: Trade Unions Building. 2: Hotel Ukraine. 3: October Palace. 4: Ukraiins’kyi dim. 5: City 
Administration. 6: Security Agency (SBU). 7: Saint Sophia’s Cathedral. 8: Golden Gate. 9: Central Bank. 10: Conservatoire. 11: 
Opera House. 
The death of Stalin in 1953 led to an abrupt end to this architectural neoclassicism, however. 
Khrushchev rejected the grandiose plans and completed the reconstruction in a much simplified form. 
Hotel Moscow (from 2001, Hotel Ukraine), illustrates this simplification well. The hotel, which 
stands on the top of the hill in the end of the square’s SE part, was meant to be built as one of the 
Stalin vysotki (skyscrapers), but was quickly finished, lower than planned, and without a classicist 
decor. The two largest buildings on the square, the Central Post Office and the Trade Unions Building, 
are stylistically in contrast with each other. The Central Post Office is built in a traditional Soviet 
classicist style, while the Trade Unions Building is postmodern structure, topped by a 24 meter high 
digital clock tower. 
 
8 From an excursion with the firm Interesnyi Kiev, 27 July 2013.   








After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kyiv went through a rapid transition to capitalism. Today, 
there are large illuminated advertising billboards on top of all the buildings on Independence Square. 
Before the Trade Unions building was completely destroyed during Euromaidan, its façade was 
covered by enormous advertising posters. On the ground level, banks, fast food restaurants, and 
kiosks now dominate the cityscape. 
During the winter of 2000-01, a  redevelopment of urban space began on a grand scale, and a 
shopping mall was built on Independence Square. The shopping mall is two floors deep and stretches 
underneath the whole NW part. A six-meter-tall glass dome at the end of the square sheds light down 
into the mall. In the other, south-eastern end of the square, there is an enormous mirror glass façade, 
which is three floors high. This is the second part of the shopping mall, located in front of Hotel 
Ukraine. The shopping mall was strongly criticised for damaging the appearance of Maidan, and even 
the developer, Hari Korohodskyi, stated in 2007 that he agreed with the criticism (Fokus, 2007). 
Parallel to the construction of the shopping mall, numerous new monuments were raised, which 
portray Ukrainian historical and mythical figures. This was part of a nationalization project by Leonid 
Kuchma, aimed to unify the country around a shared historical memory. 
Hryshchenko has written about the reconstruction of the urban space and relays how the 
square went from being a green point for gatherings into a grey and inaccessible area, which has lost 
much of its charm. Indicative of how the nationalization project of Kuchma never became very 
popular with the wider population, is the fact that the Independence Monument – the city’s most 
famous landmark – is often referred to by nicknames, such as “the pole,” “the lady with the twig,” or 
“Batman” (Hryshchenko, 2013, pp. 86-87). 
Daily use 
Despite a somewhat messy layout, the urban space of Maidan is used by a vast number of people 
every day. Khreshchatyk functions as the natural thoroughfare between several important roads: 
Naberezhne – which goes along Dnipro on its right bank; Bul’var Tarasa Shevchenka – a prolongment 
of Prospekt Peremohy, which is an important traffic artery from the western parts of Kyiv to the city 
centre; and Lesi Ukrainky, which goes through Baseina, from the south east to the centre. All of these 
are wide, heavily trafficked roads. Instytuts’ka, which crosses Khreshchatyk and leads further to 
Mykhailivs’ka, is well trafficked, too, and is an important path from the political centre out into the 
city. 
Kyiv has three rapid transit circuits. The interchange between Independence Square Station 
on the red circuit and Khreshchatyk Station on the blue circuit is situated underneath Independence 
Square. There is also a short walking distance to Zoloti vorota Station (“Golden Gate”) on the green 
circuit. Buses, minibuses and trolleybuses have routes crossing Independence Square, and the main 
railway station is approximately 3,5 kilometres away. 









Figure 2: The Independence Monument (or the Pole). The statue is 62 meter tall and portrays Berehynia – the protector, a female 
spirit from Slavic mythology. Photo: Pedro J Pacheco CC BY-SA 4.0. 









Figure 3: Kyiv within Ring Road. 1: Independence Square. 2: Kontraktova ploshcha. 3: Main railway station. 4: Kyiv National 
University. 5: Cave Monastery Kyievo-Pechers’ka lavra. Illustration: Arve Hansen. 
Many pedestrians use the urban space, too. The Independence Monument has become one of 
the natural meeting places for people in the area, whether they want to stroll in one of the parks in the 
city centre or go shopping in one of Kyiv’s increasing number of shopping malls. There is also a 
multitude of cafes, restaurants and nightclubs in the area which attract crowds of people during the 
day and evening. During the weekends, Khreshchatyk is closed for traffic and becomes a pedestrian 
zone, which fills up with ice cream parlours, street musicians, entertainers and much else, all the way 
between Maidan and Bessarabs’kyi. For tourists, the square is one of Kyiv’s most frequented places, 
not just due to its history, location, and events, but also because several of the city’s hotels are located 
on and around Maidan. 
Since the urban space is large and centrally located, it is also used in the context of festivals, 
concerts, and on commemorative days. Rallies and military parades are arranged on Labour Day (1 
May), Victory Day (9 May), and Independence Day (24 August). On 1 December every year, a large 
New Year’s spruce is built on the square. 
Protest Space 
There are many practical advantages of using Independence Square for protests and demonstrations. 
The large number of parks, large urban spaces, and educational institutions within short walking 
distance from the square make it possible to arrange simultaneous rallies in several places in the city, 








and later lead them down to Maidan when they are large enough to fill the square. The park in front 
of Shevchenko University, Kontraktova Square, as well as St. Mykhail Square, have often been used 
this way, e.g. during the so-called Revolution on the Granite in 1990 (see below), the Orange 
Revolution in 2004-05, and Euromaidan in 2013-14. 
Independence Square has become a natural meeting place for different groupings and 
organizations, because it has enough room for a large number of people, and because it is a short 
distance from the political centre. A protest encampment at Maidan could quickly organise responses 
to politicians’ actions. During Euromaidan, for example, the demonstrators reacted to new laws and 
the imprisonment of activists by arranging demonstrations in front of, among other places, Verkhovna 
Rada and the city courthouse. 
Since Independence Square is used by a large number of people, a protest there will quickly 
be noticed and could potentially grow fast. The position of Kyiv as the centre of politics, and the 
city’s religious and historical importance, far beyond the country’s borders, provide suitable 
conditions for attracting attention. Additionally, the many plateaus over the SE part provide the media 
and others who wish to take photos of the protests a good overview over what is going on at Maidan. 
Even so, there still are some disadvantages for protests in the urban space. The ten entrances 
to the square and its large size make it easy for demonstrators to access the square, but it also makes 
the area vulnerable to attacks from police and other law enforcement agencies. This is mainly true for 
smaller demonstrations. Conversely, large crowds of people have shown themselves particularly 
difficult to remove. Even when military vehicles and firearms were employed in February 2014, the 
government did not manage to clear more than a fraction of Euromaidan. 
What constitutes a real challenge for large protests, however, are all the physical obstacles 
which appeared on the square after the reconstruction of the urban space in 2000. The many fences, 
fountains, and benches in the NW part prevent movement across the square and reduce the room for 
mobility and outward visibility for the people there. The SE part is more open, but the Independence 
Monument hinders the utility of the square’s natural focal point as a space for a stage where everyone 
could see it. For this reason, the protesters often put up their stage close to Khreshchatyk Avenue, 
facing the SE part and the press’s vantage points, with its back facing the NW part. 
Even so, the disadvantages are outweighed by the advantages of arranging protests at 
Independence Square. It is very likely that the square’s physical suitability has been an important 
factor for the successful outcome of large protests there (among others, the Orange Revolution in 
2004–05, and Euromaidan in 2013–14). The physical qualities do not, however, by themselves 
explain why Maidan has become such a powerful symbol in Ukraine. Nor does it explain what 
functions Maidan has in Ukrainian society. 
The Symbolic Value of the Urban Space 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti consists of two words: maidan and independence. The word maidan became 
part of the Ukrainian language during the Mongol Yoke from the middle of the thirteenth century, 
and it derives from the Middle-Persian and Arabic word میدان (meydân [Persian], midān [Arabic]). 
Maidan means space or arena in Middle-Persian; and volume, sphere, or a place for games in Arabic 








(maidan, 1989). In Ukrainian there are two words for square/open urban space: maidan and ploshcha. 
A maidan is, unlike a ploshcha, a larger arena with many entrances (Vasianovych, 2011). 
The word maidan does not exist in Russian, which only knows one word, ploshchad’. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Ukraine’s declaration of independence, the October 
Revolution Square (ploshcha) changed name to Independence Maidan. The new name thus not only 
symbolises Ukraine’s independence but also emphasises that the country is not Russian. 
In addition to the name of the square, which symbolises Ukrainian independence, there is 
something quite commonplace about Maidan. In the apparent mess one finds at Independence Square, 
which consists of monuments, buildings in a variety of architectural styles, enormous advertising 
boards and much else, it is possible to find symbolic markers of the city’s and the country’s history. 
Additionally, the Trade Unions Building – the large cornerstone structure in the NW part of the square 
– serves as a symbol of the fight for labour rights. The cultural life of Ukraine is represented on the 
other side, through the Art Centre and the Conservatoire. Maidan’s position below the religious and 
political institutions is still regarded as the centre of the city, which reinforces the sense of Maidan 
belonging to the people. 
25 Years of Protest 
The first mass protest in this specific urban space (then known as October Revolution Square) took 
place in October 1990. Ukraine was, as many other Soviet republics, ravaged by a faltering economy, 
corruption, and widespread lack of goods, in addition to the consequences of the Chornobyl 
Catastrophe in 1986. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost’ reform projects had opened up for 
protests, and two student organisations from Kyiv and Lviv staged a hunger strike on the granite in 
front of the Lenin Monument. This was called Revolution on the Granite (henceforth the Granite 
Revolution). The students demanded, among other things, Ukraine’s exit from the Soviet Union, a 
parliamentary re-election, and that conscripts should not be required to serve in hot spots, such as in 
Afghanistan or Nagorno-Karabakh. The protests, which begun with a few hundred students, soon 
grew large, and when miners from the Donbas region joined them, the authorities began to react. The 
biggest achievement of the Granite Revolution, after 16 days of hunger strike, was that the leader of 
the Kyivan student organisation, Oleksandr Donii, was granted speaking time in the Verkhovna Rada. 
During the live broadcast, he repeated the protesters’ demands. Conscripts were also promised that 
they would serve in Ukraine (Divaki production, 2011). 
One year after the Granite Revolution, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, but the newly won 
independence did not mean that everything suddenly improved. A rapid transition to a capitalist 
system, uncontrolled privatisation, and some premature economic decisions led to inflation and 
shortages of goods (Morrison, 1993, p. 686). In the wake of the economic crisis followed increases 
in corruption and crime. Three rival oligarch clans  (the Kyiv clan, the Dnipropetrovsk clan, and the 
Donetsk clan) were established during the 1990s, and these remained in economic, but quite often 
also violent, conflict with each other (Matuszak, 2012, pp. 13-15). 
The second president in Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, was able to stop the economic chaos that 
had ravaged the country during President Leonid Kravchuk’s term. In the course of his first 
presidential term (1994–1999), Kuchma stabilised the economy, introduced the country’s first 








constitution, and oversaw a large growth of the middle class. In Kuchma’s second period (1999-
2005), however, the positive development ended, and the oligarchs increased their power. Corruption 
swelled, and the president increased the censorship of the mass media (Dyczok, 2006; Hansen, 2015, 
pp. 15-16). 
In 2000, Kuchma became the centre of a huge scandal. Three weeks after Heorhii Gongadze, 
a journalist critical of the regime, was found tortured and beheaded in a forest outside Kyiv, sound 
recordings from the president’s telephone were leaked by the president’s former bodyguard, Mykola 
Mel’nychenko. The recordings allegedly confirmed that the president, among other things, ordered 
the killing of Gongadze, and that he was behind election fraud, corruption and numerous other 
criminal acts (Kuzio, 2007, p. 42). The so-called Cassette Scandal triggered the Ukraine Without 
Kuchma protests in the winter of 2000-01, during which thousands of demonstrators demanded the 
president’s resignation. The protesters first settled at Maidan, yet the substantial redevelopment of 
the square, mentioned above, became a pretext for pushing the protest camp away from Maidan. The 
demonstrators had to move to the park in front of the Shevchenko University, where they stayed for 
almost three months, until the encampment of tents was brutally removed by riot police in March 
2001. Cybriwsky (2014a, p. 167) asserts that the authorities used the work on Maidan that winter in 
order to remove the protests and to reconstruct the square in order to make it less suitable for protests. 
Despite these new obstacles, Independence Square became the venue for the Orange 
Revolution in 2004-05. After a dramatic election campaign between Kuchma’s preferred candidate, 
Viktor Ianukovych, former PM, and Governor of the Central Bank, Viktor Iushchenko, the former 
was declared the winner. Iushchenko had been poisoned during the election campaign but survived, 
and there were many reports of election fraud (Wilson, 2005, pp. 70–121). The biggest protest in 
Ukraine up until that point was led by Iushchenko and Iuliia Tymoshenko. After two months at 
Maidan, which at times was populated by hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, the authorities 
agreed to change the constitution and to hold new elections. Iushchenko won the new elections. 
Iushchenko had pledged during his campaign to reform the country, eliminate corruption, and 
improve the economy, but he and the new economic elite turned out to be a big disappointment. The 
president struggled with the implementation of the reforms and could not cooperate with either the 
parliament or Tymoshenko. The latter’s critique against Iushchenko became increasingly vociferous, 
and the two soon became political enemies. In 2010, five years after Iushchenko had been elected 
president, he achieved little. Corruption soared, the value of the Ukrainian Hryvnia fell by 38% in 
relation to the dollar (BBC, 2009), the murder of Gongadze still stood unsolved, and the oligarchs 
had at least as much power as before. In the presidential elections of 2010, Ianukovych returned as a 
candidate and won against Tymoshenko with 48,95% against 45,47% of the votes. Iushchenko lost 
the race in the first round with a mere 5,5 % support (Kireev, 2007) 
Ianukovych was soon criticised from many sides. He was accused of conducting un-national 
politics (Kuzio, 2012; Zik, 2010), of enhancing the obstacles for small businesses (Hansen, 2015, p. 
19), for the increased levels of corruption and crime, and for weakening the position of human rights 
in the society (Zakharov, 2014, pp. 13-28, 161-173). Several protests against the authorities were 
arranged on Maidan. Some of the biggest were the Tax Maidan in 2010, against an increase in the 
government’s control over small- and medium-sized businesses; the Freedom for Iuliia 








demonstrations (Iuli voliu) in 2011, against the criminal prosecution aimed at Tymoshenko 
(Ianukovych’ rival); and the Vradiivka protests, directed against legal officials, accused by the 
demonstrators of protecting one of the police officers suspected of involvement in an abduction and 
brutal gang rape of a woman in a little town called Vradiivka (Hansen, 2015, pp. 19-20). 
 
Figure 4: Orange Revolution at Independence Square 2004. Photo: Oleksandr Klymenko. 
Euromaidan was therefore only the last of several protests against Ianukovych, and one of a 
large number of protests which have occurred at Maidan since Ukraine achieved independence. The 
protests described above include only some of the most widely known protest actions, and a tradition 
of going to Maidan when one wants to protest against the authorities has been firmly established.9 
Because Maidan can simultaneously be associated with four revolutions, the space also has a 
revolutionary symbolic value. The Granite Revolution, the Orange Revolution, and Euromaidan took 
place at Maidan, while the October Revolution was the name of the square until 1991. The 
photojournalist Oleksandr Klymenko believes that the name of the October Revolution Square was 
one of the reasons why students chose it as their location for the Granite Revolution in 1990. This 
revolutionary symbolic value has not weakened after a large number of demonstrators died in the 
clashes in February 2014. The killed demonstrators are now presented in Ukraine as heroes, 
collectively known as the Heavenly Hundred (Nebesnia sotnia) – a symbol of Ukrainians’ willingness 
to die for changes in the country. 
Maidan is, of course, not the only urban space which can be used for protests in central Kyiv. 
The urban spaces on Sophia Square and St. Mykhail Square can, as a whole, accommodate many 
 
9 During my two periods of living in Kyiv and frequent trips to the city, there have apparently “always” been or been planned 
protests on Independence Square. 








people. Shevchenko Park in front of the university of the same name has a great symbolic value 
because the poet Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) is considered one of the most important figures for 
the opposition. Parliament Square in front of Verkhovna Rada is centrally located in proximity to 
various political institutions. All these urban spaces can and have been used for demonstrations, yet, 
as mentioned above, they are used to a lesser extent and often in the context of bigger demonstrations 
at Maidan. Their layout and locations are probably important reasons for why they have not been 
used as often as Maidan (Hansen, 2015, pp. 37-38), although the heavy symbolic value of Maidan 
probably is an even more important reason. 
Function 
What functions, then, does Maidan have in Ukrainian society? Many of my respondents state that 
they perceive Maidan as a vital part of the political system. Hanna, an Internet activist, believes that 
Maidan has occurred as a reaction to the corruption in the political system, and has now turned into 
a movement to get rid of it: 
Our politics is corrupt on such a level […] that Maidan has become a necessity for us. […] Maidan is a 
spontaneous reaction, a protest, a reflex […]. Yet, subsequently, a shared goal appeared: to completely change 
the corrupt system. You could say that this is a social movement against corruption, or against the ghost of the 
Soviet Union.10 
When my respondents were asked what function they believe Maidan has, several of them 
compared Maidan with various political institutions. Both the photojournalist Oleksandr Klymenko 
and the local historian Serhii (who have seen a number of protests on the square over time), as well 
as Stanislaŭ (a Belarusian activist who came to support Euromaidan), call the space a form of people’s 
parliament, where one goes to resolve problems. Serhii compares Maidan with two forms of popular 
assemblies: 
[…] the word Maidan has simply begun to mean some kind of mass action. As a type of the Old Russian 
phenomenon viche. Or like the Norwegian word ting. In other words, this is a popular assembly which takes 
some kind of important decision [italics applied by the author].11 
The American history professor Timothy Snyder draws a similar parallel to the Greek Agora: 
[…] a maidan now means in Ukrainian what the Greek word agora means in English: not just a marketplace 
where people happen to meet, but a place where they deliberately meet, precisely in order to deliberate, to speak, 
and to create a political society (Snyder 2014).  
Several others, including the Ukrainian journalist and blogger Volodymyr Zolotoriov, also 
emphasise Maidan’s role as a place for discussion: “Maidan is social training for collective action 
and joint communication. Ukrainians are learning to become a society, act collectively and 
communicate together.”12 
 
10 Nasha polityka nastilky korumpovana, […] shcho nam prosto neobkhidnyi Maidan. […] Maidan – tse spontanna aktsia, 
protest, refleks […]. Ale zhodom ziavylas’ spil’na meta – povnistiu zminyty korumpovanu systemu. Mozhna skazaty, shcho tse 
sotialnyi rukh proty koruptsii abo pryzraku Radianskoho Soiuzu. 
11 […] slovo Maidan prosto stalo oznachat’ imenno kakuiu-to mnogoliudnuiu aktsiiu. Kak tipa drevnerusskoe iavlenie veche. Ili 
podobnoe k norvezhskomu slovu ting. To est’ eto narodnoe sobranie, kotoroe prinimaet kakoe-to reshenie vazhnoe. 
12 Maidan – eto sotsialnaia praktika vzaimo-deistviia, so-obshcheniia. Ukraintsy uchatsia byt’ obshchestvom, vzaimo-
deistvovat’ i so-obshchat’sia» [sic]. 








It is, of course, possible to questions claims about Maidan being a ting or an agora. During 
Euromaidan, questions about the political situation and what was to be done were naturally discussed 
by the various groupings, yet there were few signs during my field work that Majdan was a place 
where discussion was the central element. The government and people of other opinions were not 
given access to the debates at Maidan, and the attendees usually were in broad agreement about what 
and whom they were against, even if they occasionally disagreed about the methods. Therefore, 
Maidan was more of a space for action than a democratic institution. 
It might, however, be less relevant to ask whether or not Maidan functioned as a people’s 
assembly, and more important to ask which functions Maidan has in Ukraine. Since a location exists 
where people often go in order to act against the authorities, it also achieves an important function: 
Protests appear at Maidan when there is great discontent with an issue, and Ukrainians are not 
satisfied with how the authorities deal with that issue. It is thus possible to see Maidan’s top function 
as a form of safety valve for Ukrainian society – a place where Ukrainians sense they have a real 
possibility of affecting the politics directly if the pressure becomes too high. 
Anyone can occupy Maidan, and different groups and segments of the population have started 
protests on the square. During the Granite Revolution in 1990 and Euromaidan in 2013–14, students 
initiated the protests, yet protests have also been started by politicians, as during the Orange 
Revolution in 2004-05; by businessmen, as during the Tax Maidan in 2010; and by people from minor 
towns, as during the Vradiivka protests in 2013. It is, however, the appeal of a current issue which 
decides if other groups in society join in and, as they say in Ukraine, “a new Maidan begins” (novyi 
Maidan pochynaetsia). 
Conclusions 
I asked initially what it is that makes Independence Square the protest space of Ukraine, what is the 
symbolic value of the square, and what functions Maidan has in Ukrainian society. 
For a long time, protests have been part of the political landscape in Ukraine. During the 25 
years or so of social discontent and 30 years of economic hardship, the trust in the country’s political 
institutions has worn thin. Corruption and crime amidst the country’s small elite have led to many 
Ukrainians perceiving politicians as representatives only of their own personal interests – not the 
interests of the people. The disappointment that followed the Orange Revolution contributed to the 
perception that all politicians are like this, whether or not they are in the opposition. When people 
believe that politicians are doing a poor job of protecting their interests, they go out to Independence 
Square. Despite attempts at the start of this century to make the urban space less suitable for large 
crowds, the area still remains the place where people gather to protest. 
Independence Square is physically well suited as a protest space. It is strategically located 
between several key meeting places in the city, which facilitates the possibility of arranging 
demonstrations at several places in the city simultaneously and lead them down to the Maidan, and it 
is only a short distance from the political centre on the Pechersk Hill. The collective urban space of 
Maidan and Khreshchatyk Avenue is also big and allows huge crowds to demonstrate at the same 
time. Many main roads and entrances to the square make it easy to get to Maidan, and the authorities 








have a hard time controlling actions on the square. The square’s layout makes it very difficult to clear 
people off it if they have first had the opportunity to set up camp there.  
Independence Square is also well suited for protests from a symbolic and cultural viewpoint. 
The square’s name symbolises a distance from Russia, as both words maidan and independence are 
interlinked with the independence of 1991. The square is located lower than Kyiv’s central political, 
religious and historical landmarks, yet still in the centre of the city. This creates a peculiar symbolic 
value as a people’s space. The symbolic value is enhanced by the Trade Unions’ Building, the cultural 
buildings, and all the local history in the shape of buildings and monuments. Maidan is 
simultaneously associated with four successful revolutions, three of which are directly connected with 
the square, hence the city and country dwellers are reminded of the possibilities afforded to them by 
such an urban space. 
It is to Maidan that Ukrainians go to be heard when their political institutions fail, and Maidan 
can be seen as a kind of safety valve – a place where people congregate to reject their rulers if those 
deviate too far from the people’s wish. The sheer number of protests at Maidan bears witness to how 
important this safety valve is, and how difficult it is to reform Ukrainian society. The goal of most 
protests has been to remove the corrupt leadership, yet it is not a given that a new leadership will 
bring in a new and reformed society. 
The current political leadership of Ukraine knows the significance of Maidan. The politicians 
got their positions after the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 had been expedited, 
owing to the revolution. Therefore, when the Poroshenko administration is threatened with a new 
Maidan, it knows the implications very well. In a climate ravaged by war and instability, but also by 
several reforms, it will be interesting to see how Maidan will be used in the times ahead. 
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PUBLIC SPACE IN THE SOVIET CITY:  
A SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE ON MASS PROTESTS IN MINSK 
Arve Hansen (UiT the Arctic University of Norway) 
Abstract 
In many capitals, the central public square is the place where people go en masse when 
they wish to voice their discontent. The squares used for such collective actions are 
diverse. Each square has its unique combination of symbols and history; they are used in 
different ways by the public; and they often have distinct physical characteristics. Yet, in 
social sciences, when determining what makes collective actions successful, space is often 
overlooked. 
In this article, I present an approach for analysing public space in relation to mass 
protests. I then apply this approach to the Belarusian capital Minsk, where virtually no 
protests have been successful during the post-Soviet period. In what ways are mass 
protests in Minsk affected by the perceived (symbolic), social and physical elements of 
the city’s public spaces? I examine the centre of Minsk in general, and analyse two central 
squares in particular. The article is based mainly on qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews with protesters, observers and opposition leaders; research literature; and on 
my own fieldwork and experiences from living in Minsk. 
I conclude that space is contributing to the difficulties facing the Belarusian opposition 
in several ways. 1) The perceived elements of Minsk and the two main squares do not 
have a preferable symbolic value to the opposition. 2) The social elements of the city 
show that the political centre is avoided by the public, thus making protests less 
noticeable. 3) This latter point is important, given that the physical elements of the 
squares makes policing particularly easy and swift. The physical elements of the squares 
also limit the protesters’ communication, movement and flexibility. I argue that a spatial 
perspective should be included in research on collective actions. 
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In the concept of democracy, the square has a central position. Historically, when people 
started to live in urban societies, the town square often became the natural meeting place 
– a space in which people deliberate, make policies and decide on a course of action. We
find examples of this on the ancient Greek agora, the medieval Scandinavian ting, and 
the Slavic vecha. 
In our day and age, most of the decision-making has moved from the town square into 
political institutions, and the squares have been given other uses, such as for recreation 
and celebration. Yet, ever so often, people return to the square’s original function. We 
have, to mention just a few recent examples, seen people gather on and occupy several 
squares in modern history: from the Tiananmen in 1989; to the squares of many post-
Soviet cities during the wave of ‘colour revolutions’ in the 2000s. We saw massive 
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uprisings starting on squares throughout the Arab world from 2010; and from 2011, there 
were Occupy-protests in many large cities in the West. In Kyiv, protests in the winter of 
2013-14 led to a regime change in Ukraine, for the second time in less than a decade.  
Belarusians, as well, have taken to the central squares of Minsk to protest against 
Aliaksandr Ryhoravich Lukashėnka, 1  the country’s only president since 1994. Most 
notably, thousands of Belarusians went to the Kastrychnitskaia square in 2006, and to 
Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi squares in 2010. However, these and many other 
similar actions have quickly been supressed by the authorities. 
The success and failure of mass protests 
In social sciences, several theories are offered to account for what makes collective action 
(un)successful. The sociologist Susan Olzak (1989) describes the factors used to analyse 
events, such as a mass protest or a revolution: the duration of the event, the number of 
participants, and the presence or lack of violence. The importance of such factors has 
been the subject of much discussion in the research literature.2 
During the wave of colour revolutions in the early 2000s, new research was made on 
the conditions of why some of these protests had led to a regime change. Political scientist 
Michael McFaul (2005) lists seven external conditions necessary for a colour revolution 
to occur.3 Others analyse the internal conditions, such as the political scientist Joshua 
Tucker (2007), who focuses on motivation, and argues that electoral fraud was a main 
trigger for all the colour revolutions. 
Yet, one aspect of mass protests has not been thoroughly analysed, namely, that of 
public space. In what ways does public space affect collective actions? 
A spatial perspective 
Public space is diverse. From one city to another, the characteristics of urban public space 
differ greatly. Firstly, every square has its own unique history, traditions, ideological 
symbols; secondly, spaces are used differently, based on their connection and proximity 
to infrastructure, buildings, landmarks, and so on; thirdly, there are physical differences 
such as shape and size, elevations, monuments, layout, entrances, and much more. 
In the research relating urban public space with mass protests, authors are mostly 
concerned with either urban spaces of protest in general, or the uniqueness of some urban 
space in particular. The former usually leads to a discussion of modern political 
philosophy, referring to Habermas’s public sphere – the space in which people meet to 
talk and deliberate; to Arendt’s more physically oriented public space; or to Lefebvre’s 
                                                 
1 In Belarus, there are three written languages: Russian and Belarusian, both of which are official 
languages, and the classic Belarusian Tarashkevitsa. The name of the president could be transliterated as 
Aleksandr Lukashenko (Russian); Aliaksandr Lukashėnka (Belarusian); and Aliaksandar Lukashėnka 
(Belarusian Tarashkevitsa). I use the official Belarusian (Aliaksandr) for proper nouns, in accordance 
with the American Library Association & Library of Congress ALA-LC Romanization table. 
2 See for example Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) on nonviolent resistance. 
3 1) The regime has to be semi-autocratic, rather than fully autocratic; 2) there has to be an unpopular 
incumbent; 3) the opposition needs to be united and organised; 4) there must be independent electoral-
monitoring capabilities available; 5) there must be a modicum of independent media; 6) the opposition 
must have the capacity to mobilize significant numbers of protesters; 7) and there must be a split among 
the “guys with guns.” In other words, the opposition must have some support in the state apparatus. 
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right to the city.4 Discussions also tend to centre on aspects, such as privatization and/or 
exclusion of space for some parts of the public (i.e. homeless people, youth, drug users).5 
The latter appears in literature that analyses the uniqueness of certain public spaces, which 
focuses on one or several attributes of a public space.6 
What I believe to be missing in the literature, however, is a general approach on how 
to analyse public spaces, and evaluate how they enable (or fail to enable) public protest. 
My current research project, which this article forms part of, aims to establish and develop 
such an approach. 7 The aim is to demonstrate that space is, potentially, an important 
condition for collective action.  This is the context for my following analysis of the public 
space of Minsk, which asks in what ways the central squares in the Belarusian capital do 
affect the course and nature of mass protests, and how Minsk’s central squares do 
facilitate and/or inhibit protest. 
Research question, approach, methodology 
In an earlier study, I applied the architectural theory of Lynch (1960) to describe how 
people in Kyiv relate to the Maidan square (Hansen 2016). This approach is identifying 
and describing the different ‘elements of the city’ (paths, nodes, landmarks, edges and 
districts), and using interviews to find out how these elements affect the day to day life 
in the city: how people employ landmarks to navigate the city, what paths they take, and 
so on. For the current article, I have expanded on Lynch’s theory in order to better suit a 
perspective on mass protests. I have added several new elements and divided these into 
three categories: perceived elements, social elements and physical elements.8 In what 
way are these perceived, social and physical elements affecting stationary mass protests 
in Minsk? 
Between October 2015 and March 2017, I had many conversations and discussions 
with Belarusians from my extended circle of contacts (I elaborate on this below). From 
amongst these, I chose 9 observers, organisers and protesters for eleven qualitative 
interviews. 9  The interviews were conducted in Russian and Belarusian via Skype, 
                                                 
4 See Goodsell (2003); Frenzel, Feigenbaum & McCurdy (2013); Göle (2013); Harvey (2012). Also 
relevant is Howell (1993) on historical geography; and Parkinson (2012) on public space, political 
institutions and democracy. 
5 See Kohn (2013); Mitchell (1995); Mitchell (2017); Köksal (2012). 
6 See for instance Örs (2013) on the history and symbolic importance of the Taksim square in Istanbul; 
Hansen (2016) on the Maidan square’s perceived role as a safety valve in the Ukrainian society; Gillham 
et al. (2013) on the policing of Occupy protests; Ramadan (2013) on the importance of Tahrir square in 
Egypt; Lee (2009) on the making of Tiananmen square a political space. 
7 My background is in Slavonic area studies, and my PhD project, which analyses three post-Soviet 
capitals, Kyiv, Minsk and Moscow, is interdisciplinary, straddling cultural studies and social sciences. In 
a wider context, my PhD project is part of the research group RSCPR (Russian Space: Concepts, 
Practices, Representations) at UiT – the Arctic University of Norway. 
8 These elements have been identified in my previous publications (Hansen 2015; 2016) and during my 
work on this article. Although I have tried to make this list as complete as possible, the list can never 
become exhaustive. During my work on Kyiv and Minsk, I discovered new elements, and I expect  more 
will emerge in subsequent case studies. 
9 I interviewed one Belarusian journalist (Vital’); five Belarusians who participated in protest actions 
(Dzmitry, Katsiaryna [twice], Piatro, Yaraslaŭ [twice], Paŭliuk [who is also a member of the LGBT-
movement]); and three politicians (Stanislaŭ Shushkevich, Belarus’ first head of state and presidential 
candidate in 1994; Aliaksandr Milinkevich, the joint opposition’s presidential candidate in 2006; and 
Mikola Statkevich, a presidential candidate in 2010). The names of all respondents, except the politicians, 
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telephone, and email. 10  All the interviews, except the email correspondence with 
Milinkevich, were in the form of semi-structured conversations with open-ended 
questions. I asked the respondents to tell me about the general situation in Belarus; Minsk 
and its spaces of protests; and about particular protests (mainly the mass actions of 2006 
and 2010). I paid a particular attention to instances when the elements of the city were 
mentioned, then prompted the respondents with questions, such as “How accessible was 
Kastrychnitskaia square for you in 2006?” 
 
Perceived elements Social elements Physical elements 
History Paths Location 
Ideological symbols Nodes Size 
Buildings Buildings Shape 
Landmarks Landmarks Entrances 
Monuments Districts Exits 
History of protests Traditions Walls 
 Official use Floor 
  Objects 
  Obstacles 
  Edges 
  Public works 
  Focal points 
Figure 1 The elements of the city 
In addition to the interviews, the current article is based on a recent fieldwork in Minsk;11 
research literature on the politics of Belarus, the history and architecture of the city; 
cinema and television documentaries; 12 my own experience of living in Minsk;13 and 
from working with the Belarusian opposition in Kyiv and Vilnius.14 
I use these data to describe the city and the elements of its main squares, and I identify 
instances where the elements of the squares have affected the opposition’s conduct. I 
argue that Minsk is a particularly difficult place to protest in because: 1) the city 
represents Lukashėnka and his success, as well as the mainstream and official view of 
history; and at the same time, alienates the pro-European opposition; 2) the two main 
squares (Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi) are places most people tend to avoid, 
                                                 
have been altered. The interviews are referred to by the respondent’s surname or pseudonym either in-text 
or in brackets. The number of respondents is limited because this article is part of a bigger project 
including several cities. Nevertheless, I believe that my selection of an observer, politicians and protesters 
is sufficient to map how space is perceived in Minsk. 
10 The interviews were conducted online or by phone, to minimize the risk of our contact being noticed by 
the government, potentially leading to repressions. The interviews were audio-recorded only after getting 
permission from the respondents beforehand. 
11 The fieldwork was conducted in October and November 2015. 
12 Obyknovennyĭ prezident (Khashchevatskiĭ 1996); Lekcja Białoruskiego (Dembinski 2006); Ploshcha 
(Khashchevatskiĭ 2007); Belarusskaia mechta (Kibal'chich 2011); Banda (Mikhaĭloŭskaia 2015). 
13 As a language student in Belarus in 2006–10. 
14 During my internship at the Norwegian embassy in Ukraine (2011), I worked with many young people 
from the Belarusian opposition in Ukraine and Lithuania. They had been expelled from Belarusian 
universities for participating in the protests of 2006, and given funding by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers to continue their education in Ukraine and Lithuania. 
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making protests there hardly visible; 3) the squares give little shelter or safety to 
protesters, it is hard to communicate with each other there, and they are easily controlled 
from the outside. 
Belarusian protests, from Glasnost’ to Lukashėnka 
The first major protests in Belarus in the 1980s were enabled by Gorbachev’s reform 
policies. The main concerns for protesters at the time were the effects of the Chernobyl 
disaster (1986); rising economic difficulties; and the question of independence – fuelled 
by the discovery of one of Stalin’s killing fields in the Kurapaty forest on the outskirts of 
Minsk (Marples, 1994). Protests continued during the post-Soviet 1990s. More often than 
not they were concerned with economic problems and food shortages. 
The current regime in Belarus is by and large personified by Aliaksandr Lukashėnka – 
commonly referred to in the West as ‘the last dictator in Europe’, a phrase coined by 
Condoleezza Rice in 2005 (Nielsen 2012). Lukashėnka won the first Belarusian 
presidential elections in 1994 with more than 80 per cent of the votes (Vardomatskiĭ 1995, 
49). Initially he was regarded as an alternative to five other candidates who represented 
to the Belarusian electorate either inexperience or corruption, or both.15 Soon, however, 
new reasons for protest occurred. During Lukashėnka’s first term in office (1994–2001), 
one of these was the reintroduction of Soviet symbols, as well as the president’s 
increasing authoritarianism and suppression of the political opposition. 
It took Lukashėnka ten years to consolidate his presidency: in two referendums in 1995 
and 1996, he increased presidential powers and weakened the parliament (Wilson 2011, 
168–86). Meanwhile certain political and ideological opponents disappeared or died 
under unclear circumstances (Bennett 2011, 70; Mikhaĭloŭskaia 2015). Protests against 
Lukashėnka increased as colour revolutions against authoritarian leaders spread through 
a number of post-Soviet countries. Large protests were staged against a proposed union 
with Russia, which was never realised (Statkevich); and in 2004, people protested against 
a referendum that removed the two-term limit on the presidential rule. Significantly, large 
numbers of people went out to protest against the alleged fraud in the presidential 
elections of March 2006 and December 2010, attempting to achieve a Belarusian colour 
revolution. Both attempts were brutally suppressed by the authorities. 
David Marples (2006) points out that Belarus in 2006 was lacking every single of 
McFaul’s (2005) conditions (see above), arguing that the president had a firm grip on the 
official ideology, and had been able to maintain his popularity in large segments of the 
population through his control over media, through his repressions of political opponents, 
and by maintaining close relations to Russia (Marples 2006). To this, Barbara Törnquist-
Plewa (2001) adds the (most) successful Russification under the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union, and a weak Belarusian identity. By playing on the post-Soviet nostalgia of 
Belarusian citizens, Lukashėnka has built an official national myth on the Soviet past of 
his country, which emphasises the special position of Belarusians in the narratives of the 
                                                 
15 Of his main opponents, campaigning for the presidency its worth mentioning three: 1) The prime 
minister Viacheslaŭ Kebich, who represented the status quo. 2) Zianon Pazniak, who represented the 
nationalist new political force, while promising a radical Belarusification of the society and government. 
3) The former head of state, Stanislaŭ Shushkevich, who was representing the more conservative new 
political force. Initially a very popular person, he lost because of the accusations of corruption 
(Shushkevich). 
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Soviet Union and World War II (known in the former Soviet Union as the Great Patriotic 
War). Lukashėnka’s Soviet-oriented and pro-Russian worldview has pushed the majority 
of the opposition into the pro-European camp. Yet in spite of its common contempt of 
Lukashėnka and its shared pro-European values, the opposition shows little unity, 
answering to its description by Törnquist-Plewa as “weak and fragmented” (2001, 81). 
My own experience from working with members of the Belarusian opposition confirms 
this view.16 
Since spring 2011, Belarus has faced mounting economic problems. The combination 
of a nationalised and planned economy, combined with poor decision-making 
(Romanchuk, 2011) and a weakened Russian rouble (from 2014), has led to several 
devaluations of the Belarusian rouble and to shortages of goods. In early 2017, protests 
erupted in many Belarusian cities against the economic hardship and the introduction of 
a new law ‘on social parasites’, which taxes the unemployed. However, since March 25, 
when a large demonstration in Minsk was supressed by riot police and opposition leaders 
arrested, protests have, for now, ceased. (Bylina 2017) 
My respondents repeat many of the observations presented in research literature 
regarding the situation in Belarus, such as: authority-controlled media and a Belarusian 
mentality similar to that of a Soviet citizen who values short-term stability over freedom. 
Statkevich agrees with Tucker (2007) that only presidential elections have the potential 
to unite the opposition and motivate large numbers of people to take to the streets: “A 
small chance appears at the night of the presidential elections […]. Belarusians are a 
rational people, very rational. If there’s no chance, why take the risk?”17 To this, my 
respondents are prone to add that Lukashėnka has built a police state, which cannot be 
overthrown by a popular protest or revolution. “Here, the secret service KGB, a large 
police apparatus and the possibility to use internal troops work well to suppress any public 
actions.”18 (Paŭliuk). Several of my respondents also emphasise differences in national 
character between Belarusians and Ukrainians: “We don't have the same mentality as 
Ukrainians. They are good at it.” (Yaraslaŭ). “Maidan is the national character of 
Ukrainians, not Belarusians.” (Piatro). “Our national identity is the same as [the identity] 
of people in Eastern-Ukraine […]”19 
Thus, there are many current arguments which, combined, offer plausible explanations 
of why the Belarusian opposition has failed to achieve success. Nevertheless, I wish to 
add space as another relevant factor in this picture. In the following section, I shall turn 
to the first group of elements of the city, and look into how these also affect the 
opposition’s possibilities. 
                                                 
16 In spring 2011, after the violent crackdown of protests in December 2010, I arranged a meeting at the 
European Humanitarian University in Vilnius. The meeting was attended by staff members of the 
Norwegian embassy in Ukraine and the Nordic Council of Ministers, as well as Belarusian students 
studying in Kyiv and Vilnius. The different opposition groupings as represented by the students, appeared 
to be aggressively opposing each other, and showed few signs of unity between them. 
17 “Маленький шанс придвигает ночь президентских выборов […]. Белорусы – рациональный 
народ, очень рациональный. Если нету шанса, зачем рисковать?” 
18 “Здесь хорошо работают спецслужбы КГБ, большой аппарат милиции и возможность 
использовать внутренние войска для подавления любых публичных акций” 
19 “У нас нет такого менталитета, как у украинцев. У них это хорошо получается.” (Yaraslaŭ). 
“Майдан является национальным характером украинцев, не белорусов.” (Piatro). “У нас 
нацыянальная ідэнтычнасть, як у людзей ва ўсходніх абласцях Украіны […]” (Dzmitry). 
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Perceived elements 
Minsk is well known for looking ‘Soviet’ and a first-time visitor is struck by just how 
much of Soviet architecture has been preserved. The city is characterised by wide 
avenues, Stalinist architectural style, prominent red stars and Soviet slogans, huge squares 
and monuments to the 1945 victory. 
There are several reasons why Minsk was infused with such a Soviet identity, but 
perhaps the most significant relates to the Great Patriotic War, which reduced the city to 
rubble. This enabled Soviet architects to rebuild Minsk as an example of what the socialist 
experiment could achieve (Bohn 2013, 6). With the building boom of the 1940s and 
1950s, the infrastructure was developed further, with industry, educational institutions 
and more. Only a small proportion of the city’s original inhabitants returned to Minsk 
after the war, while Russians and rural Belarusians moved in. This contributed to a 
Russification of the city. In addition to the monumental celebration of Communist heroes, 
such as Lenin, Dzerzhinsky and Kalinin, the War became an important theme of the 
public spaces of Minsk – not least after it was granted the status of a hero city in 1974 
(Bohn 2013, 30). Analysing the memory of the war, Per Anders Rudling states that “in 
no other country does the war occupy such a central place in the national historiography 
as it does in Lukashenka’s Belarus.” (2008, 57). 10 per cent of the toponymy of major 
streets, parks and squares in the city centre relate to the War, in addition to 60 per cent 
related to other Soviet events and persons (Titarenko 2008, 38). These names often 
replaced the ethnic ones (i.e. from the significant pre-war population of Jews and Tatars). 
The city’s historic markers went through a similar ‘cleansing’. In an article on the 
phenomenon of Minsk, Larissa Titarenko and Anna Shirokanova describe how a majority 
of symbolic markers were either destroyed during the fighting or removed by Soviet 
architects. Prominent examples of this are the levelling of Zamchyshcha (Castle Hill), 
where a wooden castle long had stood as a distinctive landmark, and the river Niamiha, 
now laid in pipes underground. (Titarenko & Shirokanova 2011, 31) The latter is 
especially noteworthy, since Minsk’s first appearance in a historical text is in the Primary 
chronicle for the year 1067, which reports a battle near Minsk on the river Niamiha (Cross 
& Sherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, 145–46). The river Svislach has since taken Niamiha’s place 
and is now the main waterway of Minsk.  
Most of the capital city’s official institutions are placed along the 15 km-long and eight 
lane-wide Praspekt Nezalezhnastsi (henceforth Independence avenue). The avenue runs 
from Nezalezhnastsi square (Independence square) in the western part of the city centre  
to the city’s border in the northeast, crossing four more squares after Nezalezhnastsi. The 
first of these is Kastrychnitskaia (October square), then the avenue bridges the river 
Svislach, becomes a roundabout when it crosses the square Peramohi (Victory square), 
passes the third, Iakuba Kolasa, and cuts through Kalinina (see fig. 2). 
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Since Lukashėnka came to power, a number of new monumental building projects have 
been launched. At Kastrychnitskaia, the unfinished Palace of the Republic had stood 
untouched since 1984, when economic problems put a halt to the project. In 2001, after 
17 years as a construction site, the building was completed and the square reopened. Even 
more grandiose projects include the National Library (2006), the Stalitsa shopping centre 
on Nezalezhnastsi square (2006), and the new museum to the Great Patriotic War (2014), 
to mention but a few. These building projects are similar to the Soviet brutalist 
monumental style. It could be said that the Lukashėnkian architecture carries on the 
Soviet tradition of aiming to represent the success and prosperity of the country’s 
leadership. 
Nevertheless, capitalism has also made its mark with the introduction of advertising 
and brand names. Yet, compared to neighbouring capitals, such as Kyiv, Riga or Vilnius, 
Minsk has escaped the extremes of post-Soviet marketing. Sarna (2008) describes the 
current authorities’ attempt to make Minsk a ‘glamourous heaven’, by removing 
everything unsanctioned and disorderly, such as intrusive advertising boards, garbage … 
and even political dissent. In other post-Soviet countries, Minsk enjoys a reputation as a 
clean and orderly city. 
Still, protests do occasionally occur in the city, and especially two central squares have 
been used by the opposition for mass protests: Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi (I 
explain why below). In the following two sections, I shall look more closely at the 
perceived elements of these two squares. 
Figure 2 Minsk City Centre: Yellow: Independence Avenue; 1) Nezalezhnastsi; 2) KGB; 3) GUM 
Shopping centre; 4) Kastrychnitskaia; 5) Peramohi; 6) Niamiha; 7) Zybitskaia; 8) Park Ianki Kupaly; 9) 
Gorkyi park; 10) Train station; 11) Presidential Administration. Illustration: Arve Hansen 
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The perceived elements of Kastrychnitskaia (October square) 
Kastrychnitskaia is named after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. It is the most 
geographically central square in Minsk, and between 1949 and 1984, it was named 
Tsentral’naia (Central square), intended as the heart of the city (Bohn 2013, 49). 
Kastrychnitskaia and Minsk’s position in the world is marked on the square’s only 
monument, a tiny pyramid, called the 0-km sign, which shows distances from Minsk to 
other major cities of the world. 
The centrepiece on the square is the Palace of the Republic, where officially sanctioned 
concerts and receptions of foreign delegations are held. This is also where Lukashėnka 
has been inaugurated four times since 2001 (the 1994 inauguration took place in the 
House of Government) (Naviny 2015). The palace is perceived as a monument to the 
success and economic stability achieved during Lukashėnka’s first term in office, and 
Milinkevich calls it “almost a sacred place for the authorities”.20 The city’s inhabitants 
like to call it the giant sarcophagus, because of its brutal but simplistic design – 
reminiscent of a giant coffin. Piatro confirms that the uneasiness of the metaphor is 
appropriate: “The Palace of the Republic evokes a feeling of horror. It’s a sarcophagus 
that blocks the view to [Verkhni Horad]”.21  
                                                 
20 “амаль сакральнае месца для ўлады” 
21 “Дворец Республики вызывает чувство ужаса. Это Саркофаг, который закрывает вид на 
[Верхний город]” 
Figure 3 The National Library. Photo: Wikimedia, Julian Nitzsche 
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After the presidential elections in March 2006, on the appeal of Aliaksandr 
Milinkevich, people went to Kastrychnitskaia in large numbers with the slogan “Freedom, 
Truth, Justice”22 (Milinkevich) to protest against alleged election fraud. In the West, the 
protests are known as the Denim revolution.23 In Minsk, however, the protesters tried to 
change Kastrychnitskaia’s association from Lukashėnka and the October revolution, to 
something more ideologically appealing. They started to call the square Ploshcha 
Kalinoŭskaha, after Kastus’ Kalinoŭski – a key person in the 1863 January Uprising 
against the Russian Empire. 
Usually, though, the square is simply called ‘Ploshcha’, which is Belarusian for ‘square’. 
By choosing a Belarusian word, the protesters distance themselves from the largely 
Russophone leadership. At present, when members of the opposition say “We’ll start the 
Ploshcha,” or “go out to the Ploshcha”, they mean starting a large protest at 
Kastrychnitskaia, and the way the opposition uses the word is similar to how Ukrainians 
use the word ‘maidan’ (Ukr.: ‘square’) (Hansen 2016, 119). 
‘Ploshcha’ that’s because of Maidan. In the beginning we called it Maidan, but 
Belarusian media has successfully used Maidan to scare everyone. Both in 2004 
and later in 2013 […]. For many people it has a negative association, therefore 
                                                 
22 “Свабода, Праўда, Справядлівасць” 
23 Wilson explains that the Belarusian ‘colour revolution’ was given the symbol of denim, because “it 
would be difficult for the repressive local police to victimise people for wearing it.” Wilson then criticises 
the symbol for being too common (2011, 211). Judging by my respondents, the name Denim revolution is 
rarely used. 
Figure 4 Palace of the Republic on Kastrychnitskaia. Photo: Colourbox.com/Grisha 
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we didn’t call it Maidan. But at the same time we wanted to come up with 
something of our own. […] The most simple solution was ‘Ploshcha’.24 (Piatro) 
Despite these attempts of appropriating the space and change the association from the 
Bolshevik October revolution to a people’s revolt against Russia, the Ploshcha of 2006 
did not turn out like the Ukrainian Maidan of 2004, and the protests ended with massive 
arrests. According to Milinkevich, following the protests, 1500 people lost their jobs, 
1200 were sent to jail and 500 students were expelled from their higher education 
institutions. Today, none of my respondents seems to have been associating the square 
with revolution. When I asked about their feelings for Kastrychnitskaia, several spoke of 
disappointment and failure. “[Kastrychnitskaia] is associated with the authorities, with 
failed desires, dreams, […] yes, and with disappointment.”25 (Paŭliuk) 
The perceived elements of Nezalezhnastsi (Independence square) 
The next mass protests in Minsk happened on December 19, 2010, after yet another re-
election of Lukashėnka. Triggered by claims of election fraud, the opposition announced 
a new “Ploshcha” and marched to Kastrychnitskaia, where tens of thousands of people 
gathered. After staying at Kastrychnitskaia for a couple of hours, the protesters then 
decided to move the protest down to Nezalezhnastsi to protest outside the House of 
Government. 26  On the way to Nezalezhnastsi, the crowd grew, and several of my 
respondents claim that the whole kilometre of Independence Avenue linking the two 
squares was filled with people. 
One attraction for the opposition is the square’s symbolic name – Independence square, 
which could be interpreted as independence from Russia and Lukashėnka. The Catholic 
Church of Saints Simon and Helena, commonly known as The Red Church, could also be 
considered as an ideological symbol, especially for the Polish and Catholic minorities in 
Belarus. Yet, the perceived elements of Nezalezhnastsi are problematic. Despite its 1991 
renaming from Lenin Square to Independence Square, Lenin is still present as a 7-meter-
tall statue looming in front of the House of Government. A bust of the Bolshevik leader 
also decorates one of the entrances to the metro station, which is still called the Lenin 
Square Station (Stantsyia Ploshcha Lenina). My respondent Paŭliuk perceives the square 
as a constant struggle for independence from Lenin, more than anything else. Even as a 
place for political protests, the square has lost much of its value after Lukashėnka stripped 
the national assembly of political power. “The parliament [in the House of Government] 
is considered to be in the pocket [of Lukashėnka]. They just wait for the president’s 
                                                 
24 ‘Плошча’ – это потому что Майдан. В начале называли Майдан, но Майданом успешно в 
белорусской медиа всех запугали. И тогда в 2004 и потом в 2013 […]. Для многих это имело 
негативную ассоциацию, поэтому Майданом не называли. Но при этом хотели что-то свое 
придумать. […] Самое простое это было ‘Плошча’.  
25 “[Октябрьская] ассоциируется с властью, с неудавшимися желаниями, мечтами, […] да, и с 
разочарованием.” 
26 None of my respondents could give a concrete answer why. Several of them talked about going to 
protest outside the Central Electoral Commission in the House of Government, next to Nezalezhnastsi 
(Piatro, Yaraslaŭ, Katsiaryna), “where evil is being done” / “там дзе робіцца зло” (Katsiaryna). 
Statkevich suggested that marches are more effective than stationary protests. Dzmitry and Milinkevich 
talked about the possibility that KGB planted the idea among the protesters, so that they could carry out 
the well-planned police operation at Nezalezhnastsi and remove the political opposition, once and for all 
(see below). 
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orders.” 27 (Piatro). In addition to this, the Ploshcha of 2010 was even more brutally 
supressed than the Ploshcha of 2006, adding failed protests to the associations citizens of 
Minsk have with the square. 
Minsk’s two main squares of protest, Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi, are 
associated by the city’s inhabitants with the success of Lukashėnka, and with failed 
protests. The opposition’s attempted appropriation of Kastrychnitskaia by changing the 
name of the square has not been successful; and Nezalezhnastsi still represent Lenin and 
Belarus’s Communist past, while the House of Government is not seen as the place where 
real power is positioned. 
In sum, the perceived elements of Minsk are seeking to reinforce the authorities’ 
official version of history and Belarusian identity. The vast majority of the city’s main 
features represent Lukashėnka and the Soviet past. Be it the architecture; the reputation 
as a clean city; or the many monuments to ideologically ‘correct’ people and events. As 
such, the city does not represent a particularly inviting place for the pro-European 
opposition, whose meetings easily appear alien and misplaced amongst the glamour of 
the socialist city, surrounded by the evidence of Lukashėnka’s apparent success. 
Social elements 
Even though Minsk, as the perceived elements above demonstrate, might offer an 
uninviting environment for the opposition, people have turned to protest several times. I 
now turn to look at the social elements of the city and its protest spaces, in order to assess 
their visibility. My respondents all agree, that once you’re out to protest, your main 
objective is to be seen and heard. “We’re going to the square to show that we exist. […] 
                                                 
27 “[…] Парламент [в Доме правительства] считается карманным. Просто ждут указов президента”  
Figure 5 Nezalezhnastsi (Independence square). CC-BY-3.0 Wikimedia, Alexander Groshev 
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That we are many, that we do not agree with what is happening in the country.” 28 
(Dzmitry). This statement is typical for the respondents, but in a country where the media 
are controlled by the government, it is difficult to be seen, by authorities, by media and 
by fellow citizens. Therefore, the visibility of a location becomes decisive. 
The political centre 
The importance of being seen by the political authorities dictates what areas are suitable 
for a political mass protest. To be in, or in proximity to, the political centre is regarded as 
a necessity. There is also symbolic value to be gained from occupying a space close to 
where political decisions are being made. This helps demonstrators express that the space 
belongs to them as well; that they represent the people; and that the political institutions 
are not doing their job. 
On this basis, it is not surprising that the largest political protests have centred in the 
vicinity of Independence Avenue, on Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi squares. The 
House of Government is situated on Nezalezhnastsi; and Kastrychnitskaia is close to the 
presidential administration. When asked why protests have been held at these particular 
squares, my respondents unanimously agree: “[Kastrychnitskaia] is just a central square, 
on which the administration of Lukashėnka is located.”29 (Dzmitry) 
The closest alternative to Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi is Svabody (Freedom) 
square, about 200 meters to the northeast of Kastrychnitskaia. Freedom Square has been 
used several times by opposition leaders for protests, despite obvious shortcomings: 
Freedom square is an uneven space […] It is inaptly named, not square at all, 
with very little open space for mass gathering, and no focal point. People tend to 
collect on the pavements, steps and pathways and continually threaten to spill 
onto the roads […]. (Bennett 2011, 233) 
However, according to Milinkevich and Statkevich, two elements of the square still make 
it a suitable space for protest: “Protests occur on this Square when their organisers do not 
expect that there will be a large number of participants. In addition, it has a very attractive 
name.”30 (Milinkevich). “Firstly, it has its symbolic value. Secondly, it is smaller than 
Kastrychnitskaia. Because we don’t [always] see that there’s a chance that tens of 
thousands of people would come.”31 (Statkevich). Svabody is therefore mainly suited for 
smaller protests. 
Still, it is possible to imagine other alternatives to Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi. 
There are several large squares located along Independence Avenue: Peramohi (Victory), 
Iakuba Kolasa and Kalinina. Some of these have a certain history of protest, but only 
Peramohi is in proximity of the political centre. However, Peramohi is archetypically 
Soviet, and can easily be blocked off from the political centre by closing the bridge over 
Svislach. Pryvakzal’naia in front of the main railway station has also been mentioned as 
                                                 
28 “Мы збіраемся на плошчы, каб паказаць, што мы ёсць. […] Што нас шмат, што мы не згодныя з 
тым, што адбываецца ў краіне.”  
29 “[Кастрычніцкая –] гэта проста цэнтральная плошча, на якой размешчана адміністрацыя 
Лукашэнка.” 
30 “На гэтай Плошчы адбываюцца пратэсты калі іх арганізатары не спадзяюцца, што будзе вялікая 
колькасць удзельнікаў. Акрамя таго, яна мае вельмі прывабную назву.” 
31 “Во-первых, есть своя символика. А во-вторых, она меньше, чем Октябрьская [Кастрычніцкая]. 
Потому что мы не [всегда] видим, что есть возможность, что придут десятки тысяч человек.” 
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an alternative, but my respondents tend to talk of it as a place to gather before marching 
to the city centre. Being a lush and green city with several large parks, Minsk could 
potentially offer its green lungs as meeting places for large crowds. What makes parks 
less suitable for protests are trees and other objects which limit visibility and mobility. 
This leaves only a few public spaces suitable for mass protests. As my respondent Piatro 
states, “There are not many open public spaces. There are not many options for 
gatherings: Nezalezhnastsi […], Freedom square […], yet Kastrychnitskaia is considered 
the main square of Minsk.”32 
The people’s centre 
As we have seen, there are good reasons why political mass protests tend to be held at 
Kastrychnitskaia or Nezalezhnastsi, in plain view of the ruling power. To what extent, 
then, are actions at these two squares visible to ordinary people? When out walking, 
citizens tend to use the city’s green areas or stroll along Svislach river, rather than along 
the avenues or across the large, empty squares of the city centre. The popular café district 
is also concentrated in a secluded area on Zybitskaia street, down by Svislach, and in the 
Verkhni Horad district – a reconstructed part of the old town between Internationalists 
street and the Niamiha region. Only commercial businesses have some proximity to the 
squares (Stalitsa shopping centre is under Nezalezhnastsi, the GUM warehouse two 
blocks from Kastrychnitskaia). Yet shopping is not limited to these areas. 
Intended or not, the political centre, especially the area around Kastrychnitskaia, has 
become a district where people pass through only occasionally. Yaraslaŭ sees the city 
centre as “[…] a place you won’t go without an especially good reason. It's a nonspace.”33 
Everything interesting, Katsiaryna confirms, is going on a safe distance from the political 
centre: 
On central squares in Vilnius and in Kyiv there are some festivals, some fairs, 
people gather there. […] They have stuff happening but we’ve only had 
something similar a couple of years. That is on the Karl Marx street, and it is so 
small, mobility is small […]. To get to Kupalaŭskaia (metro), to 
Kastrychnitskaia square is far. And there is nothing going on there. 
(Katsiaryna)34 
My respondents state that their aim is to be seen, by the people and by the authorities. 
However, in a society with very little free media and a political centre that most people 
tend to avoid, the visibility of political protest is limited. Still, the largest protests in post-
Soviet Minsk have been held in the political centre, at Kastrychnitskaia and 
Nezalezhnastsi squares. I shall now take a closer look at the social elements of these two 
squares. How have they been used for protests? How are they used in the everyday? 
                                                 
32 “Не так много мест открытого публичного пространства. Собраться вариантов немного: 
Независимости […], Свободы […], но Октябрьская считается главной площадью Минска.” 
33 “[…] место, куда без особой причины не идут. Это ничейное пространство.” 
34 У Вільнюсе і ў Кіеве на цэнтральных плошчах праходзяць нейкія фэстывалі, нейкія кірмашы, 
там людзі збіраюцца. […] У іх праводзяцця нейкія штукі, а ў нас толькі пару гадоў праводзіцца 
нешта падобнае. Гэта на вуліцы Карла Маркса і яна такая маленькая, рух маленькі […]. Дабрацца 
да Купалаўскай, да Кастрычніцкай плошчы там далёка. І там нічога не праводзіцца. 
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The social elements of Nezalezhnastsi 
Belarus’ first head of state, Stanislaŭ Shushkevich explains that up until the end of the 
1990s, protests usually occurred outside the House of Government. One of the opposition 
leaders, Mikola Statkevich, on the other hand, claims that they arranged protests all over 
Minsk during the 1990s, not only on Nezalezhnastsi, but he agrees that many of the largest 
protests were on that square. 
Some of Nezalezhnastsi’s social elements might be perceived as those increasing 
visibility. Several paths cross Nezalezhnastsi or are in close proximity to it. Public 
transportation (trolleybuses, buses, and metro) is on and under it (the Lenin square metro 
station) and the main railway station is only 550 meters away; and several avenues and 
streets from the eastern and southern parts of the city meet next to where Independence 
Avenue begins. Students are also travelling daily to the Belarusian State Pedagogical 
University and to six of the Belarusian State University’s faculties, located on and around 
Nezalezhnastsi. Hotel ‘Minsk’ and important landmarks – such as the House of 
Government, the Lenin statue and the Church of Saints Simon and Helena – are popular 
places to visit for tourists. This makes the square more visible than Kastrychnitskaia. 
However, although Nezalezhnastsi is a node for travel, it is only so for some people, 
such as students and tourists, less so for the ordinary inhabitants of Minsk. On the surface 
of the square, there are large flowerbeds, benches and fountains, but people don’t tend to 
spontaneously gather there. Reasons for this may be the large walking distances involved, 
the fact that little recreational infrastructure is found and no protection from the elements 
(sun, rain, snow etc.) is offered. Between 2002 and 2006, Nezalezhnastsi was closed to 
the public, while Stalitsa – a huge 75 000 m2, three storey shopping centre was 
constructed beneath the square. Although it now attracts some shoppers, it has not quite 
become the popular attraction its size suggests it was meant to be. 
Nezalezhnastsi might therefore be characterised as a place where several paths meet, 
but as a node only for some people. Thus it offers less visibility than the opposition ideally 
would want. 
The social elements of Kastrychnitskaia 
In 2006, by the completion of Nezalezhnastsi’s reconstruction, the preferred space for 
protests had moved one kilometre up the Independence avenue to Kastrychnitskaia 
square. This was made possible by the reopening of Kastrychnitskaia in 2001, but the 
main reason was probably Lukashėnka’s moving into the former Communist party 
headquarters on the Karl Marx street shortly after becoming president, arguably because 
it was the tallest and most central point in the capital. 
The square functions as a node for travel. Cars drive past it on the highly trafficked 
Independence avenue, and Minsk’s two metro lines have their transit point under 
Kastrychnitskaia. Still, people rarely stop at the square, merely pass by beneath any event 
on the surface above. 
The buildings on Kastrychnitskaia include the Palace of the Republic, the Palace of 
Culture; a construction site where the museum to the Great Patriotic War stood until 
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2014;35 and a business centre. Across Independence Avenue, between Kastrychnitskaia 
and the presidential administration, lies Aliaksandraŭski skver, one of Minsk’s oldest 
parks, dating from the 19th Century. In the area, there are several institutions of high 
culture: the Ianka Kupala National Theatre, the Music academy, the Palace of Culture 
and the House of Officers – now mainly used as a concert house. Some concerts are also 
arranged in the Palace of the Republic. The common denominator for virtually all the 
buildings on and around the square is that they are government-controlled. 
Even though Kastrychnitskaia is large, central, and surrounded by several buildings of 
high culture, it is not widely used by people. It is a place where, except the ‘giant 
sarcophagus’ itself, there is nothing to look at, virtually nothing going on and nowhere to 
sit. 36  There are some cafés and a Belarusian language club in the Palace, but, as 
mentioned above, people prefer the cafes on Zybitskaia street. 
On this basis, Kastrychnitskaia could be considered part of a small number of paths, 
rather than a node. Despite its central location, it is underused. Respondents describe it 
as empty, Soviet and cold, and less visible than Nezalezhnastsi. 
To sum up, people tend to avoid the central parts of Minsk, along Independence avenue, 
where most of the political institutions are situated; and even though both of the two 
protest squares, Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi, are parts of the paths some people 
make, they are rarely used as nodes, i.e. few people are travelling to get there specifically. 
On this basis it can be concluded that the social elements of Minsk is not particularly 
helpful for putting protests in the spotlight. 
Physical elements 
In this final section I shall look at the physical elements of the two squares, 
Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi. I argue that the physical attributes of these squares 
have contributed to the failure of the mass protests in 2006 and 2010. 
Kastrychnitskaia and Ploshcha 2006 
As shown above, Kastrychnitskaia is a large square. 22000 of its approximately 27400 
m2 occupy an open, rectangular space in front of the Palace of the Republic. The square 
has two narrow openings to Internationalists street on either side of the Palace; the left 
side is bordered by Engels Street; the right, by two buildings and a construction site; and 
the fourth side, by Independence Avenue. The spaces on the left and right sides of the 
Palace are narrow, partly because of a parking lot on the left and a pool of fountains on 
the right. The virtually impenetrable facades on the left and the right sides limit movement 
on the square to Internationalists Street and Independence Avenue.37  
                                                 
35 It has now moved to the Victors’ avenue (Praspekt Peramozhtsaŭ), and it is unclear what will take its 
place. One of the proposed projects is an administrative office centre in a traditional imperial style, 
similar to the style of the Palace of Culture (Onliner, 2016). 
36 A few times, while living in Minsk, I agreed to meet people by the 0-km sign. I vividly recall how 
boring the square seemed as a meeting place, especially if my friends were late. 
37 It is unclear if there are entrances to Kastrychnitskaia on the square’s right. None of my respondents 
could say if there are ways to enter the square from this side. Yaraslaŭ recollects a tall fence between the 
buildings. 
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Milinkevich lists three reasons for why the protesters chose Kastrychnitskaia for their 
Ploshcha in 2006: “It is central, on it most of the authorities’ festive events […] and in 
addition, it could fit up to 50 thousand citizens.”38 
 
 
Figure 6 Kastrychnitskaia (October square): 1) Palace of the republic; 2) Parking; 3) Screen; 4) 0-km sign; 
5) Palace of Culture; 6) Construction site; 7) Business centre; 8) Svabody (Freedom square); 9) Music 
academy; 10) Aliaksandraŭski skver; 11) Tribune; 12) Ianki Kupaly National Theatre; 13) House of 
Officers; 14) Presidential Administration. Illustration: Arve Hansen. 
Because Kastrychnitskaia is empty of landmarks, there are few natural focal points. If 
one wants to address a crowd, the most central elevation points are a few steps up the 
stairs surrounding the Palace, between the massive columns of the building. This vantage 
point not only excludes the audience on the square’s right and left side, it also puts the 
speaker symbolically in the shadow of Lukashėnka’s success. Probably because of this, 
the opposition decided to speak to the crowds from between the columns of the Palace of 
Culture instead (Khashchevatskiĭ, 2007), with similar problems of lateral visibility. 
The Soviet architects had considered this lack of a focal point, and in 1957 they made 
an elevated tribune in the wall on Aliaksandraŭski skver, from which officials could 
address the people on Kastrychnitskaia on official occasions. Yet the tribune is only 
                                                 
38 “[Яна] цэнтральная, на ёй адбываецца большасць святочных уладных мерапрыемстваў […] і да 
таго ж там магло змясціцца да 50 тысяч грамадзян.” 
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accessible through locked gates, and as will soon become apparent, the authorities can 
easily block access to the entire park. 
Communication on Kastrychnitskaia is further hampered by a large screen, which faces 
the square from one of its corners. The screen usually shows one of the official news 
channels, and the loudspeakers are powerful enough to potentially drown out any 
challenge to the official propaganda. (Yaraslaŭ) 
 
 
Figure 7 The Wall on Aliaksandraŭski. Photo: Anonymous 
Milinkevich goes on to explain that the main reason for protesting at Kastrychnitskaia 
was its proximity to the president. One might expect, then, that protesters occupying 
Kastrychnitskaia would take the opportunity to demonstrate outside the presidential 
administration. However, such intentions face significant obstacles, the first of these 
being to cross the eight lanes of Independence Avenue. Next, the natural choice would be 
to walk straight through Aliaksandraŭski to the presidential administration. A convenient 
location to expand to, if protests outgrew the space on Kastrychnitskaia, Aliaksandraŭski 
is, however, closed off by its surrounding stone fence and the park’s few entrances can 
be easily blocked by a few police officers. This in effect turns the park into an obstacle 
for the masses. An alternative path to the presidential administration is found on the right 
side of Aliaksandraŭski, but this path runs up several flights of stairs to a narrow strip of 
space between the walls of Aliaksandraŭski and the House of Officers. This makes the 
alternative route easily controlled as well. The only remaining option is to go via Engels 
Street, a predictable route which law enforcement personnel would easily be capable, and 
well prepared, to close off. 
One evening [in 2006] the organisers led the crowd in the direction of the 
presidential administration […]. Just as we got to the theatre, they turned us back 
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[…]. They were defending the administration well. Everybody felt the 
truncheons39 (Paŭliuk) 
Dzmitry (switching to Russian) recounts a similar situation in 2004: “We went there on 
the Engels street. We got to the corner of the administration, but buses with special forces 
had already arrived. They started to beat us, to detain, to thrash.”40 
On the other side of the Palace of the Republic, police could control movement by 
blocking the two ends of Internationalists’ Street. This area is well suited for police 
manoeuvres such as ‘kettling’ (surrounding) of the protesters, and limiting their 
movement to Independence Avenue. In 2006, police controlled all the sides surrounding 
the protests, and could stop and arrest people going to and from the protest camp. “They 
quite successfully blocked the square. They did not allow cars to stop, and they prevented 
people from bringing food.”41 (Piatro). During the night of March 24, riot police were 
deployed to the square, quickly removing the tents and arresting the protesters. 
Nezalezhnastsi and Ploshcha 2010 
As a protest space, Nezalezhnastsi has some assets worth mentioning. It is easy to get to, 
larger than Kastrychnitskaia (approximately 40000 m2) and is surrounded by a few 
buildings of symbolic value to the protesters, such as The Red Church and the university. 
Still, the descriptions my respondents, as well as other observers, give of the square are 
less encouraging: 
[Nezalezhnastsi] in Minsk, Belarus’s sad capital, is one of the most terrifying 
public spaces in Europe. It is nothing but concrete, steel, glass and fearsome 
horizons – no benches, shelter, or anything for people who might wish to do 
something so normal as to assemble and speak together. Where anything vertical 
rises from the ground, it bears a video camera, ensuring that any gathering can 
be observed by the Belarusian KGB. (Snyder, 2010) 
Although Snyder might be mistaken about the benches (the square has quite a few), 
Nezalezhnastsi is indeed little more than hard surfaces and “fearsome horizons”. 
Statkevich also talks about the practical problems with the square after the 2006 
reconstruction: 
There is no single area there. There are separate places, disturbed by these 
domes. There are many of them and citizens of Minsk jokingly call the square 
the Industrial Greenhouse. It is possible to fit tens of thousands of people there, 
but it will be a little separated area.42  
                                                 
39 “Один вечер [в 2006 г.] организаторы повели толпу в направлении администрации президента 
[…]. Как только дошли до театра, всех там развернули […]. Администрацию защищали очень 
хорошо. Дубинками получили все.”  
40 “Мы ходили туда […] по Энгельса. Мы дошли до угла администрации, но туда уже подъехали 
автобусы со спецназовцами. Они нас начали бить, задерживать, молотить.” 
41 “Довольно успешно блокировали площади. Не позволяли машинам останавливаться и запретили 
людям приносить еду” 
42 “Единого большого пространства там нет, там есть отдельные места, разбитые этими куполами 
там. Их очень много и минчане называют в шутку эту площадь парниковый комбинат. Там можно 
разместить десятки тысяч людей, но это будет немного разбитое пространство.” 
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For the sake of clarity, in figure 8, I have divided the square into three main parts: The 
Left: The rectangular shaped space between the Lenin statue and Independence avenue. 
This is quite open, apart from a few flowerbeds and a glass dome in one end. The Right: 
The space between The Left and Hotel Minsk. This part is the biggest, but is crowded by 
flowerbeds, glass domes, benches and fountains. The Pocket: The small square behind 
Lenin, between the walls of the House of Government. 
As Nezalezhnastsi is a long space with numerous obstacles and virtually without 
elevations, the problem of the absence of a good focal point applies here, too. For people 
on the Left, Lenin is a natural place to look at, but it is not as visible for people on the 
Right. On the Right, only the Church of Saints Simon and Helena offers a good focal 
point, but the many objects obstructing the view would divide spectators into separate 
clusters. 
In 2010, the opposition leaders therefore chose the former option and spoke from the 
Lenin statue’s platform – dwarfed by the giant Lenin and with the House of Government 
towering behind them. 
Figure 8 Nezalezhnastsi (Independence square): 1) House of Government; 2) Lenin monument; 3) Church 
of Saints Simon and Helena; 4) Hotel Minsk; 5) Belarusian State Pedagogical University; 6) Belarusian 
State University; 7) Post Office. Illustration: Arve Hansen 
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After an alleged provocation, the riot police went in to clear the square. According to 
Vital’, the square was cleared in 7 minutes, despite the amounts of protesters assembled 
there; according to Paŭliuk, it took only 5 minutes. Perhaps less prone to exaggeration, 
Statkevich claims it took considerably longer, perhaps 30 or 40 minutes. Even so, this can 
hardly be described as a difficult or a long-lasting police operation. The group of people, 
gathered in the Pocket and on the Lenin statue’s platform, quickly became trapped by 
police who came in from Soviet Street and blocked off the only exit. The rest of the 
protesters on the Left and the Right were also soon ‘kettled in’ by police between 
Independence avenue and the buildings to the north: 
The first part cordoned off the whole square in a ring. They ran on the perimeter 
of the avenue […]. We saw that everything up to Hotel Minsk was cordoned off. 
They just chased us and parted us in groups in rings, and threw us into buses.43 
(Katsiaryna) 
Thus, the riot police used the square’s architecture to efficiently and brutally put an end 
to the second Belarusian Ploshcha. It will appear, then, that both Kastrychnitskaia and 
Nezalezhnastsi are easily surrounded and controlled, despite their differences in size and 
shape. In this manner, the physical elements of Minsk itself constitute a major challenge 
for public demonstrations and their organisers. 
                                                 
43 “Першая частка ўзяла ўсю плошчу в ацапленне кальцо. Яні беглі па перыметру праспекту […]. 
Мы пабачалі, што да гатэля ‘Мінск’ усё ацэплена. Нас проста гналі і людзей разбіралі на групы ў 
такія кольцы, і закідвалі ў аўтобусы.” 
Figure 9 House of Government. CC-BY-3.0 Photo: Wikimedia, Alexander Groshev 
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Conclusions 
In the introduction, I stated that space is a potentially important condition for collective 
action, and my aim for this article was to demonstrate this by applying a spatial 
perspective on mass protests in Minsk. 
Belarus is an autocratic country, and the opposition is faced with many obstacles, such 
as state controlled media, a weak national identity and a large security apparatus willing 
to use force to repress protests. Still, people have on occasions dared into the public space 
of Minsk in large numbers to protest against their current leadership, notably the 
opposition went to the streets in large numbers in 2006 and 2010. When analysing the 
success or failure of such collective actions, in addition to asking what external and 
internal conditions are present, I argue that we should also be looking at the protests from 
a spatial perspective: “What space are the protesters using?”, “Why?” and “How are 
protests affected by this space?” By asking these questions in the case of Minsk, we see 
that the Belarusian opposition is faced with considerable spatial obstacles: 
The opposition does not have much room to choose from; only two squares are large 
enough to contain tens of thousands of protesters and, at the same time, be in proximity 
to the political centre. However, these two squares, Kastrychnitskaia and Nezalezhnastsi, 
are presenting obstacles to the opposition and enhancing the strategies used by 
Lukashėnka to stay in power. 1) The perceived elements of Minsk as well as the two 
protests squares are associated with the Soviet Union, Lukashėnka’s success and the 
disappointment of failed protests, and thus do not have a preferable symbolic value to the 
largely pro-European opposition. 2) Additionally, the social elements of the city divide 
the city into political space (on and in proximity to Independence Avenue) and public 
space (where the citizens’ nodes are). In a society where the media are controlled by the 
state, protests might thus go unnoticed by large segments of the population. 3) This latter 
point is especially important, given that the physical elements of the squares makes 
policing particularly easy and swift, reducing the duration of the protests and lessening 
the possibility of people learning about them – not to mention reaching the city centre in 
time before the protests are over. The physical elements of the squares also limit the 
protesters’ communication, movement and flexibility. 
I therefore conclude that a spatial perspective should be included in research on 
collective actions, because it might, as in the case of Minsk, be an additional contributory 
condition for their success or failure. 
The spatial perspective would benefit from being further tested on cases, where mass 
protests have had a variety of outcomes. Preferably, the next step would be to analyse a 
city with a similar history, culture or architecture as Minsk, such as Moscow or Chișinău. 
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